Auditing Spyware Advertising Fraud: Wasted Spending at VistaPrint

“VistaPrint is disciplined in operation … [VistaPrint’s] marketing [uses] highly analytically driven fact-based decision-making … [W]e manage those [marketing partners] tightly.”

– VistaPrint CEO Robert Keane in a January 2008 earnings call

For more than four years, I’ve been monitoring online advertising — alerting advertisers, ad networks, and the general public when ad spending finds its way to spyware vendors and when advertisers are getting cheated. (Examples: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) Every day, my Automatic Spyware Tester browses the web on multiple spyware-infected PCs, watching for spyware-delivered advertising and recording its observations in videos and packet logs.

Although VistaPrint’s Robert Keane claims to effectively oversee VistaPrint’s marketing practices, I emphatically disagree. To the contrary, I’ve seen ample evidence of VistaPrint promoted by spyware and adware programs that sneak onto users’ computers without consent (including through security exploits) and through ruse and deception. In many instances, including as detailed in the examples that follow, the corresponding affiliates trick marketing analytics — claiming commission on sales that would have happened anyway, and thereby overstating the true effectiveness of their marketing efforts.

When VistaPrint is cheated by rogue marketing partners, the costs fall in the first instance to VistaPrint shareholders. Every dollar wasted on worthless advertising leaves that much less for corporate profits, and VistaPrint’s advertising budget is already strikingly large: In 2008, VistaPrint marketing consumed 31.9% of revenue (more than $125 million) while profits were just 9.9% ($39.7 million). Meanwhile, fraud against VistaPrint also harms the general public: Consumers suffer unwanted installations of spyware programs funded, in part, by theft from VistaPrint.

The following table summarizes my recent observations of fraud against VistaPrint:

Ad network Example incident Rogue VistaPrint incidents observed
August – September 2008 January – July 2008
Number of affiliates Number of dates Number of observations Number of observations
Lynxtrack Vomba, Hydra Network Affiliate 19934 6 13 18 32
Clickbooth Vomba, Clickbooth Affiliate 14941
WhenU, MediaTraffic, Iadsdirect, Clickbooth Affiliate 7781
5 13 14 14
CPA Builder (including traffic from Revenue Gateway, from OptInRealBig / CPAEmpire, and from XY7) Zango, Revenue Gateway Affiliate 12489, CPA Empire, CPA Builder 2 8 9 21
CX Digital Media (Incentaclick) Vomba, Weclub, CX Digital Media Affiliate 13736 2 2 2 18
Performics (Google) Deluxe Communications, Smartyseek, Performics 1 5 5 5
direct relationships & other networks
not yet tabulated in full – some examples on file

During August-September 2008, my AutoTester repeatedly observed VistaPrint facing rogue traffic coming from five different ad networks. In the sections that follow, this piece presents an example of fraud by an affiliate from each of the specified networks. But I’ve seen plenty more. My AutoTester has been running for more than a year — preserving tens of thousands of records of online advertising fraud, including 133 other spyware incidents arising out of traffic to VistaPrint. These many incidents confirm the breadth of improper practices by VistaPrint’s marketing partners.

Example 1: Vomba, Hydra Network Affiliate 19934 Claiming Commission on VistaPrint’s Organic/Type-In Traffic

Vomba, Lynxtrack Affiliate 19334 Targeting VistaPrintVomba, Hydra Network Affiliate 19334 Targeting VistaPrint

In testing on September 12, my AutoTester browsed VistaPrint’s site on a computer with Vomba (from Integrated Search Technologies, makers of Slotchbar, XXXtoolbar, WhenU, AdVantage, and more). Vomba popped open a window that sent traffic to Hydra Network (LynxTrack) (affiliate 19934), and Hydra Network in turn forwarded the traffic back to VistaPrint. The result was the screen shown at right — the original VistaPrint window at left/back, with a new popup at front/right.

Crucially, both web browser windows share a single set of cookies. Whether the user buys from the original VistaPrint window or from the popup, cookies tell VistaPrint that this Hydra Network affiliate caused the sale. So VistaPrint will pay this affiliate a commission — even though, in fact, the affiliate did nothing whatsoever to facilitate the sale. I call this tactic “self-targeting” — reflecting that Vomba covers VistaPrint with its own ad. All of the examples presented on this page entail spyware/adware performing this kind of self-targeting attack.

My AutoTester preserved a video of this incident and a packet log of the underlying network traffic.

My AutoTester observed this same affiliate using the same method on three different dates in August-September 2008. My AutoTester also observed five other Hydra Network affiliates similarly defrauding VistaPrint. All told, in August-September, my AutoTester observed 18 such incidents on 13 distinct dates.

My AutoTester’s records indicate that Hydra Network receives substantial spyware-originating traffic. Looking back to June 2007, across all my AutoTester’s browsing, my AutoTester has seen a remarkable 1,287 instances of spyware sending traffic to/through Hydra Network.

Example 2: Vomba, Clickbooth Affiliate 14941 Claiming Commission on VistaPrint’s Organic/Type-In Traffic

In testing on September 12, my AutoTester browsed VistaPrint’s site, again on a computer with Vomba. Vomba popped open a window that sent traffic to Clickbooth (affiliate 14941), and Clickbooth in turn forwarded the traffic back to VistaPrint.

Because both web browser windows share a single set of cookies, this Clickbooth affiliate gets paid a commission whether the user buys from the original VistaPrint window or from the popup. This commission gets paid even though, in fact, the affiliate did nothing whatsoever to facilitate the sale.

My AutoTester preserved a video of this incident and a packet log of the underlying network traffic.

My AutoTester observed this same affiliate using the same tactics on eight different dates in August-September 2008. My AutoTester also observed three other Clickbooth affiliates similarly defrauding VistaPrint. All told, my AutoTester observed 13 such incidents on 12 distinct dates.

My AutoTester’s records indicate that Clickbooth receives substantial spyware-originating traffic. Looking back to June 2007, across all my AutoTester’s browsing, my AutoTester has seen 917 instances of spyware sending traffic to/through Clickbooth.

Example 3: WhenU, MediaTraffic, Iadsdirect, Clickbooth Affiliate 7781 Claiming Commission on VistaPrint’s Organic/Type-In Traffic

In manual testing on September 28, I browsed VistaPrint’s on a computer with WhenU. WhenU opened a popunder that flashed briefly on screen (video at 0:15) but then forced itself to an off-screen location where I could not see it even if I minimize other windows. (See video at 0:24 to 0:30, when I attempted to find the popunder.) By manually right-clicking and choosing “maximize,” I managed to make the popunder visible — confirming that it loaded VistaPrint and noting the affiliate ID number.

Packet log analysis reveals that traffic flowed from WhenU to MediaTraffic (a pay-per-view advertising marketplace also operated by Integrated Search Technologies) to Iadsdirect to Clickbooth (affiliate 7781) to VistaPrint.

As in prior examples, both windows share a single set of cookies. Thus, the WhenU popunder causes the corresponding affiliate to receive a commission if the user makes a purchase — even though the affiliate did nothing to encourage or facilitate a purchase.

I preserved a video of this incident and a packet log of the underlying network traffic.

This advertising fraud by WhenU is particularly notable because WhenU previously claimed to have reformed all unsavory practices. (See e.g. “WhenU CEO Bill Day Cleans House.”) Moreover, WhenU previously touted a TRUSTe Trusted Download certification, and TRUSTe specifically prohibits Trusted Download programs from defrauding advertisers. (See Certification Agreement, Schedule A (“Program Requirements”), provision 14.k.) That said, WhenU has silently left the Trusted Download whitelist. Furthermore, in separate testing of WhenU software, I have recently seen repeated self-targeting fraud improperly claiming commissions from a variety of advertisers.

Example 4: Zango, Revenue Gateway Affiliate 12489, CPA Empire, CPA Builder Claiming Commission on VistaPrint’s Organic/Type-In Traffic

VistaPrint
money viewers
   CPA Builder    
money viewers
   CPA Empire    
money viewers
   Revenue Gateway    
money viewers
Zango

The Money Trail and Traffic Flow

In testing on September 21, my AutoTester browsed VistaPrint’s site on a computer with Zango. Zango popped open a window that sent traffic to Revenue Gateway (affiliate 12489), which redirected to CPA Empire (formerly OptInRealBig), which redirected to CPA Builder, which in turn forwarded the traffic back to VistaPrint.

The chain of intermediaries adds additional complexity to the relationships. But traffic flows in a continuous forward path: From Zango to Revenue Gateway to CPA Empire to CPA Builder and finally back to VistaPrint. Conversely, revenue flows in the opposite direction: From VistaPrint to CPA Builder to CPA Empire to Revenue Gateway to Revenue Gateway affiliate 13425 to Zango. The diagram at right summarizes the flows of traffic and money.

My AutoTester preserved a video of this incident and a packet log of the underlying network traffic.

During August-September 2008, my AutoTester also observed other incidents wherein spyware waited for a user to browse the VistaPrint site, then sent the user back to VistaPrint via CPA Builder. Beyond this Zango / Revenue Gateway / CPA Empire example, I also observed incidents wherein CPA Empire’s relationship with XY7 was the source of the tainted traffic. All told, my AutoTester has preserved more than 600 incidents of spyware sending traffic to/through CPA Empire, as well as at least 24 incidents of spyware sending traffic to/through Revenue Gateway (though I have reason to believe that some Revenue Gateway incidents were not preserved).

Example 5: 8/17/08 – Vomba, Weclub, CX Digital Media (Incentaclick) Affiliate 13736 Claiming Commission on VistaPrint’s Organic/Type-In Traffic

Vomba, Weclub, CX Digital Media Affiliate 13736 Targeting VistaPrint Vomba, Weclub, CX Digital Media Affiliate 13736 Targeting VistaPrint

In testing on August 17, my AutoTester browsed VistaPrint’s site on a computer with Vomba. Vomba popped open a window that sent traffic to Weclub, which immediately redirected to CX Digital Media (Incentaclick), which in turn forwarded the traffic back to VistaPrint.

See the screenshot at right. My AutoTester preserved a video of this incident and a packet log of the underlying network traffic.

During August-September 2008, my AutoTester also observed another CX Digital Media affiliate using spyware to claim commission on VistaPrint’s organic traffic. All told, my AutoTester has preserved more than 200 different incidents of spyware sending traffic to/through CX Digital Media.

Example 6: Deluxe Communications, Smartyseek, Performics Claiming Commission on VistaPrint’s Organic/Type-In Traffic

In testing on September 14, my AutoTester browsed VistaPrint’s site on a computer Deluxe Communications (which I have repeatedly observed installed through security exploits and otherwise without user consent). Deluxe Communication popped open a window that sent traffic to Smartyseek, which immediately redirected to Performics, then back to VistaPrint.

In typical Deluxe Communications fashion, the popup window entirely covered the window the user had been browsing. But because both windows showed VistaPrint, some users might not notice.

My AutoTester preserved a video of this incident and a packet log of the underlying network traffic.

My AutoTester observed this same affiliate using the same tactics on five different dates in August-September 2008, and my AutoTester also observed Performics traffic during VistaPrint browsing on five other (prior) occasions.

Responsibility and Causation

It’s easy to present VistaPrint as perpetrator: VistaPrint fails to adequately oversee its marketing partners. As a result, VistaPrint’s advertising spending helps fund spyware and adware programs that sneak onto users’ PCs, with serious harms to performance, reliability, and privacy.

But I also see an important sense in which VistaPrint is a victim: VistaPrint’s marketing partners are defrauding VistaPrint by claiming commissions on sales they actually did nothing to cause. Such commissions are entirely wasted, yielding no bona fide marketing benefit to VistaPrint.

By all indications, VistaPrint faces significant difficulties in supervising its marketing partners. Yet other major retailers handle such challenges with greater success. For example, it is comparatively rare to see spyware or adware promoting, defrauding, or attempting to defraud Amazon — even though Amazon spends nearly three times as much on marketing as VistaPrint ($344 million to $125 million).

What could VistaPrint do differently? For one, I question VistaPrint’s choice of marketing partners: As the preceding statistics indicate, I have repeatedly and widely seen spyware and adware sending traffic to many of the partners VistaPrint works with. VistaPrint might face less fraud if it favored marketing partners with a track record of successful supervision of their affiliates.

More generally, an affiliate currently faces little real downside to attempting to defraud VistaPrint. If an affiliate gets caught cheating, VistaPrint will terminate that affiliate, but I see little indication that VistaPrint exacts any meaningful penalty to make the affiliate (or the network providing that affiliate) regret its transgression. In Deterring Online Advertising Fraud Through Optimal Payment in Arrears, I suggest a different approach — paying affiliates more slowly so that they face greater losses if they are found to be cheating. Alternatively, VistaPrint might sue affiliates it learns are cheaters, as in eBay v. Digital Point Solutions and Lands’ End v. Remy.

Yet Keane’s remarks (“highly analytically driven fact-based decision-making”) reveal that VistaPrint is at least attempting to supervise its marketing partners to optimize its spending. How, then, could VistaPrint end up facing so much fraud? I suspect VistaPrint’s analytics actually lead the company astray. Consider the tactics presented above, from the perspective of the information easily available to VistaPrint’s marketing staff. Because these affiliates target users who are already interested in VistaPrint, the affiliates’ conversion rates are likely to be well above average. Moreover, because these affiliates incur limited costs, they can accept payments far below what Google might require. Thus, VistaPrint’s staff are likely to assess these affiliates favorably — without realizing that the traffic at issue is traffic VistaPrint would otherwise have gotten for free. Put differently: Although VistaPrint’s measurements may be very precise, they’re inaccurate because VistaPrint misunderstands the sources of affiliates’ traffic.

In attempting to prevent such fraud, VistaPrint should also examine its ad networks’ incentives. Ad networks often mark up affiliates’ fees: For every dollar VistaPrint is slated to pay to a given affiliate, that affiliate’s network takes another (say) $0.20. As a result, ad networks have a clear incentive to tolerate rogue affiliates: Networks make money from each sale credited to an affiliate, so ejecting rogue affiliates would directly reduce the network’s earnings.

The Big Picture

Spyware-based advertising fraud extends far beyond VistaPrint. Most merchants operating affiliate, CPA, or other conversion-contingent programs face similar fraud. But VistaPrint is a large and, purportedly, sophisticated advertiser. So VistaPrint could appropriately lead by example.

I’m overdue to present further examples of spyware and adware continuing to defraud major merchants. Historically my articles have tended to emphasize the largest US affiliate networks — Commission Junction, LinkShare, Performics. But there’s plenty of fraud through smaller networks too, as well as through networks based outside the US. I’ll present additional examples later this fall.

In January, an Anti-Spyware Coalition workshop asked “Is adware dead?” Some panelists responded substantially in the affirmative. But my AutoTester indicates otherwise. I’m pleased to see that big advertisers no longer advertise directly with major adware vendors. Yet a chain of indirection — adware sending traffic to one ad network, which forwards to another, then finally to an advertiser — continues to promote top brands. Furthermore, spyware-delivered banner farms and ad-loaders are becoming increasingly widespread. This month I saw adware still promoting American Express, Apple, and AT&T — to name just a few of the A’s. There’s plenty of work left to be done.

Typosquatting: Unintended Adventures in Browsing

Edelman, Benjamin. “Typosquatting: Unintended Adventures in Browsing.” Cybercrime Gets Personal, McAfee Security Journal (fall 2008): 34-37.

Typosquatting is the practice of registering domain names, identical to or confusingly similar to trademarks and famous names, in hopes that users will accidentally request these sites–whereupon they will receive, typically, advertisements. This piece presents the basic typosquatting business model, based on my analysis of more than 80,000 typosquatting domain names. I analyze the advertising intermediaries that make typosquatting profitable, and I assess the legislation and litigation that are beginning to put a check on this practice.

Consumer Payment Systems — Japan (teaching materials) with Andrei Hagiu

Edelman, Benjamin, and Andrei Hagiu. “Consumer Payment Systems — Japan.” Harvard Business School Case 909-007, August 2008. (Revised May 2009.) (educator access at HBP. request a courtesy copy.)

In 2008, the Japanese consumer payments landscape featured ongoing widespread use of cash, limited use of credit cards and rapid rise of e-money systems based on contactless technology embedded in cards and especially mobile phones. The case details the alliances that created new products, as well as the regulations that sometimes stood in the way. Throughout, the case identifies incentives for both consumers and merchants, including direct costs, efficiency benefits, rebates, and treatment in case of loss or fraud.

Teaching Materials:

Consumer Payment Systems — United States and Japan – Teaching Note (HBP 909039)

Consumer Payment Systems — United States (teaching materials) with Andrei Hagiu

Edelman, Benjamin, and Andrei Hagiu. “Consumer Payment Systems — United States.” Harvard Business School Case 909-006, August 2008. (Revised July 2011.) (educator access at HBP. request a courtesy copy.)

In 2008, the U.S. consumer payments landscape was characterized by the ongoing prevalence of credit and debit card networks, the decline of checks, the rise of stored value cards, and the growth of new payment methods such as PayPal, Bill Me Later, and decoupled debit. This case presents the structure of these payment methods, focusing on incentives for both consumers and merchants, including direct costs, efficiency benefits, rebates, and treatment in case of loss or fraud.

Teaching Materials:

Consumer Payment Systems — United States and Japan – Teaching Note (HBP 909039)

Competition among Sponsored Search Services

Edelman, Benjamin. “Competition among Sponsored Search Services.” U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Task Force on Competition Policy and Antitrust Laws, 2008. (Hearing cancelled.) (Reprinted in Working Knowledge: Google-Yahoo Ad Deal is Bad for Online Advertising.)

Last month I was asked to testify to the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary Task Force on Competition Policy and Antitrust Laws about competition among paid search providers, particularly the proposed Google-Yahoo partnership.

At the last minute, the hearing was cancelled, and I won’t be able to testify at the rescheduled session. Rather than let my draft written statement languish, I’m taking this opportunity to post the prepared testimony I had planned to offer:

Competition among Sponsored Search Services.

PPC Platform Competition and Google’s "May Not Copy" Restriction

By all indications, Google AdWords features far more advertisers than competing PPC platforms such as Yahoo Search Marketing and Microsoft adCenter. (Consider: Search for “thinkpad x60 power supply” at Google, and there are six relevant ads from vendors who actually sell that product. Search at Yahoo Search or Microsoft Live Search, and there are various ads from indexers and aggregators, but only one or two from vendors directly selling the product. Other searches for offbeat, unusual or region-specific keywords show similar patterns.)

Why do more advertisers choose Google? Because more users search at Google, Google can offer wider ad distribution than any single competitor. So if an advertiser had to choose just one ad platform, Google would be the natural choice.

But in principle advertisers can easily use multiple ad platforms. Ads are trivially small plaintext data, and In principle ads can be copied from platform to platform without restriction. So why don’t more Google advertisers use Yahoo, adCenter, and others too?

One possible answer comes from a little-noticed Google AdWords API Terms & Conditions restriction which substantially hinders advertisers’ efforts to use multiple providers — exactly prohibiting software vendors from helping advertisers copy AdWords campaigns to competing platforms. In this article, I identify the restriction at issue, analyze its effects on advertisers and competing ad platforms, critique response from Google, and compare this restriction with Google’s commitment to “data portability” in other contexts.

The Restriction at Issue

To use the Google AdWords API, a software developer must accept Google’s AdWords API Terms & Conditions. The T&C’s include the following requirement:

“Any information collected from an input field used to collect AdWords API Campaign Management Data may be used only to manage and report on AdWords accounts. Similarly, any information or data used as AdWords API Campaign Management Data must have been collected from an input field used only to collect AdWords API Campaign Management Data. For example, the AdWords API Client may not offer a functionality that copies data from a non-AdWords account into an AdWords account or from an AdWords account to a non-AdWords account.” (emphasis added)

Sure enough, searching the web for commercial tools to synchronize PPC campaigns or to export data from Google to competing platforms, I found none.

The “May Not … Cop[y] Data” Prohibition: Effect on Advertisers

The quoted restriction prevents advertisers from easily exporting ads from Google to a competing paid search provider. Consider: The essence of an export procedure is to copy data from an AdWords account to a non-AdWords account — exactly what the restriction prohibits.

Indeed, available export procedures are strikingly complex. For example, to import a Google AdWords campaign into Microsoft adCenter, Microsoft offers a 17-step procedure (with some steps made more complicated by the presence of multiple sub-steps).

Microsoft’s procedure is necessarily convoluted because Google’s “may not … cop[y]” restriction prevents Microsoft, or any other vendor, from writing a tool that connects to the Google API, downloads an advertiser’s ads, and uploads those ads directly to, e.g., Microsoft adCenter. Instead, advertisers must download data manually, reformat it to match adCenter’s requirements, and upload it to Microsoft — just as Microsoft’s lengthy procedure specifies.

For many advertisers, Google’s restrictions on data export impose an ongoing burden even beyond the advertiser’s initial signup with a competing PPC provider. Consider an advertiser that changes its ads or keywords often — perhaps selling seasonal merchandise, or experimenting with alternative advertising strategies. Such an advertiser would typically prefer to make changes in one place, and have the changes automatically propagate to all the advertiser’s PPC platforms. If Google remains the advertiser’s primary PPC provider, the advertiser would probably want to make changes in Google’s interface, then have other PPC platforms optionally automatically copy those changes. But Google’s “may not … cop[y]” restriction applies equally to ongoing resynchronizations. If an advertiser made daily changes to its Google campaigns, it would have to daily repeat the manual export/import process — a task that would be both time-consuming and prone to error.

In short, the net effect of the quoted restriction is to reinforce the tendency of small to medium-sized advertisers to “single-home” — to use only Google AdWords, to the exclusion of competing platforms.

At their peril do advertisers rely solely on Google: If advertisers get stuck using only Google, for lack of any easy and efficient way to buy some traffic elsewhere, Google can charge prices higher than competing platforms. Of course Google can’t raise prices infinitely; at some point, advertisers would overcome the lock-in, accept manual export, and copy ads to competitors. But Google’s “may not copy” restriction increases the costs of multi-homing — letting Google charge that much more than competitors, without advertisers facing compelling incentives to look elsewhere.

The “May Not … Cop[y] Data” Prohibition: Effect on Competing Ad Platforms, on Publishers, and on Users

By encouraging small to medium-sized advertisers to advertise only with Google AdWords, Google’s API restriction reduces the number of advertisers using competing ad platforms. This harms competing platforms in two distinct ways. First, it reduces competitors’ coverage — preventing competitors from featuring relevant ads that pertain to obscure user searches. (Consider the power supply example from the first paragraph of this piece — better and more useful ads at Google.) With fewer relevant ads, the competing platform offers users an inferior service — inviting users to look elsewhere, and reducing the likelihood of a paid click that would earn the platform an advertising fee.

Second, by reducing the number of advertisers bidding for advertising positions at other platforms, the quoted provision dramatically reduces revenue at those platforms. My December 2006 Optimal Auction Design in a Multi-unit Environment estimates the revenue benefits of additional advertisers based on publicly-available data and estimates of market fundamentals. The intuition is straightforward: When many advertisers seek positions for a given search term, they must bid higher to avoid being outbid and receiving inferior listing position. Conversely, when only a few advertisers seek positions, prices can be strikingly low since even a low bid earns a prominent position.

Google’s API restriction also reduces the value of advertising inventory held by third-party publishers. Consider a publisher seeking to sell its sponsored search or other text ad inventory to a provider of sponsored search services. In general, Google can afford to pay more because Google’s revenue per search is higher than competitors’. But how much will Google offer? Google maximizes profits by narrowly outbidding competitors; anything higher is waste. So the weaker competitors become, the lower Google can bid — and the less revenue publishers receive for the traffic they sell. Google’s “may not copy” API restriction serves a role in weakening competing platforms — keeping advertisers using Google alone, and hence reducing competing ad platforms’ ability to pay for publishers’ inventory.

End users also suffer from Google’s restriction on copying ads. Were it not for Google’s restriction, more advertisers would sign up to use competing ad platforms — increasing the usefulness of Yahoo Search and Microsoft Live Search for the users who choose those services.

Google’s Response

I forwarded these concerns to Google in March, and I managed to get in touch with Doug Raymond, product manager for AdWords API. Doug offered three rationales for the restriction. The list below summarizes his arguments (black) and my responses (blue).

  • Google: The quoted provision only applies to third-party developers. Individual advertisers remain free to write software that exports their Google campaigns.
    • Small to medium-sized advertisers don’t want to be developers. Rather, they want to use code that others write. That’s exactly why the AdWords API offers a concept of developers, rather than requiring that every advertiser write its own code.
    • As a leading provider of centralized computing services, as distinguished from small programs individual users build themselves, Google well knows the benefits of rigorous design by competent professionals.
  • Google: Advertisers can extract their data in other ways, e.g. a comma-separated-value (CSV) file.
    • Manual export is convoluted, slow, and error-prone. API-based access would be faster, easier, and more reliable.
    • The existence of an inferior alternative does not justify imposing restrictions that prohibit superior implementations.
    • In other contexts (detailed below), Google has made strong requests for, and commitments to, data portability.
    • In other contexts, Google emphasizes the benefits of streamlined, automated data transfer — never viewing convoluted manual procedures as an acceptable alternative.
  • Google: Third-party developers ought not have free access to advertiser data.
    • Google’s AdWords API already offers an appropriate security model to limit developers to serving those AdWords advertisers that have specifically granted such permission. In short, a developer needs a password to access an advertiser’s account.

Google’s Position on Data Portability in Other Contexts

Google’s prohibition on AdWords API data export stands in sharp contrast to Google’s position on data portability in other contexts. Indeed, Google has previously taken a firm position in favor of data portability. Some specific examples: In a November 2006 interview at the Web 2.0 Summit, Schmidt specifically promised that “We [Google] would never trap user data.” Schmidt added that “If users can switch it keeps us honest.” Just last month, Google CEO Eric Schmidt called for open access to (and indexing of) social network data — telling IBM’s Business Partner Leadership Conference “People should be able to move from place to place, and their data is available everywhere” and “open is best for the consumer.” Well-known Google blogger Matt Cutts summarized Google’s commitment to data openness with the catchy title “Not trapping users’ data = GOOD” and a long list of Google products that support data export.

I credit that Schmidt’s statements refer to other kinds of data — search engines’ records of users’ search history, and a wide assortment of data held by social networks. But the same principles plainly apply to access to search ads: Just as consumers benefit from being able to move their data as they see fit, so too do advertisers benefit from flexibility.

Moreover, it strains credibility for Google to ask social networks to share their data with Google, while Google simultaneously imposes contractual roadblocks preventing others from accessing Google data.

Next Steps and Google’s Other Restrictions

Google already faces antitrust scrutiny for its striking growth and market share. In that context, it’s particularly hard to defend the restriction at issue — a barrier to competition, without any apparent pro-competitive purpose. Regulators might reasonably require that Google remove the quoted provision — letting third-party developers export and synchronize AdWords data if advertisers so desire. This would be a trivially straightforward requirement — just a sentence to be stricken from Google’s AdWords API T&C’s. Because Google’s existing APIs already provide the required data, Google would not need to add any new code or any new API functions.

Other AdWords API restrictions also deserve scrutiny. For example, Google insists that advertising tools collect AdWords instructions through separate fields not used for other ad platforms — blocking simplification via a single interface to streamline advertisers’ decisions. Google prohibits advertising tools from storing Google data in a single relational database along with data for other ad platforms — increasing the complexity of designing a system to manage campaigns on multiple platforms. And Google prohibits reports that compare Google ad performance data (e.g. costs and profits from advertising at Google) with data from other ad platforms — hindering advertisers’ efforts to evaluate competitors’ offerings. I gather Google defends these restrictions on the grounds that they purportedly prevent advertiser confusion. Perhaps — but their more obvious effect is to increase the costs and complexity of using competing ad platforms. Perhaps I’ll consider these restrictions in greater detail in a future article.

Meanwhile, I’m struck by Google’s calls for data portability in other contexts. With Google’s ongoing request that other companies provide data to Google, perhaps Google will return the favor by abandoning its “may not copy” restriction — ideally promptly and unilaterally, without requiring that regulators force Google’s hand.

Debunking Zango’s "Content Economy" updated May 29, 2008

Zango often touts its so-called “content economy” — purportedly providing users access to media in exchange for accepting Zango’s popup ads. After four years of debunking Zango’s claims, I’ve come to suspect the worst — and my investigations of Zango’s media offerings confirm that Zango’s media library is nothing to celebrate. This article reports the results of my recent examinations. I show:

  • Widespread copyrighted video content presented without any indication of license from the corresponding rights-holders. Details.
  • Widespread sexually-explicit material, including prominent explicit material nowhere labeled as such. Details.
  • An audio library consisting solely of prank phone calls to celebrities (without the “music” Zango promises). Details.
  • Widespread material users can get elsewhere for free, without any popups or other detriments. Details.
  • Widespread material that content creators never asked to have included in any Zango library. Details.

Widespread copyrighted video content presented without any indication of license from the corresponding rights-holders

Many of the videos in of Zango’s video library are the work of major movie studios, TV networks, and other third parties that own and assert copyright in their respective works. These videos consistently appear without any statement of authorization (e.g. “used with permission”) or even the ordinary copyright notice. I therefore conclude that Zango’s site features these videos without authorization from the corresponding rights-holders.

Zango Offers Daily Show with Guest Chris Rock Zango Offers Daily Show w/ Chris Rock

Zango Offers 'Borat' Zango Offers Borat

For many videos in Zango’s library, it is trivially easy to determine the video’s source. For example, text in the corner of Zango’s “Ashley Judd Nude Photoshoot” indicates the video comes from “Norma Jean & Marilyn” (1996, released on DVD by HBO Home Video). The title of Zango’s “Wild Things” suggests the video comes from the 2004 Sony Pictures movie by the same name; watching the video confirms the match. Zango’s “Girls Next Door Nude Compilation” begins with the distinctive Playboy logo. Zango’s “Chris Rock on the Daily Show” reproduces a video clip from Comedy Central’s Daily Show. It’s easy to find scores of other examples plainly labeled as well-known copyrighted works.

Other videos in Zango’s library are harder to identify — at least those without extensive entertainment industry experience. For example, I cannot easily determine the specific movie that included the scenes shown in Zango’s “Paris Hilton Striptease” or “Rachel Hunter in the Bathtub.” But the clips leave little doubt that they were filmed professionally and that the respective studios hold copyright in the resulting works. Similarly, I cannot easily determine the specific source of Zango’s “Branding Beat Down.” However, every frame of the video bears the distinctive Fox logo — indicating that the video originated with the Fox Broadcasting Company.

As to at least eight of the files in Zango’s library, I have specifically confirmed that Zango’s reproduction occurs without authorization from the underlying rights-holders. (Details below.) As to selected other files, I have sent inquiries to the corresponding rights-holders. I will update this page if I confirm whether Zango has properly licensed the content at issue.

Infringing videos are remarkably prominent in Zango’s video library. For example, as of May 27, Zango’s home page linked to “Borats First Trip To An American Gym” (s.i.c.). This clip was listed as the second most popular video in Zango’s entire content library, and it was placed in the top-center of Zango’s main www.zango.com web page, “above the fold” (within the portion of the page visible without using scroll bars). Yet the title of the video plainly indicates that the video contains the copyrighted work of others. Moreover, the video features the “DIVX Video” logo, indicating that DivX software was used to extract (“rip”) the video from a DVD. No authorized reproduction would be provided with a DivX overlay, so the presence of the DivX marker confirms that this video was reproduced without permission from the creators of Borat.

Other online video sites have been the target of major copyright litigation. For example, Viacom last year sued Google, alleging that “YouTube appropriates the value of creative content on a massive scale for YouTube’s benefit without payment or license.” In defense, Google points out that YouTube receives videos from independent — potentially granting Google immunity for these infringements due to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act‘s safe harbor for infringements occurring at the direction of users (17 USC 512(c)(1)).

Unlike YouTube, Zango’s video library offers no prominent “upload” function. Some of Zango’s videos arrive through the Revver video-sharing service (discussed below), probably originating with a variety of independent users. But many of the copyrighted videos Zango offers reside on Zango’s servers, not on Revver servers. (For example, all eight of the sexually-explicit videos linked in the first paragraph of the next section are hosted on Zango servers.) Because Zango offers no “upload” function by which ordinary users could have put videos onto Zango’s site, it therefore appears that these videos were provided by Zango or its agents, not by independent users. If so, Zango will not find protection in the DMCA’s safe harbor for infringements caused by users.

Moreover, even if Zango’s videos were provided by independent users, the circumstances of the reproduction seem to render Zango ineligible for the DMCA safe harbor. For one, the safe harbor requires that Zango lack actual knowledge of the infringements. But the infringing videos were obvious and self-evident, not just from their titles and contents, but also from their prevalence in featured results Zango chose to highlight. In addition, the safe harbor requires that Zango not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringements. But Zango used these videos to induce users to download its popup-generating software, a financial benefit that is directly attributable to the infringing videos. (Consider the case of a user who installs Zango in response to solicitation offering a specific copyrighted video clip. Example.) Furthermore, Zango has the right and ability to control the infringement (e.g. by removing the infringing videos). Because Zango’s financial benefit can be directly tracked to a specific infringement, and because Zango has the right and ability to prevent such infringement, Zango seems to fail the test in 17 USC 512(c)(1)(B).

Zango may claim that its videos are fair use. The Copyright Act sets out a four-factor test for determining whether reproduction of a copyrighted work is permissible, despite lack of authorization from the rights-holder. The fair use test calls for considering 1) the purpose and character of the use (e.g. whether commercial or nonprofit), 2) the nature of the copyrighted work, 3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for the work. Factor one is easy: Zango’s use is clearly commercial, which tends to cut against a finding of fair use. Zango might claim that its presentation of excerpts (rather than entire movies) supports a finding of fair use under the third test — but Zango exactly chooses what it views as highlights (e.g. the explicit portions of full-length movies), yielding clips with a greater than usual effect on the potential market for the underlying works. In short, a fair use defense is at best uncertain.

Wide-scale copyright infringement could expose Zango to substantial liability. The Copyright Act provides for statutory damages of “not less than $750” per violation. My examination indicates Zango is reproducing (at least) hundreds of copyrighted videos without any statement of authorization. Furthermore, such videos have surely been downloaded repeatedly — giving rise to potential statutory damages that could easily reach seven digits or more.

Widespread sexually-explicit material, including prominent explicit material nowhere labeled as such

Celebrity Videos Featured by Zango Celebrity Videos Featured by Zango

Prominent Video - Explicit but Unlabeled
Prominent Video – Explicit but Unlabeled

Browse Zango’s video library, and it’s easy to find sexually-explicit video. As shown in the first inset image at right, the bottom-right corner of each Zango “Browse” page gives a list of celebrities — each of them female, each featured in various states of undress. Among other explicit videos of these celebrities, Zango offers “Britney Spears See Thru“, “Britney Spears Black Dress Upskirt“, “Paris Hilton Striptease“, “Rachel Hunter in the Bathtub“, “Jessica Alba’s Chest and You“, “Jessica Simpson Nipple Slip“, “Anna Kournikova Panties Oops“, and “Angelina Jolie Sex Scene.”

The titles and descriptions of many of Zango’s videos suggest that their subjects were unwilling participants. See e.g. “nipple slip” and “upskirt” above, as well as additional videos like Zango’s “Arab wife’s sexy dance secretly taped” and Zango’s “Girlfriend Finds Hidden Camera.”

Through its placement and labeling of sexually-explicit videos, Zango creates a substantial risk that users will receive explicit materials they did not seek. For example, on May 24, I clicked “Browse” to flip through Zango’s content library. Using Zango’s default sort, the third video was entitled “the pool” with comment “havin fun in the pool” (s.i.c.). (Screenshot of the link from within Zango’s video library.) This title and comment give no indication that the resulting material is explicit. But clicking the “Watch” button immediately yields a large video showing two male adults swimming nude, then exiting the pool (entirely disrobed). As best I can tell, Zango did nothing to alert users to this explicit material, nor does Zango prevent (or even discourage) children from viewing such material.

Zango’s May 24 “the pool” video was not a mere anomaly. The same video remained linked in the same way in my tests on May 25 and 26, and on portions of May 27.

In litigation documents, Zango last week claimed that it never distributes explicit material to those do not want it. In particular, Zango argues: “Zango never sends unwanted links to pornography web sites” and “Zango only directs adult-oriented advertisements to a user after that user, by his own behavior, has demonstrated interest in such content.” I disagree. The preceding paragraphs offer a counterexample — Zango prominently providing a link to sexually-explicit materials, and provideing that links to users who never demonstrated interest in any such content. Zango may claim that these links tout videos — not a “web site” as in the first quoted sentence. Alternatively, Zango may claim that the links are not “advertisements” — hence beyond a strict reading of the second quoted sentence. But the underlying contradiction remains: Zango says it doesn’t provide pornography except when users seek it; yet in fact Zango does sometimes deliver explicit materials unrequested.

That Zango funds and distributes sexually-explicit materials is well-known. See e.g. the Sunbelt Blog’s February 2008 conclusion that “80% of [Zango’s] business comes from Seekmo, the porn side of its business.” See also Sunbelt’s off-hand November 2006 remark that “hardcore porno videos [are] funded through Zango Seekmo installs.”

But the scope of explicit materials within Zango’s video library is quite striking. Consider the first page of Zango’s library listings for Angeline Jolie. Beyond the “sex scene” video linked above, the listings also include “Angelina Jolie Taking a Bath”, “Angelina Jolie Under the Sheets”, “Angelina Jolie in Bra & Panties”, “A fairly long nude scene staring Angelina Jolie” (s.i.c.), “Angeline Jolie Getting It On”, “Angelina Jolie Nip Slip”, “Angelina Jolie Hardcore”, and “Angelina Jolie Dominatrix”, and “Angelina Jolie Hot On The Runway.” That’s ten explicit results out of twenty links — suggesting that explicit materials are remarkably widespread on Zango’s site.

The initial version of this article also flagged Zango’s “Nice But” (s.i.c.), a video that on May 27 occupied the fourth-most prominent position in Zango’s “Browse” listings. The thumbnail image of this video appeared to feature a full-screen display of a man’s naked buttocks, filling the entire screen. In a follow-up, Zango points out that in fact, the video shows an extreme close-up zoom of of two hands. So this image and video are not actually explicit. Yet a viewer merely flipping through Zango’s listings would nonetheless see an image that is, by all indications, explicit. The title “but” (s.i.c.) and the keyword “naked,” both adjacent to the thumbnail, reinforce the user’s perception of having seen an unrequested explicit image. Although the image is not actually explicit, the image’s content, placement, and labeling make it likely to leave users with the same feeling as an unrequested image that is actually sexually explicit: In both instances, a viewer who merely sees the image and does not watch the video will think he has seen an unwanted explicit image. In my view, Zango errs in mocking this harm. To the users who Zango tricks, the harm is perfectly real.

Zango’s audio library consists solely of prank phone calls to celebrities

Zango Offers Prank Phone Call Recordings Zango Offers Prank Phone Call Recordings

Zango’s content library offers three types of media: Videos, screensavers, and audio. Despite Zango’s much-touted “content economy,” Zango offers just eight audio clips. And although Zango’s “About Zango” description promises to provide free access to “music,” in fact all eight of these audio files are recordings from talk radio — just voices, with no music at all.

All eight of Zango’s audio recordings share a common theme: Prank phone calls to celebrities. In each, a caller pretends to be someone famous (e.g. the Prime Minister of Canada), and calls a celebrity (e.g. Bill Gates) under the guise of a bona fide discussion. The caller proceeds to berate the celebrity (e.g. by criticizing the features and reliability of Windows).

A comment in several of the videos reveals the source of the recordings: The Masked Avengers, which Wikipedia describes as “a Canadian radio duo … of disk jockeys and comedians Sebastien Trudel and Marc-Antoine Audette, known for making prank calls to famous persons by pretending to be government officials or officers in charitable organizations.” I wrote to Mr. Trudel, who confirmed to me that he has not granted Zango any license to use or reproduce these clips.

After placing these recordings in its content library, Zango further syndicates the materials onto Zango’s partner sites. For example, celebsprankd.com (screenshot) features all eight recordings, but requires users to install Zango before listening. Whois reports that Celebsprankd comes from the Vancouver, B.C. advertising firm Neverblue Media — a conclusion confirmed by the presence of the Neverblue.com web server at the same IP address. Neverblue describes itself as a “leading … online marketing company” offering “premier” advertising and “solid business leads” — claims arguably inconsistent with distributing and profiting from prank phone calls, not to mention distributing Zango. (But these recordings aren’t Neverblue’s only tie to Zango. This month alone, my Automatic Spyware Tester found eleven incidents of Neverblue affiliates buying popup traffic from Zango. I’ve also found dozens more incidents as to Neverblue affiliates buying traffic from other spyware.)

What of Zango’s distribution of these prank call recordings? With so few clips yet such prominent placement (including five of these eight audio recordings featured on Zango’s home page), senior Zango staff surely know what the files contain. Does Zango support prank phone calls? Wasting celebrities’ time under false pretenses? Recording phone calls without permission, even in states that specifically require such permission? It’s hard to reconcile these practices with Zango’s supposed reforms.

Widespread material users can get elsewhere for free, without any popups or other detriments

Much of Zango’s content is available elsewhere without charge and without installing any software that tracks online behavior or shows popup ads. For example, clicking Zango’s “Browse” tab and retaining defaults, every single video on the first page of results is syndicated from Revver. Users could just as easily get these videos directly from Revver, as receive them from Zango. But if users watched these videos at Revver, Zango’s software would not track their web browsing and searching, and users would not receive Zango’s popup ads.

Zango Falsely Claims that Uninstallation Eliminates Content Access Zango Falsely Tells Its Users:
“Uninstallation … eliminates content access”

Furthermore, Zango makes untrue claims about the necessity of its software. For example, Zango claims that “uninstallation … eliminates content access.” It does not. For files hosted at Revver, installation of Zango is not necessary to watch the videos in the first place, and uninstallation does not interfere with watching the videos later. Moreover, even many Zango-hosted files can be accessed without installing Zango, or after uninstalling Zango. For example, Zango’s “Chris Rock on the Daily Show” is actually just a standard Windows Media Video (WMV) distributed from the following URL: preview.licenseacquisition.org/123/1054944882.36393/yikers_chris_rock_on_the_daily_show.wmv . Zango’s “Borats First Trip To An American Gym” (s.i.c.) is preview.licenseacquisition.org/123/1054944854.02531/yikers_borats_first_trip_to_an_american_gym.wmv . Similarly, Zango’s “Bill Gates Gets Pranked” is a WMA hosted at preview.licenseacquisition.org/13/12295/12295.wma . Any user who knows these URLs can easily receive the corresponding files — without ever installing Zango, or after uninstalling Zango. Zango ought not claim otherwise.

Presenting material that content creators never asked to have included in any Zango library

By syndicating videos from Revver, Zango causes its video library to feature materials that content creators never asked to have associated with Zango in any way.

Zango’s syndication of Revver videos has prompted numerous complaints content creators who post videos to Revver. For example, Chris Pirillo asked why his videos are appearing on Zango. (“I don’t remember giving Zango permission to push crapware on my behalf.”) Revver forum user JPPI pointed out the irony of Zango claiming his videos were “FREE, thanks to Zango” when in fact the videos were free all along (even before Zango syndicated them). Revver forum user David complained that it is “kinda deceptive” (s.i.c.) “to make it sound like Zango was the one who made the video free.”

In response, Revver Vice President Asi Behar agreed to ask Zango to remove any Revver videos that Revver authors specifically so designate. But such removals do nothing to cure the deception of Zango requiring that users install its software before watching materials widely available elsewhere for free. Furthermore, such removals do nothing to protect Revver content creators who are unaware of Revver’s relationship with Zango. The word “Zango” appears nowhere on Revver’s official web site (as distinguished from Revver’s forums and some Revver-hosted videos). Thus, a Revver content creator has no easy way to learn about Revver’s relationship with Zango — not to mention learn of the option to request exclusion from Zango.

Zango’s syndication of Revver videos risks tainting the good name of Revver content creators. Consider a user who searches for a Revver video and finds that video hosted at Zango (just as Chris Pirillo did last year). The user may mistakenly conclude that installing Zango is in fact necessary to watch the video. If so, the user is likely to end up with a negative view of the underlying content creator — mistakenly concluding that, e.g., Chris Pirillo has partnered with Zango or endorses Zango’s activities. Revver forum complaints indicate that numerous Revver users share this concern. Yet Revver continues to syndicate videos to Zango without first checking with content creators.

Zango’s problems in context

Last week, Zango was one of four finalists for the Software & Information Industry Association’s CODiE Best Video Content Aggregation Service. In my view, that award is misguided: Far from deserving praise, Zango should be criticized and shunned for reproducing others’ copyrighted work without any apparent license to do so, showing sexually-explicit material unrequested, and offering users a lousy value by bundling extra ads with content users could get elsewhere for free.

Meanwhile, Zango continues litigation with Kaspersky. Recall: Kaspersky blocked Zango’s software from installing; Zango sued; Kaspersky successfully defended on the grounds that the Communications Decency Act, 47 USC 230, immunizes Kaspersky’s behavior because Kaspersky is an “interactive computer service provider” blocking material that, in its subjective opinion, is “objectionable.” In Zango’s appeal, Zango claims its software is not “otherwise objectionable” (brief pages 12-15; PDF pages 17-20). If it’s not objectionable to show explicit material unrequested — not to mention to infringe copyrights on a massive scale, and to insert extra ads around material available elsewhere without such ads – then I don’t know what is.

Finally, I’m often asked whether Zango continues the behaviors I previously reported. Installing through sneaky fake-user-interface pop-up ads that mimic the appearance of official Windows dialog boxes (as I reported last summer)? Yes. I made a fresh video showing such installations just last week.Defrauding advertisers through popups that cover merchants’ sites with their own affiliate offers(as I reported last spring, in September 2005, in summer 2004, and otherwise)? Definitely. This month alone, I reported six Zango incidents to just one of my advertiser clients — not to mention scores of other incidents targeting other web sites and advertisers. Zango repeatedly claims its problems are all in the past, but my hands-on testing continues to indicate otherwise.

Microsoft adCenter (teaching materials) with Peter Coles

Coles, Peter, and Benjamin Edelman. “Microsoft adCenter.” Harvard Business School Case 908-049, January 2008. (Revised February 2010.) (educator access at HBP. request a courtesy copy.)

Microsoft considers alternatives to expand its presence in online advertising, especially text-based pay-per-click advertising. Google dominates, and it is unclear how Microsoft can grow, despite considerable technical and financial resources. Microsoft considers a set of alternatives, each with clear benefits but also serious challenges.

Teaching Materials:

Microsoft adCenter (Teaching Note) – HBP 908062