False and Deceptive Display Ads at Yahoo’s Right Media

Yahoo’s Right Media ad marketplace features widespread ads exactly designed to deceive. I present ten examples of these deceptive ads, and I critique their unwelcome characteristics. To estimate the prevalence of deceptive tactics, I examine Right Media’s own analysis ad characteristics — finding that by Right Media’s own admission, deceptive ads total 35% or more of Right Media’s advertising inventory.

Details:

False and Deceptive Display Ads at Yahoo’s Right Media

Restaurant Promotions in 2015 (teaching materials)

Edelman, Benjamin. “Restaurant Promotions in 2015.” Harvard Business School Case 909-034, January 2009. (Revised July 2015.) (educator access at HBP. request a courtesy copy.)

A variety of services offer consumers discounts when dining at participating restaurants. This case examines four such services: Entertainment Book, Restaurant.com, Rewards Network, and Groupon. Despite key functional similarities, each of the services chooses an importantly different approach–different pricing, different benefits to consumers, different benefits to restaurants, and different underlying technologies.

Teaching Materials

Online Restaurant Promotions – Teaching Note (HBP 909063)

Ad Classification at Right Media (teaching materials)

Edelman, Benjamin. “Ad Classification at Right Media.” Harvard Business School Case 909-032, December 2008. (Revised June 2009.) (educator access at HBP. request a courtesy copy.)

Right media considers systems and policies to make sure that ads are only shown on web sites where they are appropriate, and vice versa. Setting standards is particularly challenging given the large and growing marketplace, the numerous participants, their diverse requirements, and the dynamics of policy enforcement when market participants are competing intensely.

Teaching materials:

Ad Classification at Right Media – Teaching Note (HBP 909037)

Ad Classification at Right media – Slide Supplement (HBP 911038)

Ad Classification at Right media – Slide Supplement (widescreen) (HBP 914054)

Ad Classification at Right media – Pre-Class Slides (HBP 911037)

Delaying Payment to Deter Online Advertising Fraud

In a new article, I introduce an alternative method of fraud prevention for certain online advertising systems. By delaying payments, a merchant or network differentially harms bad affiliates (who rightly worry they may get caught) without unduly harming good affiliates (who know they’ll get paid, and who receive a bonus in compensation for the delay). With a suitable delay, a merchant or network can deter many bad affiliates while retaining the good.

My working draft:

Optimal Deterrence when Judgment-Proof Agents are Paid in Arrears – with an Application to Online Advertising Fraud

Details on my approach, including initial data on merchants’ and networks’ current payment terms.

(update: published as Edelman, Benjamin. “Deterring Online Advertising Fraud Through Optimal Payment in Arrears.” Financial Cryptography and Data Security: Proceedings of the International Conference (September 2009). (Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science.))

False and Deceptive Pay-Per-Click Ads

I present and critique pay-per-click ads that don’t deliver what they promise. I consider implications for search engine revenues, and I analyze legal and ethical duties of advertisers and search engines. I offer a system for others to report similar ads that they find.

Read Google’s voluminous Adwords Content Policy, and you’d think Google is awfully tough on bad ads. If your company sells illegal drugs, makes fake documents, or helps customers cheat drug tests, you can’t advertise at Google. Google also prohibits ads for fireworks, gambling, miracle cures, prostitution, radar detectors, and weapons. What kind of scam could get through rules like these?

As it turns out, lots of pay-per-click advertisers push and exceed the limits of ethical and legal advertising — like selling products that are actually free, or promising their services are “completely free” when they actually carry substantial recurring charges.

In the sections that follow, I flag more than 30 different advertisers’ ads, all bearing claims that seem to violate applicable FTC rules (e.g. on use of the word “free”), or that make claims that are simply false. (All ads were observed on September 15 or later.) I then explain why this problem is substantially Google’s responsibility, and I present evidence suggesting Google’s substantial profits from these scams. Finally, I offer a mechanism for interested users to submit other false or deceptive ads, and I remark on Google’s failure to take action.

Charging for software that’s actually free

One scam Google doesn’t prohibit — and as best I can tell, does nothing to stop — is charging for software that’s actually free. Search for “Skype” and you’ll find half a dozen advertisers offering to sell eBay’s free telephone software. Search for “Kazaa” or “Grokster” and those products are sold too. Even Firefox has been targeted.

Each and every one of these ads includes the claim that the specified product is “free.” (These claims are expressed in ad titles, bodies, and/or display URLs). However, to the best of my knowledge, that claim is false, as applied to each and every ad shown above: The specified products are available from the specified sites only if the user pays a subscription fee.

These ads are particularly galling because, in each example, the specified program is available for free elsewhere on the web, e.g. directly from its developer’s web site. Since these products are free elsewhere, yet cost money at these sites (despite promises to the contrary), these sites offer users a particularly poor value.

Often these sites claim to offer tech support, but that’s also a ruse: Tests confirm there’s no real support.

Although sophisticated users will realize that these sites are bad deals, novice or hurried users may not. These sites bid for top search engine placement — often appearing above search engines’ organic (main) results. Some proportion of users see these prominent ads, click through, and get tricked into paying for these otherwise-free programs. Claiming a refund takes longer than it’s worth to most users. So as a practical matter, a site need only trick each user for an instant in order to receive its fee.

The “completely free” ringtones that aren’t

Ringtone ads often claim to be “free,” “totally free,” “all free,” “100% complimentary,” and available with “no credit card” and “no obligation” required. These claims typically appear in pay-per-click ad bodies, but they also often appear in ad titles and even in ad domain names, of course along with landing pages.

Often, these claims are simply false: An ad does not offer a “totally free” product if it touts a limited free trial followed by an auto-renewing paid service (a negative option plan).

Other claims are materially misleading. For example, claiming “no credit card required ” suggests that no charges will accrue. But that too is false, since ringtone sites generally charge users through cell phone billing systems, unbeknown to many users who believe a service has no way to impose a charge if a user provides no credit card number.

Each and every one of these ads includes the claim that the specified product is “free” (or some other claim substantially similar, e.g. “complimentary”). In most cases, subsequent language attempts to disavow these “free” claims. But in each case, to the best of my knowledge, service is available only if a user enters into a paid relationship (e.g. a paid subscription) — the very opposite of “free.” (Indeed, the subscription requirement applies even to unlimitedringtones.com, despite that ad’s claim that “no subscription [is] required.” The site’s fine print later asserts that by requesting a ringtone registration, a user “acknowledge[s] that [he is] subscribing to our service billed at $9.99 per month” — specifically contrary to site’s earlier “no subscription” promise.)

Vendors would likely defend their sites by claiming that (in general) their introductory offers are free, and by arguing that their fine print adequately discloses users’ subsequent obligations. This is interesting reasoning, but it’s ultimately unconvincing, thanks to clear regulatory duties to the contrary.

The FTC’s Guide Concerning the Use of the Word ‘Free’ is exactly on point. The guide instructs advertisers to use the word “free” (and all words similar in meaning) with “extreme care” “to avoid any possibility that consumers will be misled or deceived.” The guide sets out specific rules as to how and when the word “free” may be used, and it culminates with an incredible provision prohibiting fine print to disclaim what “free” promises. In particular, the rule’s section (c) instructs (emphasis added):

All the terms, conditions and obligations upon which receipt and retention of the ‘Free’ item are contingent should be set forth clearly and conspicuously at the outset of the offer … in close conjunction with the offer of ‘Free’ merchandise or service.

In case that instruction left any doubt, the FTC’s rule continues:

For example, disclosure of the terms of the offer set forth in a footnote of an advertisement to which reference is made by an asterisk or other symbol placed next to the offer, is not regarded as making disclosure at the outset.

Advertisers may not like this rule, but it’s remarkably clear. Under the FTC’s policy, ads simply cannot use a footnote or disclaimer to escape a “free” promise made earlier. Nor can an advertiser promise a “free” offer at an early stage (e.g. a search engine ad), only to impose additional conditions later (such as in a landing page, confirmation page, or other addendum). The initial confusion or deception is too strong to be cured by the subsequent revision.

Advertisers might claim that the prohibited “free” ads at issue come from their affiliates or other partners — that they’re not the advertisers’ fault. But the FTC’s Guide specifically speaks to the special duty of supervising business partners’ promotion of “free” offers. In particular, section (d) requires:

[I]f the supplier knows, or should know, that a ‘Free” offer he is promoting is not being passed on by a reseller, or otherwise is being used by a reseller as an instrumentality for deception, it is improper for the supplier to continue to offer the product as promoted to such reseller. He should take appropriate steps to bring an end to the deception, including the withdrawal of the ‘Free’ offer.

It therefore appears that the ads shown above systematically violate the FTC’s “free” rules. Such ads fail to disclose the applicable conditions at the outset of the offer, as FTC rules require. And even where intermediaries have placed such ads, their involvement offers advertisers no valid defense.

Ads impersonating famous and well-known sites

Some pay-per-click ads affirmatively mislead users about who is advertising and what products are available. Consider the ads below, for site claiming to be (or to offer) Spybot. (Note text in their respective display URLs, shown in green type.) Despite the “Spybot” promise, these sites actually primarily offer other software, not Spybot. (Spybot-home.com includes one small link to Spybot, at the far bottom of its landing page. I could not find any link to the true Spybot site from within www-spybot.net.)

In addition, search engine ads often include listings for sites with names confusingly similar to the sites and products users request. For example, a user searching for “Spybot” often receives ads for SpyWareBot and SpyBoot — entirely different companies with entirely different products. US courts tend to hold that competitive trademark targeting — one company bidding on another company’s marks — is legal, in general. (French courts tend to disagree.) But to date, these cases have never considered the heightened confusion likely when a site goes beyond trademark-targeting and also copies or imitates another company’s name. Representative examples follow. Notice that each ad purports to offer (and is triggered by searches for the name of) a well-known product — but in fact these ads take users to competing vendors.

Google’s responsibility – law, ethics, and incentives

Google would likely blame its advertisers for these dubious ads. But Google’s other advertising policies demonstrate that Google has both the right and the ability to limit the ads shown on its site. Google certainly profits from the ads it is paid to show. Profits plus the right and ability to control yield exactly the requirements for vicarious liability in other areas of the law (e.g. copyright infringement). The FTC’s special “free” rules indicate little tolerance for finger-pointing — even specifically adding liability when “resellers” advertise a product improperly. These general rules provide an initial basis to seek greater efforts from Google.

Crucially, the Lanham Act specifically contemplates injunctive relief against a publisher for distributing false advertising. 15 USC § 1125(a)(1) prohibits false or misleading descriptions of material product characteristics. § 1114 (2) offers injunctive relief (albeit without money damages) where a publisher establishes it is an “innocent infringer.” If facing claims on such a theory, Google would surely attempt to invoke the “innocent infringer” doctrine — but that attempt might well fail, given the scope of the problem, given Google’s failure to stop even flagrant and longstanding violations, and given Google’s failure even to block improper ads specifically brought to its attention. (See e.g. World Wrestling Federation v. Posters, Inc., 2000 WL 1409831, holding that a publisher is not an innocent infringer if it “recklessly disregard[s] a high probability” of infringing others’ marks.)

Nonetheless, the Communications Decency Act’s 47 USC § 230(c)(1) potentially offers Google a remarkable protection: CDA § 230 instructs that Google, as a provider of an interactive computer service, may not be treated as the publisher of content others provide through that service. Even if a printed publication would face liability for printing the same ads Google shows, CDA § 230 may let Google distribute such ads online with impunity. From my perspective, that would be an improper result — bad policy in CDA § 230’s overbroad grant of immunity. A 2000 DOJ study seems to share my view, specifically concluding that “substantive regulation … should, as a rule, apply in the same way to conduct in the cyberworld as it does to conduct in the physical world.” But in CDA § 230, Congress seems to have chosen a different approach.

That said, CDA § 230’s reach is limited by its exception for intellectual property laws. § 230(e)(2) provides that intellectual property laws are not affected by § 230(c)(1)’s protection. False advertising prohibitions are codified within the Lanham Act (an intellectual property statute), offering a potential argument that CDA § 230 does not block false advertising claims. This argument is worth pursuing, and it might well prevail. But § 230 cases indicate repeated successes for defendants attempting to escape liability on a variety of fact patterns and legal theories. On balance, I cannot confidently predict the result of litigation attempting to hold Google responsible for the ads it shows. As a practical matter, it’s unclear whether or when this question will be answered in court. Certainly no one has attempted such a suit to date.

Notwithstanding Google’s possible legal defenses, I think Google ought to do more to make ads safe as a matter of ethics. Google created this mess — by making it so easy for all companies, even scammers, to buy Internet advertising. So Google faces a special duty to help clean up the resulting problems. Google already takes steps to avoid sending users to web sites with security exploits, and Google already refuses ads in various substantive categories deemed off-limits. These scams are equally noxious — directly taking users’ money under false pretenses. And Google’s relationship with these sites is particularly unsavory since Google directly and substantially profits from their practices, as detailed in the next section.

Even self-interest ought to push Google to do more here. Google may make an easy profit now by selling ads to scammers. But in the long run, rip-off ads discourage users from clicking on Google’s sponsored links — potentially undermining Google’s primary revenue source.

Who really profits from rip-off ads?

When users suffer from scams like those described above, users’ money goes to scammers, in the first instance. But each scammer must pay Google whenever a user clicks its ad. So Google profits from scammers’ activities. If the scammers ceased operations — voluntarily, or because Google cut off their traffic — Google’s short-run revenues would decrease.

Users
service fees
   Scammers   
advertising fees
Google
How Google Profits from Scammers

Consider the business model of rogue web sites “selling” software like Skype. They have one source of revenue — users buying these programs. Their expenses tend to be low: they provide no substantial customer service, and often they link to downloads hosted elsewhere to avoid even incurring bandwidth costs. It seems the main expense of such sites is advertising — with pay-per-click ads from Google by all indications a primary component. The diagram at right shows the basic money trail: From users to scam advertisers to Google. When users are ripped off by scammers, at least some of the payment flows through to Google.

How much of users’ payments goes to Google, rather than being retained by scammers? My academic economics research offers some insight. Recall that search engine ads are sold through a complicated multi-unit second-price auction: Each advertiser’s payment is determined by the bid of the price of the advertiser below him. Many equilibria are possible, but my recent paper with Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz offers one outcome we think is reasonable — an explicit formula for each advertiser’s equilibrium bid as a function of its value (per click) and of others’ bids. In subsequent simulations (article forthcoming), Schwarz and I will demonstrate the useful properties of this bidding rule — that it dominates most other strategies under very general conditions. So there’s good reason to think markets might actually end up in this equilibrium, or one close to it. If so, we need only know advertisers’ valuations (which we can simulate from an appropriate distribution) to compute market outcomes (like advertiser profits and search engine revenues).

One clear result of my recent bidding simulations: When advertisers have similar valuations (as these advertisers do), they tend to “bid away” their surpluses. That is, they bid almost as much as a click is worth to them — so they earn low profits, while search engines reap high revenues. When a user pays such an advertiser, it wouldn’t be surprising if the majority of that advertiser’s gross profit flowed through to Google.

A specific example helps clarify my result. Consider a user who pays $38 to Freedownloadhq.com for a “free” copy of Skype. But Freedownloadhq also received, say, 37 other clicks from 37 other users who left the site without making a purchase. Freedownloadhq therefore computes its valuation per click (its expected gross profit per incoming visitor) to be $1. The other 10 advertisers for “Skype” use a similar business model, yielding similar valuations. They bid against each other, rationally comparing the benefits off high traffic volume (if they bid high to get top placement at Google) against the resulting higher costs (hence lower profits). In equilibrium, simulations report, with 10 bidders and 20% standard deviation in valuations (relative to valuation levels), Google will get 71% of advertisers’ expected gross profit. So of the user’s $38, fully $27 flows to Google. Even if Freedownloadhq’s business includes some marginal costs (e.g. credit card processing fees), Google will still get the same proportion of gross profit.

One need not believe my simulation results, and all the economic reasoning behind them, in order to credit the underlying result: That when an auctioneer sells to bidders with similar valuations, the bidders tend to bid close together — giving the auctioneer high revenues, but leaving bidders with low profits. And the implications are striking: For every user who pays Freedownloadhq, much of the user’s money actually goes to Google.

In January I estimated that Google and Yahoo make $2 million per year on ads for “screensavers” that ultimately give users spyware. Add in all the other terms with dubious ads — all the ringtone ads, the for-free software downloads, ads making false statements of product origin, and various other scams — and I wouldn’t be surprised if the payments at issue total one to two orders of magnitude higher.

Towards a solution

Some of these practices have been improving. For example, six months ago almost all “ringtones” ads claimed to be “free,” but today some ringtones ads omit such claims (even while other ads still include these false statements).

Recent changes in Google pricing rules seem to discourage some of the advertisers who place ads of the sort set out above. Google has increased its pricing to certain advertisers, based on Google’s assessment of their “low quality user experience.” But the specific details of Google’s rules remain unknown. And plenty of scam ads — including all those set out above — have remained on Google’s site well after the most recent round of rule changes. (All ads shown above were received on September 15, 2006, or later.)

Google already has systems in place to enforce its Adwords Content Policy. My core suggestion for Google: Expand that policy to prevent these scams — for example, explicitly prohibiting ads that claim a product is “free” when it isn’t, and explicitly prohibiting charging users for software that’s actually free. Then monitor ads for words like “free” and “complimentary” that are particularly likely to be associated with violations. When a bad ad is found, disable it, and investigate other ads from that advertiser.

To track and present more dubious ads, I have developed a system whereby interested users can submit ads they consider misleading for the general reasons set out above. Submit an ad or view others’ submissions.

These problems generally affect other search engines too — Yahoo, MSN, and Ask.com, among others. But as the largest search engine, and as a self-proclaimed leader on ethics issues, I look to Google first and foremost for leadership and improvement.

Google’s (Non-)Response

When Information Week requested a comment from Google as to the ads I reported, Google responded as follows:

When we become aware of deceptive ads, we take them down. … We will review the ads referenced in this report, and remove them if they do not adhere to our guidelines.

A week later, these ads remain available. So Google must have concluded that these ads are not deceptive (or else Google would have “take[n] them down” as its first sentence promised). And Google must have concluded that these ads do adhere to applicable Google policies, or else Google would have “remove[d] them” (per its second sentence).

Google’s inaction exactly confirms my allegation: That Google’s ad policies are inadequate to protect users from outright scams, even when these scams are specifically brought to Google’s attention.

All identifications and characterizations have been made to the best of my ability. Any errors or alleged errors may be brought to my attention by email.

I thank Rebecca Tushnet for helpful discussions on the legal duties of advertisers and search engines.

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Originally posted October 9, 2006. Last Updated: October 16, 2006.

PPC Ads, Misleading and Worse

Read Google’s voluminous Adwords Content Policy, and you’d think Google is awfully tough on bad ads. If your company sells illegal drugs, makes fake documents, or helps customers cheat drug tests, you can’t advertise at Google. Google also prohibits ads for fireworks, gambling, miracle cures, prostitution, radar detectors, and weapons. What kind of scam could get through rules like these?

As it turns out, lots of pay-per-click advertisers push and exceed the limits of ethical and legal advertising — like selling products that are actually free, or promising their services are “completely free” when they actually carry substantial recurring charges. For example, the ad at right claims to offer “100% complimentary” and “free” ringtones, when actually the site promotes a services that costs approximately $120 per year.

 


An example misleading ad, falsely claiming ringtones are An example misleading ad, falsely claiming ringtones are “complimentary” when they actualy carry a monthly fee.

In today’s article, I show more than 30 different advertisers’ ads, all bearing claims that seem to violate applicable FTC rules (e.g. on use of the word “free”), or that make claims that are simply false. I then analyze the legal and ethical principles that might require search engines to remove these ads. Finally, I offer a mechanism for interested users to submit other false or deceptive ads they find.

Details:

False and Deceptive Pay-Per-Click Ads

Which Anti-Spyware Programs Delete Which Cookies?

I’ve always been puzzled by the divergent attitudes of anti-spyware programs towards advertising cookies. Some anti-spyware programs take their criticism to the extreme, with terms like “spy cookies” and serious overstatements of the alleged harm from cookies. Others ignore cookies altogether. In between are some interesting alternatives — like ignoring cookies by default (but with optional detection), giving users an easy way to hide cookie detections, and flagging cookies as “low risk” detections.

I understand why some users are concerned about cookies. It’s odd and, at first, surprising that “just” visiting a web site can deposit files on a user’s hard disk. Cookies are often hard or impossible to read by hand, and ad networks’ cookies offer user no direct benefit.

Unrequested arrival, no benefit to users — sounds a lot like spyware? So say some, including the distinguished Walt Mossberg. But that’s actually not my view. Unlike the spyware I focus on, cookies don’t interrupt users with extra ads, don’t slow users’ PCs, can’t crash, and require only trivial bandwidth, memory, and CPU time.

Cookies do have some privacy consequences — especially when they integrate users’ behavior on multiple sites. But such tracking only occurs to the extent that the respective sites allow it — an important check on the scope of such practices. That’s not to say shared cookies can’t be objectionable, but to my eye these concerns are small compared with more pressing threats to online privacy (like search engine data retention). Plus, ad networks usually address privacy worries through privacy policies limiting how users’ data may be used.

All in all, I don’t think cookies raise many serious concern for typical users. Still, I know and respect others who hold contrary views. It seems reasonable people can disagree on this issue, especially on the harder cases posed by certain shared cookies.

Earlier this summer, Vinny Lingham and Clicks2Customers asked me to test the current state of cookie detections by major anti-spyware programs. They had noticed that for those anti-spyware programs that detect cookies, not all cookies are equally affected. Which cookies are most affected? By which anti-spyware programs? I ran tests to see — forming a suite of cookies, then scanning them with the leading anti-spyware programs.

Vinny is generously letting me share my results with others who are interested. The details:

Cookies Detected by Anti-Spyware Programs: The Current Status

See also Vinny’s introduction and commentary.

How Vonage Funds Spyware

I ought to be a Vonage enthusiast. I support Vonage’s efforts to protect network neutrality. I applaud their flexible voice over IP service and their efforts to compete with incumbent phone companies. I’m even a VoIP customer (albeit using a competitor’s service).

But instead of praising Vonage, I have to criticize them — not for their core business, nor for their customer service (which others have repeatedly criticized), but for their reckless advertising practices. Vonage spends huge amounts on advertising — more than $20 million per month. (source) Unfortunately, among this spending is widespread and substantial spyware-delivered advertising.

For years, my manual and automated testing have documented Vonage ads appearing in all the major spyware programs. Now that Vonage has completed its IPO — itself promoted as a way to raise more money to buy more advertising — this page presents twelve recent examples of Vonage ads appearing in spyware.

Spyware-Delivered Pop-Up Ads Banners Injected Into Others’ Sites Spyware Lead Acquisitions Spyware-Delivered Banner Farms
Direct Revenue

Targetsaver – covering AOL

Targetsaver – covering a sexually-explicit site

SearchingBooth

Fullcontext – ad injected into Google.com

Searchingbooth – ad injected into True.com

Searchingbooth – ad injected into eBay

DollarRevenue – replacing an ad within Boston.com

Direct Revenue – Vendare’s Myphonebillsavings

Direct Revenue – NextClick’s Phonebillsolution

Hula’s Global-Store

ExitExchange

Vonage’s Spyware-Delivered Pop-Up Ads

A Vonage Ad Shown by Direct Revenue. A Vonage Ad Shown by Direct Revenue

A Vonage Ad Shown by Targetsaver A Vonage Ad Shown by Targetsaver

Vonage
money viewers
Traffic Marketplace
money viewers
Targetsaver

The Money Trail – How Vonage Pays Targetsaver

I have repeatedly observed Vonage buying “ordinary” spyware pop-up ads from vendors like 180solutions, Direct Revenue, and eXact Advertising. See e.g. the top thumbnail at right, a March 2006 screenshot of a Vonage ad appearing through Direct Revenue. See also my March 2005 report of Vonage ads appearing through eXact Advertising. These relationships add up to big money: BusinessWeek last week reported that Vonage paid Direct Revenue $31,570 in a single month of 2005 — a remarkable $110 for each customer Direct Revenue sent to Vonage. Meanwhile, in its litigation against Intermix, the New York Attorney General specifically documented Vonage’s ads appearing in Intermix KeenValue pop-ups.

Beyond notorious spyware such as Direct Revenue and Intermix, Vonage ads also appear through less well-known spyware, including through programs that continue to be installed onto users’ computers through security exploits (without user consent). The second thumbnail at right shows a Vonage ad shown by Targetsaver (a California maker of software that becomes installed without consent, tracks users’ behavior, and shows targeted pop-up ads). Targetsaver sends traffic to Vonage in the way set out in the diagram at right: Targetsaver sends users to Traffic Marketplace which forwards users to Vonage (via aQuantive / Atlas, which serves to track most Vonage advertising purchases).

http://a.targetsaver.com/adshow
http://www.targetsaver.com/redirect.php?clientID=…&finalURL=…
http://www.targetsaver.com/js/jf1.html
http://ad.trafficmp.com/tmpad/banner/ad/tmp.asp?poID=emwG
http://t.trafficmp.com/p.t/i15275/37389831/
http://clk.atdmt.com/VON/go/trffevon0740000126von/direct/01/
http://www.vonage.com/startsavingnow

Despite the word “target” in its name, Targetsaver isn’t particularly picky about where it shows Vonage’s ads. The screenshot at right reflects a Vonage ad shown while a user tries to sign up for AOL — perhaps reasonable targeting, in that both companies provide telecommunication services. But Targetsaver also shows Vonage’s ads in unseemly locations, such as when users browse sexually-explicit sites. Screenshot.

Vonage pop-up ads also appear through various other spyware. Additional examples: Vonage shown in a SearchingBooth pop-up (via Rpowermedia and Traffic Marketplace), Vonage shown in a Dollar Revenue pop-up (via Oridian / Cydoor, Yield Manager, Falk eSolutions AG / DoubleClick, and Traffic Marketplace).

Spyware Injections of Vonage Ads – Into Others’ Sites

A Vonage Ad Injected by Fullcontext Fullcontext Injecting a Vonage Ad into Google

Vonage
money viewers
Yield Manager
money viewers
MediaPrecision
money viewers
Fullcontext

How Vonage Pays Fullcontext

As users revolt against pop-up ads, a growing trend is to inject ads into others’ sites. Users who receive injected ads may not notice they’re infected with spyware; the telltale signs are, perhaps, less obvious than extra pop-ups. And by hooking into Internet Explorer’s API, injection isn’t particularly difficult.

Of course ad injection raises serious legal concerns. A spyware vendor probably infringes a site’s copyright by inserting an ad right into that site — all the more so when such insertion occurs without a user’s consent and when such insertion lacks any labeling or disclaimer. But consider the vendors who use these methods: they already face substantial legal liability, e.g. from their nonconsensual installations of spyware onto users’ computers. Such vendors are unlikely to be deterred by possible copyright liability.

Despite the problems with spyware-injected banner ads, I have repeatedly observed Vonage ads appearing through banners injected into others’ sites using spyware, without permission from those sites. In general, the resulting Vonage banners appear in places where, but for the spyware at issue, no banner would exist. Consider e.g. the Google screenshot at right. The “real” Google site does not include a banner above the Google logo. Although the banner appears to be an integral part of Google’s site, the banner was injected into the site’s on-screen display by Fullcontext spyware; it was not placed there by Google.

The left and center screenshots below show similar ad injections by Searchingbooth. True.com and eBay do not sell ads that appear above their respective sites. Instead, the Vonage ads at issue were injected there by Searchingbooth, yielding the on-screen appearances shown below.

The DollarRevenue example, right screenshot below, shows a special kind of banner injection. Whereas the first three examples inject ads above a site (albeit within the site’s own window), DollarRevenue injects its ads into a site — covering a banner placed by the site (which would yield payment to the site) with a banner for DollarRevenue (which produces payments to DollarRevenue). This business model is not altogether novel; Claria (then Gator) pioneered this approach with its 2001 covering of other sites’ banners. But whereas Claria quickly abandoned this practice, in the face of IAB and other criticism, DollarRevenue continues unabated. For a particularly vivid view of DollarRevenue’s ad replacement, see the video of this ad injection. Notice the original Boston.com ad appearing for a fifth of a second at 0:00:3.65, only to be covered nearly instantly by the DollarRevenue-injected Vonage ad.

Vonage pays the respective spyware vendors through the relationships set out in the diagrams below and at right. Click an ad thumbnail for a full-size image, along with a packet log of associated network transmissions.

A Vonage Ad Injected by Searchingbooth
Searchingbooth Injecting a Vonage Ad into True.com

Vonage
money viewers
Traffic Marketplace
money viewers
Adecn
money viewers
Rpowermedia
money viewers
Searchingbooth

How Vonage Pays Searchingbooth

A Vonage Ad Injected by SearchingBooth
SearchingBooth Injecting a Vonage Ad into eBay

Vonage
money viewers
Traffic Marketplace
money viewers
Rpowermedia
money viewers
Searchingbooth

How Vonage Pays Searchingbooth

DollarRevenue Replacing a Boston.com Ad with a Vonage Ad
Initial Boston.com Ad – Visible for Only 0.2 Seconds – video

DollarRevenue Replacing a Boston.com Ad with a Vonage Ad
Replacement Vonage Ad Injected by DollarRevenue

Vonage
money viewers
24/7 RealMedia
money viewers
Yield Manager
money viewers
Oridian (Cydoor)
money viewers
DollarRevenue

How Vonage Pays DollarRevenue

The ads at issue were injected by DollarRevenue (apparently located in the Netherlands), Fullcontext (purportedly of Anguilla), Searchingbooth (from Deskwizz, giving an address in Quebec, Canada).

Vonage Lead Acquisitions via Spyware Pop-Ups

Vendare Group Using Direct Revenue to Promote Vonage Vendare Group Using Direct Revenue to Promote Vonage

Vonage
money viewers
Vendare Group / eMarketMakers
money viewers
LeadClick Media / eAdvertising
money viewers
Rextopia
money viewers
RevenueLoop
money viewers
Direct Revenue

The Money Trail – How Vonage Pays Direct Revenue

NextClick Media Using Direct Revenue to Promote Vonage NextClick Media Using Direct Revenue to Promote Vonage

As recently as March 2006, I was still observing Vonage ads shown by notorious spyware vendor Direct Revenue. (Screenshot.) But Vonage partners continue to advertise with Direct Revenue — even using Vonage-supplied site designs to do so. So Vonage’s money still reaches Direct Revenue and still helps to fund Direct Revenue.

Consider the top screenshot at right. As I browsed other telecom sites, I got a pop-up promoting Vonage. The pop-up is nearly full-screen — covering all but the title bars of the pages I had requested. The pop-up ad lacks a visible URL, but packet log analysis indicates that it was loaded from www.myphonebillsavings.com. Notably, the bottom of www.myphonebillsavings.com reads “©2001-2006, Vonage Marketing, Inc.” — reflecting that this Vonage-branded page was, by all indications, designed by Vonage itself.

To see who placed this pop-up with Direct Revenue, I again turn to packet log analysis. I observe that loading the ad entailed loading the following URLs. Click the list for the full packet log.

http://xadsj.offeroptimizer.com/imp/servlet/ImpServe?urlContext=http%3A%2F%2F…
http://login.revenueloop.com/sw/3211/CD1087/
http://rextopia.com/sw/5551/CD436/1087%3A%3A3211%3A%3A%3A%3A%3A%3A18a259ac88a…
http://www.eajmp.com/sw/7601/CD154/
http://clicks.emarketmakers.com/redir.aspx?id=671651&AFFID=CD154
http://clicks.emarketmakers.com/redir.aspx?from_pu=true&id=671651
http://clk.atdmt.com/VON/go/thvndvon0550000019von/direct/01?bannerid=671651&f…
http://www.myphonebillsavings.com/?bannerid=671651&AFFID=CD154

This analysis indicates that traffic and money flowed as listed at right. RevenueLoop (a California-based ad network), or a RevenueLoop business partner, bought traffic from Direct Revenue (controlling server offeroptimizer.com). Then RevenueLoop sent traffic to Rextopia (a New Jersey affiliate network), which redirected to Eajmp.com (LeadClick Media’s eAdvertising, of California), which redirected to eMarketMakers, which redirected to aQuantive’s Atlas and finally on to Myphonebillsavings.

The last few links of this chain reflect substantial involvement of Vendare Group. Vendare owns eMarketMakers, and Whois data indicates that Myphonebillsavings is also registered to Vendare Group. But despite receiving venture funding from Insight Venture Partners, Vendare’s ties to spyware are well-known. For example, I have widely observed — and carefully documented — Vendare’s New.net installed through security exploits without users’ consent . Furthermore, Vendare’s eMarketMakers directly funds a variety of spyware. For example, in January 2006 I documented eMarketMakers promoting NetZero using traffic purchased directly from 180solutions, and in March 2005 I documented eMarketMakers promoting Earthlink and Petchews via traffic purchased directly from eXact Advertising. Despite the direct and well-documented relationships between Vendare and spyware, Vonage nonetheless purchases advertising from Vendare and its eMarketMakers group.

Vendare’s Myphonebillsavings is just one of many Vonage partners still paying to receive traffic from Direct Revenue. Last month I also observed Phonebillsolution pop-ups appearing through Direct Revenue. Like Myphonebillsavings.com, Phonebillsolution.com’s copyright line reflects creation by Vonage. Phonebillsolutions hides its Whois data, but directly requesting the IP address of the Phonebillsolution web server yields a default page titled “NextClick Media” (a California-based ad network). The final thumbnail at right shows NextClick promoting Vonage using Direct Revenue.

Spyware-Delivered Banner Farms Promoting Vonage

A Vonage Ad Shown by Targetsaver Look2me and Hula’s Global-Store Promoting Vonage

Vonage
money viewers
ad networks (one or more)
money viewers
banner farm
money viewers
placement intermediaries (zero or more)
money viewers
spyware vendors

How Vonage Funds Spyware via Banner Farms

Last month I explained the problem of spyware-delivered banner farms: Web sites that buy spyware traffic (directly or indirectly), then show substantially only ads, thereby serving as ad placement intermediaries. I posted three distinct examples of Vonage appearing in spyware-delivered banner farms: Hula’s Global-Store promoting Vonage in a large window at screen center, a further Global-Store promotion of Vonage in a smaller window partially covered by another ad, and in ExitExchange.

But there are plenty of other banner farms, and in my testing most banner farms promote Vonage. For example, my June banner farm article mentions Whatsnewreport, which I have also observed promoting Vonage.

The diagram at right reflects the canonical relationships between Vonage, ad networks, banner farms, and spyware

Vonage’s Spyware Advertising in Context

Vonage isn’t the only advertiser with widespread spyware ad-buys. Other buyers of untargeted or semi-targeted ads get plenty of spyware-delivered advertising too. For example, I see Verizon ads in spyware pop-ups with remarkable frequency. In a future article, I’ll present screenshots of some other big spyware advertisers.

As best I can tell, Vonage does not specifically intend to have its ads shown in spyware. Instead, the advertising chains shown above reveal that these are generally indirect relationships, not direct spyware ad buys. (In comparison, see my September 2005 report of Expedia directly and intentionally buying spyware-delivered advertising from numerous notorious spyware vendors — a practice that, to its credit, Expedia subsequently stopped.) Yet by failing to take appropriate precautions and failing to diligently supervising its ads, Vonage makes payments to spyware vendors — funding spyware that is known to harm users’ PCs.

Vonage may seek to write off these examples as insignificant within its nine-digit advertising budget. But these spyware placements have important negative externalities: When Vonage pays spyware vendors, even indirectly, Vonage helps make spyware more profitable, and helps make the spyware problem worse. Even if Vonage is content to waste some money on buying unwanted spyware ads, it still needs to take action to avoid funding software that damages users’ PCs.

When asked about Vonage’s spyware funding, Vonage CEO Jeffrey Citron last year told the Associated Press “We do everything we can to make sure our partners adhere to our standards.” I disagree. There’s plenty more Vonage could do. For example, Vonage could refuse to work with partners like Vendare, that have known ties to spyware vendors and that even make and distribute their own spyware. Vonage could refuse to work with Traffic Marketplace and Yield Manager — partners that can’t provide reasonable assurances of keeping ads out of spyware. Vonage could specifically review all its advertising partners, and Vonage could prevent those partners from subcontracting with further unverified subpartners of their own. Vonage may consider these changes burdensome or inconvenient. But based on current practices, Vonage can’t credibly claim to be doing “everything” to stop spyware advertising. To the contrary, as the many examples above indicate, far more work is still required.

Last month Vonage won an “Effie” award for the “effectiveness” of its advertising campaign. I can’t speak to Effie’s criteria in granting this award. But advertisers might appropriately hesitate to praise an advertising strategy that, whether intentionally or recklessly, includes buying ads in spyware.

Beyond Vonage, criticism might reasonably focus on the advertising intermediaries that broker Vonage’s spyware placements. For example, Vonage receives and tracks all these spyware placements through aQuantive’s Atlas advertising. Atlas’s Acceptable Use Policy proclaims that “Atlas technology may not be used in connection with any downloadable application that is downloaded without notice and consent.” But I see no indication that Atlas actually enforces this policy: All the programs discussed above are programs I have observed installed without consent, yet these placements repeatedly flow through Atlas, as shown in each posted packet log. Other ad intermediaries lack even Atlas’s anti-spyware statement: Searching 24/7 Real Media’s site for “spyware” yields no hits, and 24/7’s lengthy and prominent code of conduct does not prohibit use of spyware.As advertising service providers, advertising specialists, publicly-traded companies, and purported ethical leaders, aQuantive, 24/7, and others could do far more to keep spyware out of their networks.

Yahoo syndication fraud litigation

I served as cocounsel in class action litigation challenging Yahoo placing advertisers’ advertisements in low-quality locations such as adware, popups, and typo squatting, while charging advertisers high prices predicated on search advertising.  After motion practice denying Yahoo’s motion to dismiss, Yahoo agreed to cease certain of the practices at issue and allow advertisers to exclude themselves from certain low-quality advertising placements.

In re: Yahoo Litigation, No. 06-2737-CAS (C.D. Cal.)

Case docket including consolidated second amended class action complaint and settlement agreement

Critiquing ITSA’s Pro-Adware Policy

These days, few advertisers defend “adware” advertising. It seems the world has largely noticed: Consumers hate adware-delivered popup ads. It’s rare that any consumer intentionally installs adware with an accurate understanding of what lies ahead. Since consumers don’t want adware, adware vendors get onto users’ computers by trickery and deception, without appropriate disclosures and informed consent. Problems plague even those vendors that claim to have reformed. (Recall Claria soliciting installations through other vendors nonconsensually-installed spyware and removing important phrases from its disclosures.)

Despite the rising backlash against adware, the Interactive Travel Services Association recently offered a rare contrary view. In its Statement Regarding the Use of Marketing Software Applications (PDF), ITSA effectively endorsed adware. ITSA claims adware “can be useful to many consumers because it provides timely, relevant and money-saving information.” Despite the bad consumer experience and lousy value proposition, ITSA goes on to say adware advertising is just fine, under strikingly vague and weak conditions.

My challenge to ITSA executives: Install Direct Revenue “adware” on your PCs for a month. Then report how much time and money you save.

I don’t understand why ITSA published these guidelines. Certainly I see why ITSA members want to discuss the problem of adware, and why they want to come to a joint decision on stopping bad advertising practices. After all, Expedia would understandably hesitate to stop targeting (say) Orbitz, if there was reason to worry Orbitz would keep running ads that target Expedia. This prisoner’s-dilemma problem calls for the intervention of a trade association, and ITSA seems a natural choice. But the right result from such intervention is to prohibit these bad practices and enforce members’ future compliance — not to sugar-coat the problem.

ITSA members aren’t gaining anything from adware. To the contrary, they pay big fees to adware vendors, but they’re often just trading customers who are already at ITSA member sites. Expedia would be better served by a policy that prevents Orbitz and Travelocity from stealing its traffic, in exchange for a reciprocal promise that Expedia will behave accordingly. Such a policy would serve consumers too, by reducing the funding available to adware vendors and limiting their incentives to sneak onto users’ PCs. That’s the approach I’d like to see from ITSA.

If ITSA is up for a challenge, it could focus on getting travel vendors’ ads out of adware — starting with its own members. ITSA member Cendant owns Cheap Tickets, Howard Johnson, and Super 8 — all three of which are still advertising with Direct Revenue. So is Travelocity. (All confirmed just yesterday, March 30.) Yesterday I also saw Cendant’s Budget Rent A Car still advertising with 180solutions, and Travelocity and Orbitz advertising with Hotbar. Is this what the new ITSA policy will bring? More advertisers for 180solutions, Direct Revenue, and Hotbar, but now with an ITSA stamp of approval? In my view, ITSA should focus on cleaning up its members’ practices, rather than singing adware vendors’ praises.

As best I can tell, adware vendors are the only group that benefits from ITSA’s new policy. No wonder 180solutions endorses ITSA’s approach.

See also criticism from travel expert and consumer advocate Christopher Elliott.