Google Still Charging Advertisers for Conversion-Inflation Traffic from WhenU Spyware updated January 7, 2010

When an advertiser buys a pay-per-click ad and subsequently makes a sale, it’s natural to assume that sale resulted primarily from the PPC vendor’s efforts on the advertiser’s behalf. But tricky PPC platforms take advantage of this assumption by referring purchases that would have happened anyway. Then, when advertisers evaluate the PPC traffic they bought, they overvalue this “conversion inflation” traffic — leading advertisers to overbid and overpay.

In this piece, I show Google and its partners still covering popular sites with PPC advertisements promoting those same sites. I present the role of InfoSpace, the Google partner at the core of these misplacements, and I argue that Google should long ago have severed its ties to InfoSpace. I cite specific Google promises that these placements violate, and I critique Google’s contractual disclaimers that claim advertisers must pay for these bogus placements. Finally, I propose specific actions Google should take to satisfy to its obligations to advertisers.

Google and Its Partners Still Covering Advertisers’ Sites with Spyware-Delivered Popups

WhenU covers Continental with its own Google ads -- charging ad fees for traffic Continental would otherwise receive for free
WhenU covers Continental with its own Google ads — chargingad fees for traffic Continental would otherwise receive for free

As shown in the thumbnail at right and detailed in screenshots, video, and packet log, WhenU continues to cover web sites with PPC popups. Crucially, those popups show Google ads — often promoting the very same sites users are already browsing.

In the example shown at right, I browsed the Continental Airlines site. WhenU opened the popup shown at right — covering the Continental site with a list of Google ads, putting a prominent Continental ad front-and-center. Thus, Google charges Continental a fee to access a user already at Continental’s site. That’s a rotten deal for Continental: For one, an advertiser should not have to pay to reach a user already at its site. Furthermore, advertisers paying high Google prices deserve high-quality ad placements, not spyware popups.

The details of the Continental ad, as shown in the WhenU-Google popup, further entice users to click. The ad promises a “low fare guarantee” — suggesting that users who book some other way (without clicking the ad) may not enjoy that guarantee. And the ad promises to take users to the “official site” — suggesting that users who don’t click the ad will book through a site that is less than official. In fact both suggestions are inaccurate, but a reasonable user would naturally reach these conclusions based on the wording of the advertisement and the context of its appearance.

The WhenU-Google popup lacks the labeling specifically required by FTC policy. In particular, all sponsored search ads are to be labeled as such, pursuant to the FTC ‘s 2002 instructions. But look closely at the popup screenshot. On my ordinary 800×600 screen, no such label appears. I gather the required label would ordinarily appear on a sufficiently large screen, but the FTC’s policies make no exceptions for users with small to midsized screens. Indeed, as netbooks gain popularity, small screens are increasingly common.

The diagram below (left) confirms the specific intermediaries passing traffic from WhenU to Google in this instance.

The money trail: how funds flow from advertisers to Google to WhenU
(three examples persisting over ten months)
December 2009

PPC advertisers
(e.g. Continental)
money viewers
   Google   
money viewers
InfoSpace
money viewers
LocalPages
money viewers
(unknown company*)
money viewers
WhenU

PPC advertisers
(e.g. RCN)
money viewers
   Google   
money viewers
InfoSpace
money viewers

*  LocalPages
money viewers
Nbcsearch
money viewers
LocalPages

money viewers
WhenU

PPC advertisers
(e.g. Verizon)
money viewers
   Google   
money viewers
InfoSpace
money viewers
LocalPages
money viewers
WhenU

This observation marks the third sequence by which I have observed Google paying WhenU to cover advertisers’ sites with the advertisers’ own Google ads. The center and right diagrams (above) show the intermediaries in my May 2009 and February 2009 observations of similar placements.

The Impropriety of Google’s Relationship with InfoSpace

In all three instances I reported (as summarized in the diagram above), Google’s closest link is to InfoSpace. That is, Google pays InfoSpace, and InfoSpace pays the various entities that follow. In my view, Google’s relationship with InfoSpace is ill-advised for at least three reasons:

First, InfoSpace has a track record of improper placements of Google ads. InfoSpace is implicated in all three of the placements detailed above — misplacements that have continued over a lengthy period despite ample notice and opportunity for correction. Furthermore, I have personally observed other improper placements by InfoSpace. (Perhaps I’ll post more in a futher piece.) Google need not continue to do business with a distributor with such a poor track record.

Second, Google does not need a distributor whose business model entails farming out ad placements to subdistributors. If InfoSpace’s subdistributors seek to distribute Google ads, and to be paid for doing so, let them apply directly to Google and undergo Google’s ordinary quality control and oversight. Inserting InfoSpace as an additional intermediary serves only to lessen accountability.

Third, InfoSpace’s corporate history undermines any request for lenience or forgiveness. The Seattle Times chronicles InfoSpace’s accounting fraud in a three-part investigative report, “Dot-Con Job“, presenting 12,000+ words of analysis as well as primary source documents and even voicemail recordings. The Seattle Times byline summarizes their findings: “Investors were cashing out millions, and faithful investors were left with pennies.” Hardly a mark of trustworthiness!

These Ads Violate Google’s Promises to Users

These ad placements fall short of Google’s promises to users. By paying spyware vendors to show advertisements, Google both enlarges and prolongs the spyware problem. In particular, Google’s funding supports software that users struggle to remove from their computers. Google’s payments make it more profitable for vendors to sneak such software onto users’ computers in the first place.

Furthermore, Google’s Software Principles specifically disallow WhenU’s practices. Google’s “installation” and “upfront disclosure” principles disallow deceptive and nonconsensual WhenU installations. (I have video proof on file showing nonconsensual WhenU installations.) Google’s prohibition on “snooping” prohibits certain WhenU privacy practices, including WhenU’s historic violation of its own privacy policy (transmitting full page URLs despite a privacy policy promising “As the user surfs the Internet, URLS visited by the user … are NOT transmitted to WhenU.com or any third party server”).

Crucially, Google’s partnership with WhenU directly contradicts Google’s call for software makers and advertising intermediaries to “keep[] good company” by supervising partners. Despite that commitment, present on Google’s site for 4+ years, Google inexplicably continues its relationship with WhenU.

These Ads Violate Google’s Promises to Advertisers

These ad placements also fall short of Google’s obligations to advertisers. For example, when Google describes its Search Network, Google promises:

Ads are targeted based on a user’s search terms.   (emphasis added)

But here, the user performed no search — so there was no proper cause to display a Search Network ad or charge an advertiser a high Search Network price.

Google confirms:

On the Search Network, ads are shown … on … the search results pages of … Google’s search partners … within the Search Network. On our search partners, your ads may appear alongside or above search results, as part of a results page as a user navigates through a site’s directory, or on other relevant search pages.   (emphasis added)

A placement through a spyware popup does not meet these criteria: A spyware popup is not a “page.” Furthermore, a user browsing an ordinary web site (like the Continental site shown above) is neither “search[ing]” nor navigating a “directory,” contrary to Google’s promise that search ads are shown to users at search engines and directories.

Despite these clear promises, Google’s AdWords Terms and Conditions purport to allow these placements and any others Google might choose to foist on unsuspecting advertisers. Google requires advertisers to accept the following form contract provisions:

Customer understands and agrees that ads may be placed on … (z) any other content or property provided by a third party (‘Partner’) upon which Google places ads (‘Partner Property’).   (emphasis added)

That’s circular, uninformative, and a rotten deal. Advertisers should demand better. Nor should Google’s fine print claim the right to impose such bogus charges. Google should amend its contract to disavow charges from spyware, adware, conversion-inflation, and other schemes contrary to Google’s affirmative promises.

What Google Should Do

Google’s first step is easy: Fire InfoSpace. Google doesn’t need InfoSpace, and there’s zero reason for this relationship to continue in light of InfoSpace’s repeated failings.

Google also needs to pay restitution to affected advertisers. Every time Google charges an advertiser for a click that comes from InfoSpace, Google relies on InfoSpace’s promise that the click was legitimate, genuine, and lawfully obtained. But there is ample reason to doubt these promises. Google should refund advertisers for corresponding charges — for all InfoSpace traffic if Google cannot reliably determine which InfoSpace traffic is legitimate. These refunds should apply immediately and across-the-board — not just to advertisers who know how to complain or who manage to assemble exceptional documentation of the infraction. (Indeed, in response to my May 2009 report, I know Google provided a credit to RCN — the specific advertiser whose targeting I happened to feature in my example. But I gather Google failed to provide automatic credits to all affected advertisers, even though Google’s billing records provide ample documentation of which advertisers faced charges from which Google partners. And I understand that Google denied requests for refunds or credits from other affected advertisers.)

More generally, Google must live up to the responsibility of spending other people’s money. Through its Search Network offering, Google takes control of advertisers’ budgets and decides, unilaterally, where to place advertisers’ ads. (Indeed, for Search Network purchases, Google to this day fails to tell advertisers what sites show their ads. Nor does Google allow opt-outs on a site-by-site basis — policies that also ought to change.) Spending others’ money, wisely and responsibly, is a weighty undertaking. Google should approach this task with significantly greater diligence and care than current partnerships indicate. Amending its AdWords T&C’s is a necessary step in this process: Not only should Google do better, but contracts should confirm Google’s obligation to offer refunds when Google falls short.

I’m disappointed by how little has changed since my year-ago reports of these same practices. In a conference presentation in February 2009, I demonstrated substantially similar WhenU placements, with Google’s Rose Hagan (Senior Trademark Counsel) present in the audience. In May 2009 I wrote up these WhenU placements on my web site in great detail. Yet ten months later, the problem continues unabated. Indeed, the other misplacements I identified in May 2009 also continue: Google continues partnering with IAC SmileyCentral (deceptive browser plug-ins that induce searches when users attempt navigations), placing ads on typosquatting sites (including sites that show a company’s own ads when users mistype that company’s domain name), and, through Google Chrome, inviting users to search (and click prominent top-of-page ads) when direct navigation would better satisfy users’ requests and avoid unnecessary advertising costs for advertisers. I’m disappointed by the lack of progress when, in each instance, the improper charges are clear and well-documented. Google’s intransigence confirms the need for the Bill of Rights for Online Advertisers I proposed this fall.

Measuring the Perpetrators and Funders of Typosquatting

Moore, Tyler, and Benjamin Edelman. “Measuring the Perpetrators and Funders of Typosquatting.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer-Verlag. Financial Cryptography and Data Security: Proceedings of the International Conference 6052 (2010). (Introduction, Web appendix.)

We describe a method for identifying “typosquatting”, the intentional registration of misspellings of popular website addresses. We estimate that at least 938,000 typosquatting domains target the top 3,264 .com sites, and we crawl more than 285,000 of these domains to analyze their revenue sources. We find that 80% are supported by pay-per-click ads, often advertising the correctly spelled domain and its competitors. Another 20% include static redirection to other sites. We present an automated technique that uncovered 75 otherwise legitimate websites which benefited from direct links from thousands of misspellings of competing websites. Using regression analysis, we find that websites in categories with higher pay-per-click ad prices face more typosquatting registrations, indicating that ad platforms such as Google AdWords exacerbate typosquatting. However, our investigations also confirm the feasibility of significantly reducing typosquatting. We find that typosquatting is highly concentrated: of typo domains showing Google ads, 63% use one of five advertising IDs, and some large name servers host typosquatting domains as much as four times as often as the web as a whole.

Who Owns Metrics?: Building a Bill of Rights for Online Advertisers

Edelman, Benjamin. “Who Owns Metrics?: Building a Bill of Rights for Online Advertisers.” Journal of Advertising Research 49, no. 4 (December 2009). (Adapted from Towards a Bill of Rights for Online Advertisers.)

I offer five rights to protect advertisers from increasingly powerful ad networks-avoiding fraudulent charges for services not rendered, guaranteeing data portability so advertisers get the best possible value, and assuring price transparency so advertisers know what they’re buying. I explain the need for these rights by presenting specific practices causing particular concern.

Red Light States: Who Buys Online Adult Entertainment?

Edelman, Benjamin. “Red Light States: Who Buys Online Adult Entertainment?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 23, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 209-220.

This paper studies the adult online entertainment industry, particularly the consumption side of the market. In particular, it focuses on the demographics and consumption patterns of those who subscribe to adult entertainment websites. On the surface, this business would seem to face a number of obstacles. Regulatory and legal barriers have already been mentioned. In addition, those charging for access to adult entertainment face competition from similar content available without a fee. In the context of adult entertainment, free access offers consumers an extra benefit: online payments tend to create records documenting the fact of a customer’s purchase; consumers of free content may feel more confident that their purchases will remain confidential. More broadly, measured levels of religiosity in America are high. On the other hand, social critics often argue that the rise of Internet pornography is contributing to a coarsening of American culture. Do consumption patterns of online adult entertainment reveal two separate Americas? Or is the consumption of online adult entertainment widespread, regardless of legal barriers, potential for embarrassment, and even religious conviction?

Personal Rapid Transport

This page indexes my writings about Personal Rapid Transport.

Deception in Post-Transaction Marketing updated December 5, 2009

Post-transaction marketers Webloyalty, Vertrue, and Affinion have attracted criticism for solicitations that tend to deceive consumers. They typically feature recurring billing programs that promise a savings or discount, but actually charge users on an ongoing basis. They promote these services while customers are finishing the checkout process at trusted e-commerce sites — a time when few users expect unrelated offers from third parties. Furthermore, they obtain consumers’ credit card numbers from partner sites — so a user may enter a billing relationship and face credit card charges without providing a card number to the company that posts the charges.

In this posting, I present key primary source documents (internal company emails and analyses and reports from victim consumers) as well as outside analyses (a Senate staff report and testimony from hearing witnesses including my own statement for the record).

Higlights of my Statement for the Record: I argue that the timing, placement, and format of post-transaction offers deceptively suggest that the offers are part of the checkout process. (3) I suggest that automatic transfer of consumers’ payment information removes a key warning that customers are incurring a financial obligation. (3-4) I examine disclosures and find them inadequate to cure the deception resulting from the substance, format, and context of the offers. (5) I point out that credit card network rules disallow key post-transaction marketing practices, and I suggest that credit card networks enforce these rules. (6-7) I suggests that low usage rates support an inference of deception, and I provide an empirical strategy to estimate usage rates from publicly-available sources. (7)

Details:

Deception in Post-Transaction Marketing

In a subsequent analysis, I cite, quote, and analyze relevant credit card network rules — finding that those requirements disallow key post-transaction marketing practices:

Payment Card Network Rules Prohibit Aggressive Post-Transaction Tactics

Personal Rapid Transport at Vectus, Ltd. (teaching materials)

Edelman, Benjamin. “Personal Rapid Transport at Vectus, Ltd.” Harvard Business School Case 910-010, November 2009. (Revised September 2010.) (Featured in Working Knowledge: Can Entrepreneurs Drive People Movers to Success?) (educator access at HBP. courtesy copy.)

Personal Rapid Transport (PRT) vehicles—often called “driverless taxis”—sought to combine the best characteristics of cars, taxis, and trains, while adding features unavailable in any existing transportation system. Like cars and taxis, PRT vehicles carried small groups—often just a single passenger—with no need to wait for a shared vehicle to arrive or for others to board. Yet PRT followed train systems in using an exclusive right of way that avoided delays from other traffic. Where would such systems be most useful? Could system designers successfully compete with well-established networks of trains, buses, cars, and roads?

Teaching Materials:

Personal Rapid Transport at Vectus, Ltd. – Teaching Note (HBP 910024)

The Dark Underbelly of Online Advertising

Edelman, Benjamin. “The Dark Underbelly of Online Advertising.” HBR Now. (November 17, 2009).

The Internet is sold to advertisers as a highly measurable medium that is the most efficient way to target exactly the right customers. But online advertising is also easily subverted–letting fraudsters claim advertising fees for work they did not actually do. The trickiest frauds deceive advertisers so effectively that measurements of ad effectiveness report the fraudsters as exceptionally productive and high quality, rather than revealing that their traffic was actually worthless. This is a quiet scandal. In a time of tightening ad budgets, losses to advertising fraud come straight from the bottom line–but savings can be equally dramatic. Here’s a look behind the veil–an explanation of ad practices that have cheated even the Web’s largest advertisers. Advertising scams take plenty of victims, both witting and not, but I offer strategies to help determined marketers protect themselves.

Deception in Post-Transaction Marketing Offers

Edelman, Benjamin. “Deception in Post-Transaction Marketing Offers.” U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, November 2009.

I examine the consumer protection issues raised by post-transaction marketing offers. My key concerns:

  • Post‐transaction marketing offers systematically reach consumers in a time when consumers are particularly vulnerable. Post‐transaction offers feature deceptive designs that invite consumers to conclude, mistakenly, that the offers comes from the companies the consumers have chosen to frequent, and that the offers are a required part of the checkout process.
  • The automatic transfer of consumers’ payment information from a merchant to a post ‐ transaction marketer runs contrary to consumer expectations, and creates a heightened risk that consumers will “accept” financial obligations they did not intend to incur.
  • Disclosures fail to cure the deception created by post-transaction offers, their timing and formatting, and their automatic transfer of consumers’ payment information.
  • Straightforward remedies could protect consumers who have suffered unwanted charges, and could prevent further consumers from incurring similar charges.