A Closer Look at IronSource Installation Tactics with Pat*

In public statements, IronSource promises to "empower software" through "faster" downloads, "smoother" installations, and increased "user trust." It sounds like a reasonable business — free software for users in exchange for advertising.

Yet a closer look at IronSource installations reveals ample cause for concern. Far from facilitating "user trust," IronSource installations are often strikingly deceptive: they promise to provide software IronSource and its partners have no legal right to redistribute (indeed, specifically contrary to applicable license agreements); they bundle all manner of adware that users have no reason to expect with genuine software; they bombard users with popup ads, injected banner ads, extra toolbars, and other intrusions. It’s the very opposite of mainstream legitimate advertising. We are surprised to see such deceptive tactics from a large firm that is, by all indications, backed by distinguished investors and top-tier bankers.

In the following sections, we present two representative IronSource bundles, then offer broader assessments and recommendations.

An IronSource-Brokered "Chrome Browser"

Install a "Chrome Browser" and you wouldn’t expect a bundle of adware. But that’s exactly what we found when we tested an IronSource bundle by that name.

IronSource snares users who are searching for Google Chrome IronSource snares users who are searching for Google Chrome

IronSource landing page repeatedly presents Google's Chrome trademark and logo, giving little indication that users have reached an independent installer. IronSource landing page repeatedly presents Google’s Chrome trademark and logo, giving little indication that users have reached an independent installer.

Installer also lacks any branding of its own, giving little indication that users have reached an independent installer. Installer also lacks any branding of its own, giving little indication that users have reached an independent installer.

IronSource's installer presents a series of screens like this, each touting a separate bundled adware. Eventually a user might notice something amiss -- but no 'cancel' button lets a user reverse the entire process. IronSource’s installer presents a series of screens like this, each touting a separate bundled adware program. Eventually a user might notice something amiss — but no "cancel" button lets a user reverse the entire process.

In testing on October 31, 2014, we began with a Google search for "download google chrome." A large ad promised "Download Google Chrome – Downloadb.net" (title) with details "New Google Chrome(R) 35 Version. Google Chrome 2014. Install Today! Chrome is still fast and loaded with new standard support. -PC Mag". Sublinks below the ad elaborated: "Download the New Version – Get the Latest Chrome(R) – 100% Free Installation". Thus, nothing in the text of the ad gives any suggestion that the ad would take a user to a third party rather than to genuine Google software. The display URL, "google-chrome-install.downloadb.net", might alert sophisticated users — but "downloadb.net" is generic enough that the warning is minimal, and bold type focuses attention on "google-chrome" (matching the user’s search terms).

The resulting landing page did not show anything amiss either. The landing page uses Google’s distinctive Chrome icon twice, as well as the large-type label "Google Chrome." On our standard 1024×768 test PC, no on-screen text offered any logo, any company name, or any product name other than Google Chrome.

We clicked the "Download Free" button to proceed, then run the resulting installer. After a perfunctory first screen (still without any affirmative indication that the software is not a genuine Google offering), the installer began to tout third party software. The installation solicitation was strikingly deceptive. First, the window’s two headings were "Google Chrome" and "Make your selection to continue", plus it repeated the distinctive Google Chrome icon at top-left. Notably, no large type indicated that the software is anything other than genuine Google software. Furthermore, the large scroll box on the right offered the bold-type heading "END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT" — more naturally understood to be a EULA for Chrome, the software the user requested and the software the user expected to receive. Small type at top-left mentioned "Astromedia new-tab add-on," but this could easily be overlooked in light of user expectations, prior statements, window headings, icon, and the EULA box heading. Nor did the bottom disclosure cure the problem: The bottom text mentioned Astromedia only in the second line of a disclosure where it is more likely to be overlooked. In addition, the disclosure’s links (to a EULA and privacy policy the user purportedly certifies having read and accepted) lacked any distinctive color or underline, so users are unlikely to recognize them as links. As a result, users have no reason to know that they are (purportedly) accepting lengthy external documents.

Next, the installer pushed another program, "Framed Display." The screen followed the same template critiqued in the prior paragraph, including deceptive headings, deficient disclosures, and unlabeled links. Moreover, the program name "Framed Display" is itself deceptive — a generic name, a combination of two standard words without secondary meaning, which gives no serious indication of the program’s function, origin, or even the fact that it is third-party software unrelated to Chrome.

The installer then touted two further programs, RegClean Pro and DriverSupport. These at least appeared with logos in the top-left, which might help some users realize that they are being asked to install third-party software. But like the prior screens, these both linked to (and asked users to agree to) contracts presented only via links not formatted as such. Both offers still appeared within a window entitled "Google Chrome," continuing the false suggestion that these programs are affiliated with or endorsed by Google.

Seeing the logos for RegClean and DriverSupport, some users might realize that they have received something other than Google Chrome. But the installer lacked a "Back" button to let a user return to prior screens and revoke the acceptances previously (purportedly) granted.

The install video shows the full install sequence, culminating in various popups, new programs, changed browser settings, and other interruptions. The computer becomes noticeably slower, and most users would find the computer much less useful. In fact we found 2,478 new files created as well as 2,465 registry values created — quite an onslaught. Among the most urgent problems is that, as best we can tell, a user cannot remove the DriverSupport’s window from the screen except by killing the process with Task Manager.

In a remarkable twist, the installer pushes the user to install additional software even after the main installation is complete. In particular, after the user receives the four offers described above, the installer runs a 30+ second download of the various programs to be installed. (In the video, this is 1:16 to 1:50.) The user then sees a "Finish" button. But far from ending the installation solicitations, "Finish" brings a solicitation for yet other adware, MyPCBackup. At the conclusion of an installation and after pushing a button labeled Finish, users naturally and reasonably expect only perfunctory final tasks, not requests to install more unrelated advertising software. Furthermore, the on-screen disclosures say nothing of adware, pop-up ads, or tracking of users’ browsing; and the links to EULA and privacy policy again lack any labeling to alert users that they are clickable. On the whole, users are poorly positioned to evaluate this offer, understand what they are asked to accept, or provide meaningful acceptance. Nor is this installer alone in presenting other solicitations after installation; we’ve seen other IronSource installers try the same scheme.

This bundle constitutes both software counterfeiting and trademark infringement. Contrary to the title of the initial ad and the large-type heading in every screen of the installer, this is not the genuine "Google Chrome" installer that Google provides; rather, it’s a wrapper with all manner of other software from third parties unaffiliated with Google. At every step, the installer features Google’s distinctive "Chrome" brand name and logo with no statement that Google authorized their use. And the installer redistributes Chrome despite a clear admonition, within the standard Chrome Terms of Service, that "You may not … distribute … this Content [Chrome] (either in whole or in part) unless you have been specifically told that you may do so by Google… in a separate agreement." The installer offers no suggestion, and certainly no affirmative statement, that Google has provide any such permission. Indeed, in a telling twist, we found that the installer never even showed the Chrome Terms of Service, contrary to Google’s standard requirement (implemented in all genuine Chrome installers) that users accept the ToS before receiving Chrome.

This bundle is also an objectively bad deal for consumers. A consumer seeking Chrome can easily obtain that exact program, on a standalone basis, without any bundled adware, toolbars, popups, injections, or other extra advertising or tacking. The installer adds nothing of genuine value to users; it delivers only the software that its adware partners pay it to deliver, and the partners pay to have their software delivered to users only because they correctly anticipate that users would not seek to install adware if it were not foisted upon them.

Although the IronSource company name appears nowhere in the installer’s on-screen displays, numerous factors indicate that this is indeed an IronSource installation. For example, installation temporary files include multiple references to "IC", and registry keys were created within the hierarchy HKEY_USERSSIDSoftwareInstallCore. (InstallCore is the IronSource service that provides adware bundling and adware installation.) Other temporary files were created within folders with prefix "ish******", "is**********", and "is*******", best understood as abbreviations for IronSource. Furthermore, while each installer connected to different hosts to obtain installation components, each installer’s hosts included at least one with an IP address used by IronSource (according to standard IP-WHOIS). Host names followed a pattern matching longstanding IronSource practice (as previously reported by, e.g., Sophos), including hosts called cdneu and cdnus, exactly as Sophos reported.

Moreover, it seems that some of the bundled adware is itself made by IronSource. For example, the Astromenda browser plug-in stores its settings in a Windows Registry section entitled SoftwareInstallCore — a fact most logically explained by Astromenda being made by IronSource’s InstallCore.

The Nonexistent "Snapchat Windows" App that Delivers Only Adware

Snapchat fans often wish for a Windows client. No such software exists, but that doesn’t stop an IronSource bundle from claiming to offer one, and thereby bombarding interested users with a variety of adware.

IronSource snares users who are searching for Snapchat. IronSource snares users who are searching for Snapchat.

IronSource landing page repeatedly presents Snapchat's trademark and logo, giving little indication that users have reached an independent installer. In fact there exists no genuine 'Snapchat for PC' software, and IronSource's bundle is most notable for delivering adware. IronSource landing page repeatedly presents Snapchat’s trademark and logo, giving little indication that users have reached an independent installer. In fact there exists no genuine "Snapchat for PC" software, and IronSource’s bundle is most notable for delivering adware.

In testing, we searched for "Snapchat Windows" and clicked an ad claiming to provide the "Latest 2014 PC version" of "Snapchat." The resulting landing page correctly describes Snapchat but says nothing of any bundled adware. Meanwhile, a prominent "McAfee SECURE" Logo purports to certify the trustworthiness of the site, notwithstanding the problems that follow. (We discuss McAfee’s strange role, both flagging this installation and simultaneously certifying it, at the end of this article.)

We clicked "DOWNLOAD NOW" and proceeded to the installer. The first install screen said nothing of any bundled adware. The subsequent screens (second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth) had the same problems detailed above, including lacking distinctive branding for the unrelated third-party software that’s touted, lacking distinctive format on links to contracts users purportedly accept, and lacking back buttons to serve users who realize something is amiss and want to change their mind. Additional shortcomings in this installation:

  • As we repeatedly demonstrated in the install video (1:35 to 1:47, 2:34, 2:47, 3:01), even if a user does click to activate the license, the installer remains superimposed always-on-top in the foreground, thereby blocking a user’s effort to read the document the user is purportedly accepting.
  • For one bundled program (video at 2:19 and 2:29), the agreements are hosted on an inoperational server, which completely prevents any attempt to read them.
  • The text of the installation disclosures is illogical. For example, the disclosure for MyPCBackup adware advises the user to "Click ‘Play’ on the video to see what MyPCBackup can do for you" — but no video or play button is shown.

This installer bundles even more software than the fake Chrome installer detailed above. We found the fake Snapchat bundling Astromenda, Framed Display, RegClean Pro, MyPCBackup, and Weatherbug.

As far as we can tell, the installer never actually provides Snapchat software. Rather, the installer provides unrelated software called BlueStacks (a program which lets users "install" and use Android apps on Windows PC). It’s no surprise that the installer doesn’t provide a Snapchat Windows app, since none exists. Yet this omission undermines the entire value proposition promised to the user. Notably, BlueStacks is itself freely available, without bundled adware.

Similar Installations

We have seen numerous similar installations. These installs share many factors:

  • They grab the attention of users searching leading search engines for common software including popular commercial applications like Adobe Reader, Chrome, Firefox, Flash, Internet Explorer, and Java as well as open source software such as 7zip, GIMP, and OpenOffice.
  • Often, the installations significantly overstate the need for the installation or the benefits it can provide. For example, some installation solicitations falsely claim that a media player is out of date or, as in the Snapchat example above, even promise software that does not actually exist.
  • They use generic domain names (our examples of downloadb.net and downloadape.org are typical) with no affirmative indication that they are not the official distributors of the specified software. Quite the contrary, their text, images, and layout suggest that they are the authoritative sources for the software they promise.
  • They fail to disclose the presence of bundled adware until midway through the download process, and they almost always lack "back" buttons to let a user reverse course once the bundled adware becomes apparent.
  • They fail to disclose the true identity of the companies behind the installs, including using domains with limited or no contact information, as well as domain Whois with privacy protection.

Ultimately, these bundled installations provide users with nothing of genuine value beyond the adware-free installs easily available from the original developers. They are a source of widespread user complaints on software discussion forums, as users with so much adware systematically report that their computers are slow and unreliable.

IronSource’s Responsibility

By all indications, IronSource has the right and ability to control these installations. Installation code is obtained from IronSource servers; the installer EXE acts as a bootstrap, downloading configuration and components at runtime. Indeed, the IronSource installer architecture entails all "creative" materials (such as installation text and images) hosted on IronSource servers, letting IronSource easily accept or reject configuration details.

IronSource is likely to blame third party "partners" for most or all of the defects we have listed, but our analysis indicates that IronSource is importantly responsible. First, IronSource’s servers and systems create the installation bundle; IronSource can easily refuse to create deceptive installations, including refusing to create bundles with names matching well-known software such as "Chrome." Moreover, by IronSource’s own admission, its systems select and optimize the offers presented to users: "InstallCore improves install completion rates by about 32%" with "customized installers [that] reinforce branding and user trust," optimized through "the installer A/B testing tool to continuously improve results." IronSource even indicates that its own staff design installations: "Every branded installer is backed by dedicated graphic designers and a team of UI/UX specialists [who] adjust and continually make improvements that drive more installs." And IronSource itself brokers the relationships between "premium advertisers" (making adware) and software publishers using IronSource installers.

Meanwhile, the apps at issue entail self-evident counterfeiting. It is widely known that Google does not allow third parties to bundle its Chrome browser with adware, and that there is no such thing as a Snapchat Windows app. Even the barest of examinations by IronSource staff would have revealed these implausible titles for the respective installers — red flags that the installations are not what they claim to be.

IronSource’s installers are "bootstraps" that check with an IronSource server before beginning an installation. (IronSource explains that its "installation client downloads in real-time a list of offers" to present to a given user.) By removing or modifying installer configuration files on an IronSource server, IronSource can disable any installer it determines to be deceptive or otherwise improper — even months after that installer was created. Thus, IronSource can easily block further installs using the deceptive practices we have flagged here, as well as similar practices by other installers.

Notably, IronSource’s involvement meets the common law tests for both contributory and vicarious liability, wherein a company is liable for the actions of its partners. Contributory liability arises when a company knows of illicit acts and when it assists in those acts. Here, IronSource surely knows of illicit conduct (including counterfeiting) both because it is obvious and because consumers and rights-holders have complained. IronSource’s knowledge of deceptive installation disclosures is even clearer because by all indications IronSource systems optimized or even designed the installation disclosures. As to IronSource’s assistance, note that IronSource helps partners by entering into agreements with adware providers to be paid to install their software, bundling adware into installers, and designing and optimizing installers. IronSource thus satisfies the tests for contributory liability. Meanwhile, vicarious liability arises when a company has the power to prevent illicit acts and when it benefits from those acts. Here, IronSource can stop the deceptive installations because each installation checks with IronSource servers to obtain adware to be presented to users, which gives IronSource with an easy opportunity to disable an installer. IronSource benefits from the installations because it retains a portion of the payment from adware vendors. IronSource thus also satisfies the test for vicarious liability. In addition, of course, IronSource might itself be directly liable for those acts that it does itself, e.g. designing or optimizing deceptive installations.

TRUSTe Trusted Download Violations

IronSource has sought and obtained TRUSTe Trusted Download certification, which claims to assure that software is "safe" so that users "feel more secure" and proceed with installations. Trusted Download requires compliance with numerous rules, and our inspection reveals that IronSource falls short.

For one, TRUSTe Trusted Download rules specifically prohibit "induc[ing] the User to install, download or execute software by misrepresenting the identity or authority of the person or entity providing the software." See rule 14.g. IronSource might argue that if any such misrepresentation occurred, it was made by an IronSource distributor, publisher, or other partner, but not by IronSource itself. But rule 14.j disallows certified software from being included in any bundle with software engaging in violations of any portion of rule 14. So even if it was IronSource’s partners who violated rule 14.g, their violation put IronSource in violation of rule 14.j.

Furthermore, TRUSTe Trusted Download requires disclosures that go well beyond what these installs actually provide. For example, rule 3.a.i.2 requires "prominent link[s]" to all reference notices providing full terms and conditions, whereas the examples above show links not labeled as such (without distinctive color or underlining), and thereby prevent users from recognizing the links as such. We also question whether IronSource partners’ changes of user browser configuration (home page, toolbars, etc.) satisfy the requirement of 3.a.i.1.A-D.

Here too, IronSource might argue that its distributors, publishers, or other partners are responsible for these violations. But Trusted Download rules specifically speak to a company’s responsibility for its partners’ disclosures. See rule 9. Under rule 9.a, IronSource is required to establish contractual provisions in agreements with partners to assure compliance with TRUSTe’s rules. Under 9.d, IronSource must demonstrate to TRUSTe that it has an effective process for assuring compliance. Under 9.e, IronSource must itself monitor compliance and report any known noncompliance to TRUSTe; failure to report is itself a violation.

A further violation comes from IronSource’s detection of virtualization environments where its software may be tested. Trusted Download rule 2.c.viii requires that certified software be compatible with virtualization tools such as VMware to facilitate testing. In contrast, IronSource systematically declines to show adware offers — its raison d’être — when running in virtualization environments. If TRUSTe tested IronSource using VMware, TRUSTe staff would see none of IronSource’s deceptive installation solicitations, and they would reach a mistaken assessment of IronSource’s purpose and effect.

We have forwarded these violations to TRUSTe and urged TRUSTe to revoke the certification of IronSource. Given the nature and scope of the violations, we suggest revocation without permission to reapply. TRUSTe’s distinguished members and Trusted Download founding supporters (including AOL, Verizon, and Yahoo) wouldn’t want to be associated with a company engaged in software counterfeiting, trademark infringement, adware bundling, and the other practices we have presented.

Violations of Other Industry Rules for Software Practices

Beyond TRUSTe, several key firms and industry groups offer standards for software practices. IronSource installations systematically fall short.

For example, Google’s Software Principles require "upfront disclosure" of the programs to be installed and their effects, whereas these IronSource installations disclose the programs one at a time — the very opposite of "upfront." Furthermore, Google’s "keeping good company" principle disallows bundling an app with others that violate Google’s principles and simultaneously blocking any IronSource attempt to deflect responsibility to others. Meanwhile, Google’s AdWords Counterfeit Goods policy prohibits any attempt to "pass [something] off as a genuine product of [a] brand owner," thereby disallowing IronSource installations that claim to be Google, Snapchat, or the like. Google’s AdWords Misrepresentation policy requires that an advertiser "first provid[e] all relevant information and obtain… the user’s explicit consent" (emphasis added) before prompting users to begin a download, whereas these IronSource installations include no such disclosures on landing pages and disclose bundled apps one by one during the installer. Other Google requirements ban deceptive domain names and display domains as well as unauthorized distribution of copyrighted content, which also occur here. We see strong arguments that IronSource installs fall short of each of these requirements.

Microsoft’s Bing has similar Editorial Guidelines, which these installations similarly violate. For example, Microsoft’s intellectual property guidelines disallow promoting counterfeit goods and further disallow copyright infringements (such as redistribution of another company’s software without its permission). Microsoft’s misleading content guidelines prohibit deceptive suggestions about a site’s relationship with a product provided by others and requires an explicit disclosure of that fact. Microsoft further limits use of brands and logos which tend to give a false sense of authorization. Microsoft’s software guidelines add special rules for installations including requirements for the timing and substance of disclosures, and Microsoft specifically bans adding additional software to a package produced by someone else. We see strong arguments that IronSource installs fall short of each of these requirements.

Facing these and other requirements, it’s hard to see how IronSource could claim to comply. In response, Google and Microsoft should ban IronSource from advertising through their respective search engines. They should enforce that ban both through diligent checks and through "cease and desist" orders advising IronSource and its partners and affiliates not to attempt to buy advertising through intermediaries or other company names.

The Role and Responsibility of Investors

IronSource’s efforts to date have relied on significant support from investors. Specific investors apparently decline to be listed (perhaps anticipating unwanted scrutiny like this article). But the Wall Street Journal reports that JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley are serving as bankers and raised $80 to $100 million in August 2014. IronSource reportedly plans an IPO for 2015 with anticipated valuation of $1.5 billion.

We wonder whether investors fully understand IronSource’s activities, users’ distaste for adware, and the lurking risks if users, software rights-holders, search engines, and others seek to block IronSource’s activities. Suppose, for example, that Google banned all IronSource installations from advertising in AdWords — a reasonable decision based on the deceptive installations flagged here. A few large losses like this could put a major crimp in IronSource’s plans.

Interest from investors also opens IronSource to new forms of vulnerability and accountability. A decade ago, notorious adware vendor Direct Revenue succeeded in raising significant funds from investors, some of whom later found their computers running Direct Revenue adware. In a notable email, Barry Osherow of TICC sought personal assistance from Direct Revenue CEO Joshua Abram in removing unwanted Direct Revenue adware. In another, a consumer complained to Insight Partners about their funding of Direct Revenue. Insight’s Ben Levin passed the message on to managing director Deven Parekh who instructed that Insight be removed from Direct Revenue’s web site. Deven specifically worried that “all I need is Bob Rubin getting this email,” referring to the former Secretary of the Treasury who later became a special limited partner at Insight. (These emails and hundreds of others became publicly available when the New York Attorney General sued Direct Revenue and released selected business records.) In my view, these investors were correct to worry that their adware would attract unwanted public scrutiny, and that risk remains for current adware investors.

Co-author Edelman has updated his Investors Supporting Spyware page to list IronSource and known information about its investors and bankers.

Next Steps

IronSource boasts that its installation service "installs better" in that it "improves install completion rates by about 32%." IronSource attributes increased installations to solving technical problems. But another plausible reason for more installs is that IronSource and its partners resort to exceptional deception including disguising their software as coming from others, presenting disclosures that are at best incomplete, and otherwise pushing the limits in foisting advertising software few users would willingly accept. In that context, a higher installation rate is nothing to celebrate; more installs just mean more users infected with unwanted adware.

To bring an end to these practices, a natural first step is to enforce existing rules for advertising standards and practices. Having established Trusted Download to check for this kind of misbehavior, TRUSTe is particularly well positioned to take action based on the violations detailed above. TRUSTe should at least revoke its erroneously-granted certification and perhaps also post an affirmative statement of noncompliance. Google and Microsoft should similarly ban these IronSource installations from their respective search engines.

Computer security companies appear to have at best partial success at detecting both IronSource and the additional programs that IronSource bundlers install. For example, on December 15, 2014, Mozilla blocked the Astromenda Search Addon (included in both bundles presented above) from being installed into any Firefox browsers, reporting that "This add-on is silently installed and is considered malware, in violation of the Add-on Guidelines." That said, IronSource quickly moved to pushing new toolbar, this time labeled Vosteran, with similar functionality. As of the posting of this article, Vosteran has not been blocked by Mozilla. For a broader assessment of security companies’ assessment of IronSource software, we used VirusTotal to check detections of the fake Snapchat installer described above. VirusTotal reported just 14 of 54 security programs detecting it as unesirable software. For example, McAfee detected it, but Microsoft and Symantec did not.

We are particularly struck by McAfee’s inconsistent approach to IronSource software. On one hand, as we note above, McAfee was one of a minority of security vendors that detected IronSource’s fake Snapchat app, so if a McAfee user attempts to install the app, a warning will protect the user. That said, McAfee SiteAdvisor’s online safety tool inexplicably fails to detect downloadape.org, the site hosting the installer. (Disclosure: co-author Edelman previously served as an advisor to SiteAdvisor, but has had no connection to the product or McAfee since 2010.) In addition, as we note above, the fake Snapchat landing page features a prominent "McAfee SECURE" logo which purports to certify the trustworthiness of the site. Once McAfee’s software flagged the app as untrustworthy — correctly, in our view — we think SiteAdvisor’s page should have been updated and any McAfee SECURE certification should have been rescinded.

We and others have been fighting adware for more than a decade. But with capable and well-funded adversaries like IronSource pushing adware through new and creative tactics, there’s ample work left to do.

* – Pat participated as an equal coauthor but prefers to be listed only with his first name.

Blinkx Adware Revisited: Installation and Operation

My January 2014 “Darker Side of Blinkx” explored Blinkx’s adware business and other controversial practices. The posting prompted significant interest, but unexpectedly much of the subsequent discussion focused on why I did the work rather than Blinkx’s actual practices. With this piece, I further examine of Blinkx’s adware, deceptive installations, and other tactics that harm both users and advertisers.

In remarks last week, Blinkx attributed Zango’s downfall to “lax oversight of rogue partners.” In today’s article, I show similar problems among Blinkx’s installations. I begin with deceptive installation of Blinkx adware when users request a (nonexistent) Flappy Bird game — an abusive bait-and-switch installation that burdens a user with half a dozen different adware programs yet never provides the promised game. I then show similarly deceptive installation of Blinkx adware when users request a (nonexistent) Snapchat app for Windows. I compare these practices to FTC requirements and evaluate Blinkx’s defenses. I then to demonstrate Blinkx that adware undermines HTTPS security by collecting and retransmitting users’ seemingly-secure browsing activity, as well as showing deceptive advertisements that targeted web sites would never allow along with numerous ad-fraud popups that charge merchants for traffic they would otherwise receive for free. I then find Blinkx adware loading Google ads in pop-ups, which specifically violates Google ad placement rules. I conclude with recommendations and next steps.

Note that this article examines only Blinkx’s ex-Zango adware business — not its ex-AdOn traffic brokering or its various other activities.

Deceptive Installation: Fake Flappy Bird App Installs Blinkx Adware

Softdlspro claims to offer a 'Flappy Birds Game Download.' The bundle provides myriad adware including Blinkx adware, but no Flappy Birds. Softdlspro claims to offer a “Flappy Birds Game Download.” The bundle provides myriad adware including Blinkx adware, but no Flappy Birds.

Deceptive Fast Media Converter installation solicitation pretends to be a Flash Player update.  It installs Blinkx adware (and more). Deceptive Fast Media Converter installation solicitation pretends to be a Flash Player update. It installs Blinkx adware (and more).

Deceptive Super Backup installation puts the Next button above disclosures, and makes no mention of any popups or any advertising at all.Deceptive Super Backup installation puts the Next button above disclosures, and makes no mention of any popups or any advertising at all.

A decade after the dawn of adware, one might ask why users agree to install programs that slow their computers, reduce their privacy, and bombard them with pop-up ads. A close look at Blinkx installs is instructive: Often, users aren’t fairly told what they’re getting. Though FTC rules call for clear disclosure of key effects, in prominent text outside a license agreement, Blinkx and its partners often omit these statements. That omission isn’t just an occasional error — it’s a common characteristic of many Blinkx installations. Yet the omission is no great surprise: If Blinkx and its partners fairly told users what they’d be getting, most users would decline. The following sections show installations with this problem (among others).

On February 10, 2014, Flappy Bird creator Dong Nguyen withdrew his popular game from Apple and Google’s app stores. In response, users went to search engines to try to get the game. Users searching on Google often saw ads that promoted a Softdlspro page that purported to offer “Flappy Bird Game Downloads” but actually had no such thing. Through this process, unfortunate users received Blinkx adware.

In the top screenshot at right and in a first video, I demonstrate that a search for “flappy birds” took users to a Softdlspro download page. In a second video, I then show that this Softdlspro bundle bombards users with an onslaught of adware. In my testing, a user who attempts to install this game is asked to install Fast Media Converter adware (video at 2:42), Program Starter (3:51), Yahoo Toolbar (3:55), Gamevance/Trafficvance ArcadeParlor adware, “Clean Water Action Reminder” from We-Care (a browser plug-in that monitors users’ browsing and claims affiliate commission on users’ purchases) (4:02), SLOW-PCfighter (which purports to offer computer repair) (4:03), and Super Backup (4:08).

This Softdlspro “Flappy Bird” bundle appears to install two different programs with Blinkx adware. First, Softdlspro touts Fast Media Converter, which installs Blinkx ex-Zango adware. I credit that the FMC site and EULA give no immediate indication that FMC installs Blinkx adware. But taken as whole, the installation leaves litle doubt. Relevant factors: FMC retrieves configuration files and advertisements from URLs that match standard ex-Zango patterns. FMC’s pop-up ads match the longstanding Zango format including the same user-interface and delivery methods. (Examples: FMC popups defraud Amazon by claiming commission on Amazon’s organic traffic. FMC popups claim a “New Version Available” and use the Chrome name and logo. FMC popups claim “your Video Player has a faster version available” and use the Internet Explorer name and logo. FMC popups claim “Outdated Browser Detected” and repeatedly use the Internet Explorer name and logo.) In addition, the FMC installer downloads component EXEs from Premium-apps.net, which is Ignition Installer run by Verti Group, a Blinkx subsidiary.

Second, Softdlspro’s “Flappy Bird” touts Super Backup which is also monetized by Blinkx. Super Backup more readily discloses the link to Blinkx: Its Privacy Policy (visible in the video at 4:17) describes the program’s advertising component as “LeadImpact Software,” and its Terms of Use say the same thing. Furthermore, LeadImpact’s privacy policy says LeadImpact comes from Pinball Corp, and LeadImpact’s DNS servers are also within pinballcorp.com. Notably, Blinkx’s 2010 annual report lists Pinball as a wholly-owned subsidiary. LinkedIn statements are in accord: Tony Gozzo describes his employer as “the Leadimpact division” of Blinkx, and Ramon Navarro says he works for “Leadimpact – a division of Blinkx.”

The Softdlspro “Flappy Bird” bundle is deceptive for multiple reasons. For one, it never provides the game the user requested and the offer purports to provide. Any associated “consent” to receive adware is therefore ill-gotten; as Softdlspro didn’t hold up its end of the bargain.

Furthermore, the Softdlspro offers are less than forthright. Consider the Fast Media Converter solicitation that appears in the video at 2:42 and in the second screenshot at right. (In general this is a freestanding offer — it appears on its own web page, separate from the Softdlspro install window, so users can and do receive this offer from other sources. That said, the Softdlspro installer systematically opens this web page, so users in the fake Flappy Birds install sequence are bound to see this pitch too.) The FMC offer reads “An update to Adobe Flash Player is available,” prominently references “Adobe Flash Player 12”, and uses the distinctive Adobe logo. But the software at issue is not provided by, or in any way affiliated with, Adobe. Indeed, Fast Media Converter has no genuine connection to Adobe Flash Player, and FMC uses the Adobe name, logo, and trademark only to appear familiar and legitimate. Users may be induced to install software because they are told it will “update” software they genuinely want on their computers. But when Blinkx and its distributors falsely claim to provide updates to unrelated software, any user’s “agreement” is ill-gotten and invalid.

FMC’s disclosures are also cause for concern. FMC mentions advertisements in a single clause midway through its installation disclosure (third paragraph, next-to-last sentence) — a place where users are unlikely to notice. Furthermore, the disclosure is vague: FMC “is ad-supported software and displays advertisements during your web browsing experience.” Missing from this disclosure are the two key facts FMC needs to convey to users before asking them to accept the adware: First, that ads appear in pop-ups, a format users are known to dislike. Second, that the adware tracks users’ browsing in detail and at all times. Such disclosures are required to alert users to the material consequences of the installation, and such disclosures are specifically required under longstanding FTC rules. See analysis below.

In some respects, the Super Backup installation is even more deceptive. For the on-screen display, see the video at 4:08 and the third screenshot at right. Prominent on-screen disclosures are placed above the oversized green “Next” button. But these disclosures only mention innocuous features about a program launcher. (These features are associated with Program Starter, a bundler that solicits a series of further installations.)

  • Blinkx’s Super Backup is mentioned in a format that invites users to overlook what they are purportedly accepting. The disclosure is in grey type on a grey background (text color RGB 128 128 128 against 224 224 224, whereas black on white would be the higher-contrast 0 0 0 on 255 255 255).
  • The disclosure is at the far bottom of the window, outside the natural flow of a user’s review from top to bottom. Indeed, a user reading the window from top to bottom would have already have reached (and perhaps clicked) the Next button before reaching the disclosure.
  • The Next button does not solicit a clear manifestation of assent. To obtain meaningful permission to install, Biinkx and its partners would need a label like “I accept” or “I agree.”
  • Worst of all, the disclosure says nothing at all about advertising. It only mentions backup functions: “makes backup easy with intelligent system scans…” A user reading this description would conclude that Super Backup provides backup with no advertising at all. But in fact Super Backup uses the ex-Zango adware engine to present users with popup ads.

These Super Backup practices fall short of legal requirements, including the duty to disclose material effects outside the license agreement. See analysis below.

Deceptive Installation: Fake Snapchat App Installs Blinkx Adware

Soft1d claims to offer a Snapchat download. The bundle actually provides myriad adware but no Snapchat app.Soft1d claims to offer a Snapchat download. The bundle actually provides myriad adware including Blinkx adware, but no Snapchat app.

In February 2014, I used Google to search for a Snapchat app from a Windows PC. Sophisticated users may know that there is no such app — Snapchat is for phones only. But in my testing (preserved in video), my request yielded a Soft1d page ad touting an app purportedly entitled “Snapchat.” I clicked Download Now (0:10), ran the resulting installer, and ultimately received no Snapchat app — but I did receive numerous adware including adware funded by Blinkx ads. Specifically, the bundle included Program Starter (1:40), a deceptive Fast Media Converter “Update to Adobe Flash Player” solicitation (1:49), Yahoo Toolbar (3:40), Savings Bull (3:42), Gamevance/Trafficvance Arcade Parlor adware (3:43), “Clean Water Action Reminder” from We-Care (3:48), and SLOW-PCfighter (3:50).

These installations are deceptive for the same reasons detailed in the preceding section.

Chris Boyd of ThreatTrack Labs critiqued this same installation in a posting dated November 19, 2013. Yet the same practices continued three months later in February 2014. To my knowledge, these practices are ongoing.

Blinkx might like to write off these practices as rogue affiliates or subaffiliates. Such a response would be ironic after Blinkx attributed Zango’s downfall to “lax oversight of rogue partners.” Most importantly, these installations are the norm and not the exception: When I find a distributor asking users to install Blinkx adware, the distribution has defects like these as often as not.

Blinkx says users who receive its adware are “getting utility for free in exchange for being served ads.” Blinkx further claims “the user experience is explicit and clear” and “the installation process is unambiguous.” Blinkx even touts a “25 point evaluation check list” for every app it considers as a distributor for its adware. But the installations speak for themselve; whatever Blinkx is doing, it’s not enough. The fact is, Blinkx’s distributors are pushing its adware through deception — claiming to be “Update to Adobe Flash,” promising apps like Flappy Bird and Snapchat that they don’t even provide, and failing to disclose key effects in the way the FTC requires.

Relevant FTC Requirements

The FTC Act bans “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” (15 USC 45). Cases interpret the prohibition on “deceptive” practices to disallow conduct that is “likely to mislead” (Gill , 71 F.Supp.2d at 1037, citing Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. FTC, 785 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1986)). In litigation evaluating a FTC complaint, a court examines a defendant’s representation to determine whether the “net impression” is likely to mislead reasonable consumers. See FTC v. Cyberspace.com, LLC , 453 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006). Notably, it is not a sufficient defense for a defendant merely to disclose the truth somewhere. FTC. v Cyberspace.com is on point: “A solicitation may be likely to mislead by virtue of the net impression it creates even though the solicitation also contains truthful disclosures” (emphasis added). See also Removatron Int’l Corp., 884 F.2d at 1497 (examining the “common-sense net impression” of an allegedly deceptive advertisement).

Caselaw on “unfair” advertising takes an equally dim view of Blinkx’s tactics. The FTC’s Policy Statement on Unfairness disallows behavior that causes or is likely to cause substantial consumer injury that a consumer could not reasonably avoid, and is not outweighed by the benefit to consumers. Blinkx might argue that users can avoid its adware by declining installation solicitations. But the vague, unclear, and otherwise-deceptive installation disclosures make it difficult for a reasonable user to understand what they are asked to accept and to recognize the importance of declining. Meanwhile, in the examples I presented, Blinkx adware fails to offer a single benefit to consumers. Indeed, Blinkx and its partners never provide the promised benefits (e.g. the Flappy Birds game or Snapchat app), so users receive only the detriment of extra advertising and tracking, without the promised benefit. The failure to provide the promised benefit is an exceptionally clear case of lack of countervailing benefit.

Squarely on point, the FTC has long held that adware may only be installed after providing a clear and conspicuous notice of key effects. For example, in 2008 testimony, Eileen Harrington (FTC Deputy Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection) described the FTC’s view of appropriate practices for adware vendors. Specifically, Harrington stated that “buried disclosures … are not sufficient.” She continued: “burying material information in an End User License Agreement will not shield [an adware] purveyor from Section 5 liability.”

Despite Director Harrington’s statement of applicable requirements, these examples indicate that Blinkx and its distributors are disclosing key practices at most in license agreements, not in prominent on-screen text. In this crucial respect, Blinkx’s practices are exactly contrary to Harrington’s statement of the FTC’s longstanding generally-applicable requirements for adware.

Critiquing Blinkx’s Response to Deceptive Installations

In its response to my January article, Blinkx argues that “Ad supported … options are valid, recognized and accepted alternatives for packaging and distributing premium content.” Blinkx goes on to compare its adware to the Google Chrome web browser, noting that both show ads and that there is nothing inherently wrong with showing ads. (“Chrome is itself ad-supported software distributed by Google.”) Blinkx even compares itself to “mainstream publishers, such as MSNBC.com and People.com,” which also show advertising and sometimes popups. But this misses the concern completely. Google Chrome shows ads in the program window, when it is in use, and at no other times. MSNBC shows ads when a user visits its site, but at no other time. Blinkx adware is quite different: It runs at all times; it tracks users’ browsing and sends users’ activities to Blinkx servers; and it shows frequent popup ads. This could hardly be more different than mainstream web advertising. Moreover, my piece did not criticize ad-supported software in general. Rather, I criticized deficient disclosures that give users no clear statement of what they are (purportedly) accepting. The absence of informative disclosures leads users to “accept” software that, unbeknownst to them, is actually adware they would never have agreed to receive, had they been aware of its true effects.

Blinkx then argues that whatever installation problems occurred, they are not its responsibility. For example, I presented an unauthorized Google Chrome package that (contrary to Google’s Chrome Terms of Service) included Youdownloaders code which installed Desktop Weather Alerts which is Blinkx adware. To this, Blinkx argued that “Youdownloaders is a third party distributor and is neither blinkx nor a blinkx affiliate.” But I never claimed Youdownloaders had a direct relationship with Blinkx. The best description of Youdownloaders is a Blinkx subaffiliate: By all indications, Blinkx pays Desktop Weather Alerts to place Blinkx adware on users’ computers, and then Desktop Weather Alerts in turn pays Youdownloaders. But this chain of relationships in no way relieves Blinkx of responsibility for the underlying installation practices. Indeed, in 2006 litigation against Zango (the very company that created the adware here at issue), the FTC noted that Zango acted “through affiliates and sub-affiliates.” Reinforcing the importance of this business structure, the FTC repeated that phrase six separate times in five paragraphs. Similarly, the FTC’s 2007 order specifically indicated that its obligations apply both to Zango and to any intermediaries Zango chooses to use: In five separate paragraphs, the order repeats that its obligations apply to Zango directly and also to acts “through any person, corporation, subsidiary, division, affiliate, or other device.” Moreover, the FTC further noted that, at best, Zango had failed to adequately supervise its affiliates and their subaffiliates when acting on Zango’s behalf: “Respondents knew or should have known that there was widespread failure by their affiliates and sub-affiliates to provide adequate notice of their adware and obtain consumer consent to its installation.” In such circumstances, the FTC found that Zango was liable for the actions of its affiliates and subaffiliates. The same principle applies to Blinkx.

Relatedly, Blinkx argues that even the conduct of Weather Alerts is not Blinkx’s responsibility because “blinkx does not own Weather Notifications.” But Blinkx admits two sentences later that it “does maintain a commercial relationship with Weather Notifications, where the Company provides the monetization engine for this application and others like it.” Indeed, link Zango, Blinkx has numerous distributors who place its adware onto users’ computers. Zango has historically arranged its partnerships so that its affiliates all used the same name — all installing, at one time, “Zango” adware. Blinkx has now structured its affairs somewhat differently — causing affiliate Weather Notifications to distribute adware with one set of names (including Desktop Weather Alerts) while other affiliates distribute Blinkx adware under other names (such as Fast Media Converter and various others). But the chosen names are irrelevant. Notice Blinkx’s crucial roles: Like Zango, Blinkx provides the adware engine that monitors users’ behavior, targets ads, and displays ads. Furthermore, like Zango, Blinkx sells the ad inventory to advertisers, including receiving advertisers’ requests about which popups to show when users visit which pages and search for which keywords. Consistent with prior litigation and longstanding principles of agency, these efforts make Blinkx responsible for the associated adware. Introducing more product names serves primarily to reduce accountability by making it harder for users to figure out whose adware they are actually running, what company made the adware engine, or who to complain to. But multiple product names do not reduce Blinkx’s responsibility for the underlying practices.

Blinkx and its defenders took issue with a portion of my January article that said certain adware “is part of Blinkx” when the adware is distributed by a third party. But under the FTC’s articulated standards and caselaw, Blinkx is responsible when adware shows ads sold by Blinkx, when Blinkx makes the adware engine that presents the ad, and indeed when the entire advertising delivery system uses Blinkx (ex-Zango) code. In each of the examples I presented previously and above, Blinkx plays these roles. That Blinkx chooses to label its software with the names of third parties such as Weather Alerts and others, rather than under its own name, is of little import to users. Notably, these distinctions are also of no consequence to the FTC, as discussed above.

Blinkx further suggests that Google may even have authorized Youdownloaders to redistribute Chrome and to bundle Chrome with multiple adware programs: “It is quite likely that Youdownloaders may have a commercial relationship with Google” allowing the redistribution I flagged. I emphatically disagree. For one, Google’s Software Principles rules confirm that Google takes a dim view of deceptive bundling: Google requires “upfront disclosure” including “clearly and conspicuously” explaining key functions and advertising, which is missing in the examples above. Google also requires “keeping good company” which requires “not allow[ing] products to be bundled with applications that do not meet these guidelines.” But the bundles at issue include numerous deceptive adware programs. Furthermore, I know of no instance where Google has ever allowed Chrome or any other Google software to be bundled with any adware or other software showing popup ads. Blinkx says it is “quite likely” that Google authorized the installation I flagged. I believe it’s far more likely that Youdownloaders acted without authorization and, indeed, contrary to the Terms of Service that bind every copy of Chrome.

Blinkx consultant E.J. Hilbert purports to have evaluated Blinkx’s practices in search of improprieties. But in describing his methodology, Hilbert says “I have spoken with the Blinkx” staff and managers. Interviews are unlikely to uncover the problems I flagged previously and above. Specifically, Blinkx staff and managers have every reason not to know — and not to want to know — how their affiliates and subaffiliates are getting Blinkx adware onto users’ computers. Nor are Blinkx business records likely to reveal the actions of affiliates and, especially, subaffiliates. The better methodology for investigating such installations is to test live installations on the web, as I did in preparing the installation videos previously and above. Hilbert’s statement gives no indication that he did so.

Hilbert then says that Blinkx’s risk is reduced because “A lot of what blinkx does is … revenue sharing” which he says “takes that ability to hide out of the practice.” I disagree that revenue sharing offers important benefits for the practices at issue. Even if Blinkx pays its distributors and affiliates through revenue sharing, and even if affiliates pay subaffiliates by revenue sharing, the affiliates and subaffiliates still have every incentive to place Blinkx adware on users’ computers without proper disclosure and consent. Revenue sharing in no way dulls the incentive for deceptive installations.

The Applicability and Importance of Zango’s 2007 FTC Consent Order

Blinkx argues at length that Zango’s 2007 FTC consent order does not bind Blinkx. Broadly, Blinkx contends that it “purchase[d] select ex-Zango assets” and that the FTC settlement obligations did not flow with that purchase. A Blinkx attorney even contacted the FTC to seek the FTC’s view. Based on the facts the attorney provided, the attorney reported that an FTC representative stated that he “believes that the Zango consent order might no longer be active or enforceable [on Blinkx] in light on Zango’s bankruptcy.”

I see three reasons why these FTC staff remarks offer Blinkx limited protection. First, as discussed above, the FTC has long held that “buried disclosures” are not sufficient. Zango settlement or not, Blinkx is bound by generally-applicable law, and Blinkx and its partners are using exactly the “buried disclosures” that the FTC has criticized, disallowed, and even brought suit to prevent.

Second, there is good reason to doubt that Blinkx only acquired “select assets” from Zango. In 2009, Zango then-CTO Ken Smith was surprised to see news articles saying that Blinkx acquired “only ten percent” of Zango’s assets, which prompted him to write a piece unambiguously entitled “Blinkx acquired 100% of Zango’s assets.” Smith continued: “[T]he banks have nothing left of Zango’s which they can sell. Blinkx owns it all.” Indeed, Blinkx clearly received the ex-Zango client-side software (adware), the server-side software (receiving information about users’ browsing and selecting and sending ads), the mechanism used to sell the ads (including receiving advertisers’ requests and offers, and collecting payment), Zango’s contractual relationships with advertisers, and Zango’s installed base (computers with Zango adware, which continued showing ads for years). Blinkx’s admittedly “hired select ex-Zango staff.” Blinkx also retained Zango’s headquarters at 136th Place SE Bellevue WA. Apropos of Smith’s message, one might ask: What assets of Zango did Blinkx not acquire? If in fact Blinkx acquired the entire Zango adware business, or substantially all of it, the FTC consent order may well follow the acquisition — as the FTC has repeatedly and successfully argued in other matters.

Third, as Blinkx’s attorney explains in detail, FTC staff specifically refused to offer any official or binding endorsement of Blinkx’s practices — making their informal oral comments non-binding and by all indications not intended for reproduction or redistribution. That’s entirely appropriate, as the FTC is in no position to judge Blinkx’s practices based solely on supposed facts provided by Blinkx; any evaluation would require that the FTC perform its own investigation of Blinkx’s practices and Blinkx’s relationship to Zango. Pending such an evaluation, it’s too soon to say how the FTC would view Blinkx’s activities.

In a further attempt to distance itself from Zango and Zango’s consent order, Blinkx argues that “current practices bear no relation to the ex-Zango practices that led to FTC action in 2006.” In this regard, I urge rereading the FTC’s complaint. In relevant part (emphasis added):

10. In numerous instances, Respondents, through affiliates and sub-affiliates acting on behalf and for the benefit of Respondents, bundled Respondents’ adware with purportedly free software programs (hereinafter “lureware”), including without limitation Internet browser upgrades, utilities, screen savers, games, peer-to-peer file sharing, and/or entertainment content. Respondents, through affiliates and sub-affiliates, generally represented the lureware as being free.

11. When installing the lureware, consumers often have been unaware that Respondents’ adware would also be installed because that fact was not adequately disclosed to them. In some instances, no reference to Respondents’ adware was made on the website offering the lureware or in the install windows. In other instances, information regarding Respondents’ adware was available only by clicking on inconspicuous hyperlinks contained in the install windows or in lengthy terms and conditions regarding the lureware. Because the lureware often was bundled with several different programs , the existence and information about the effects of Respondents’ adware could only be ascertained, if at all, by clicking through multiple inconspicuous hyperlinks. …

13. Respondents knew or should have known that there was widespread failure by their affiliates and sub-affiliates to provide adequate notice of their adware and obtain consumer consent to its installation. …

The preceding examples demonstrate substantially the same problems — “lureware” distributed “through affiliates and subaffiliates acting on behalf and for the benefit of” Blinkx, with “information regarding [Blinkx’s] adware available only by clicking on inconspicuous hyperlinks.” Though seven years old, the FTC’s complaint remains a fine summary of the installation practices at issue. Even if the 2007 consent order does not bind Blinkx, the same concerns — and the FTC’s generally-applicable principles — make Blinkx’s current practices deficient.

Monitoring and Retransmitting Users’ Otherwise-Secure Activities

Blinkx adware observes users’ browsing on all web sites, including sites that employ HTTPS encryption to protect users’ activities from outside examination and interference. Because Blinkx adware runs on users’ computers, HTTPS over-the-wire encryption offers no protection against Blinkx adware examining users’ behavior.

In addition, Blinkx retransmits portions of users’ behavior in cleartext. For one, as users browse, Blinkx sends messages to its control server — obfuscated but by all indications unencrypted. In the excerpted packet log below, see the transmission highlighted in blue, showing the HTTP POST parameter with name epostdata. (Historically, Zango transmitted user activity in clear text in an otherwise-similar method. Example with the relevant transmission marked in yellow.)

Blinkx then also often sends users’ activity details to advertisers. At this stage, the information is neither encrypted nor obfuscated.

For example, in February 2014, I logged in to Google (activating Google’s encryption of all communications between my computer and google.com), then ran a Google search for “cheap flights.” A moment later, Blinkx adware opened a popunder to an advertiser, sending the advertiser the HTTP querystring parameter “FpSub=cheap*flights” (red highlighting below). That transmission exactly revealed the term I had specified in my Google search just seconds earlier, even though my communications with Google were encrypted by HTTPS. See a screen-capture video (confirming the search and encryption) and the unexcerpted packet log (showing the excerpt in context).

POST /showme.aspx?ver=1.0.13.0&pkg_ver=1.0.13.0&rnd=4 HTTP/1.1…
Host: desktopweatheralerts02.desktopweatheralerts00.desktopweatheralerts.com
epostdata=3C60DF491BE019B6857A89B458345C791FF11C4C55E6FC8FB35987CBC1557D1A339623137547FD6C6654CADA9
75131C409FEB9283395BC919707E551027AD090D6091FDFDE98B8BC61B2A63BC53BDC0D1A1ADE3EA8E1D435FC9374A6E997
F16441108EE76153B6FF686FA7C387F36A3E6538ACA30A45DAEC602EC8379A646B307816D825731D8BEAF003EBAD78B9EA2
A50CC41CA8EC06475D89787EFF6D0CBEB614EBDAA642EF628E75B3B7CEE67D329ED0473A25A0B7658708DCDC78D38D64BC7
74979FF5C790B07498F427D6B7A6D7927358BB31D04D483853190ED3DF2624C6D2F5AF8220A09F4C8127506DB58127365CE
7E802385F209311D4176B926D3F2E135AA5A5A72EA88612B9CB5E4E2955F9684E8BFC70139E0CEA582190542B6C9477E912
CEB505940E42AB3C80623ECFF21599AFE3D533B7A4DE8589D178EB996CE29ECD8142D8C91DFD04FA739E19D2EA7179332CB
4E6F28E695A9DA14D45291FFA2289AB24FD4909E542A580397EB75FDFAA834B948596773EB7D306951070937A2DBBB659D6
DBD3F5A4AA893701D83D06825BFB2E332F153DA37745838917237A0C274684F2A04BA80F5AD7EA8523471079417CBB29781
B24DB8869B348CD2FB99CB3AD5A0249FF2407EB276AC0F7776558066304BF116CFC3FC4056B562306DBB4858E77A85AC879
030CB25AEE366703094802AC31A0C8A7495F1D6B07CBDFAC98A59224179D8974C6A184BF7B362040DF1CE0C8FA79D248186
C070053E6E43996407780AFAF7645A733D0717AC6A9E4689C2EEBAFE5E6E600028CDD0BA335C25966A0ABF37B32CCBBCC88
652143BF54BB42B5EB7E526D6BF7C2498F8822D9ED02086ACC723278085A6C006716ABF0CD31205D3A02366C093BE47ED7E
1A8082221B214DFE78D2CFE2385AFB9D85D37CEE076B3109A893C6AF6AA72EE9CF948309C67F83CA8E530324A&data1=01z
M8fY4Pjz%252f2eU5ykwF2WKD4i7vOGf68ZAm01xPGNy3gRrwg5yCweqAgVctm%252b%252bHrHyyVbCqMA28GARV3CugCWKBRv
vJ%252fiQlc%252fSNrRTQniqjqRsrvi%252bw6nUKG4H8sCmoP3IHVih35aSM%252fudbeHi7I9qm6klVmnAT%252f2RFapa9M
BdDXqh4gaVDLu9diOq10N087NnPOZE3nifYHj4Srml9uhiMVE%252fnWdMC0%252fIBwfwb9IhWLsry9YfiN5V99aRmPuoZPn6P
VkIUJ%252bPHs3MGPvKhpusNdr3uR%252bDHkugiVcvIxGi3%252fM%252fGPaE%252bacpY%252bIfaBhJOd315OhlKnz12qRr
HvXydyGcGx%252bt5VkEEz3EiRYinWKwd7wSHfzykYYzwn1DwkfK%252fmfH1pRwsSqvHDCu0gNRsAoX3HqntELdq9OKMIRj%25
2bf5WxZ9HLUTPGibPFT%252bXRsltoAvlY3tl2pENhtkAXUCnx7xNiMjp6wG2y9W7gsDwtKnc7bvyGgM2kkZKE4iwCakYlz9S79
pWl%252bps0IrBMJfLWUx%252fy9JyjBJgdNu0IstCUCPYJvVyA0bzV%252f4kQBybB8%252bOS2wwytiKnpksJNRUNIvRXNzUK
7%252bQunQ6h3gXYFdGhEKdo7glYoivxcyIbL65Z4oze8kx0NM%252fADCXnbkqWNnf8pmZuhpR5L2kVzzZno6p6G78wAJGsZAo
gxRkwVIDvdENnwhDT104NSXao2hwHCUbQ7nFqBfz%252fjf9k0v1Go%252fSLxoHUqkgCCfIrbbd42zygfL24YiHnbFghx4OGcm
UyADk113wYAu7misrVBRGzazaD5zc%252bZqA%252bxWnjiwJF7nOFmO4mC7PGXXSSrZhdqXL6uRbe%252fidiAaQwqB36HuWtG
unkY72K9HwZwViJmaL4rsM28ETJUS9NbU4jESsfnBTZIH%252faViCk7GJnRAgNa3iFo8v9iVrZFtAAzi5%252b%252fWSciE26
ro8rUrZr%252f5iQVyHfGOxgjG1Cc%252btoObB0urQVg48AbuPadcj961p9VYedUrzolNHppRtrTUzyV9%252bLGfn1sUlNRph
ny8oEmlx5GBEs76TVXJBwKju%252fpjUrh1zEESuWrPNUuj3gnhqEUXLdwE7VwpQHPN6P71jRNoAKuZ6QvDOSVJ535pnnz9fAul
ImnnMHDFIiXIhycR7P7ml%252f8Z5Fa8eN0Ac1p%252fCDRnytskpOq8gtSnF3e%252bQdgYwz%252bH4a9mogkR9wio61qpAB%
252fKDKy2xibksTPZfYePBJwGHwWpsH4QNZ2f7yyVanzQAXrGtvUQ0OwkPWlt%252f7aKQw6jkpUfHS8A2hnX0CHI%252fr6Z%2
52fjqMHZWwltzVV00EhAxjxVxXdwn0Ftq5aCbsbUw6RDg0sd14tR5WZYbDyB0HUsI2WRqoEeGvkrN6%252fbvG2SFNll1OcCgJG
Lj2SM6Y8A6C6iSRyIohSuQCqaWC56IGpzenoIO19lPcbUHGrTeYJr14tWuKIIhK6%252fTzhthHEQFqfTQ2BSmt6M2i3Q4k7UX%
252f0FDMrd4Dmt7Kx%252furspSkRzIIARn5QIYTWnvB17Z9l300IiZXVztaget rfwQpF2Ye11Ghzl1jB8A1NrKLSuK5azFl12D8Pb
qDMrXIQe0C4SgPedcWnxOIixma%252f5fEJJ%252fYPIvaVspXlwALzmmcYtB3JbxCLiBzEGLvau0dzfuisHn4IOkJGKr%252fP
7mycLRIdHyZltWCdYTTZSkIRgrX5VQAnHiSqJB8UuV%252bUQ4smjGzcb5JOCs9D9qu8P%252fis5qAblTVkxp5cwTQHOv9zUz6
FMwOAHkDu50T4jIXm0FKtvFF7E%252bkl2zCJHXPg%252b80FUt6LBLCrMn%252bRiSC3vq01SbhLGuhpRPCJSIlBXUzbwFFGkI
QmnG%252b2D3S%252fC7tJzJ40kZhazr89%252fEPRK94Sz0OT7JRDLH%252bzlruvZnsC9MQ4HlaPxU69ssxu32Fli6fb228zS
2mkDQOLJ%252beAC7ygJ6kmeMRf2vXLdas28%253d

HTTP/1.1 200 OK…
 
ad_url: <input id=ad_url name=ad_url value=http://www.cheapoair.com/?FpAffiliate=Zango&amp;FpSub=cheap*flights><br> …

GET /?FpAffiliate=Zango&FpSub=cheap*flights HTTP/1.1 …
Host: www.cheapoair.com
 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK …

Google goes to great lengths to keep users’ searches confidential, including devoting additional server capacity and electricity to the required encryption. Blinkx defeats those efforts by interceding at the user’s computer and retransmitting a portion of users’ search terms unencrypted, in plaintext. Blinkx’s interception and retransmission allows users’ activities to be observed by anyone along the way, including by other users of the same wifi hotspot.

The FTC has previously filed suit against companies whose desktop software revealed communications through broadly similar design flaws. In 2010, I reported college savings service Upromise transmitting users’ activity in cleartext, even when sites used HTTPS to attempt to keep that information confidential. In response, the FTC brought a complaint against Upromise. In count 1, the FTC expressed concern that Upromise collected “information consumers provided in secure sessions when interacting with third-party websites.” To my knowledge, Blinkx’s data collection is a notch less aggressive than Upromise: Upromise collected credit card numbers, social security numbers, and more, whereas in my testing Blinkx largely collects and retransmits search terms and domain names. But the same principle holds, and the plain language of the FTC’s complaint indicates well-justified concern at client-side software collecting (and insecurely retransmitting) information that users had transmitted with the benefit of encryption.

Incidentally, the green highlighting above shows that when Cheapoair receives traffic from Blinkx, it labels the traffic as coming from “Zango.” Consistent with my longstanding experience, this indicates that Cheapoair, an ex-Zango advertiser, was automatically transferred to Blinkx.

Deceptive Popup Ads

Blinkx adware presents a deceptive ad falsely claiming 'You have been personally selected for todays annual anonymous survey.' Blinkx adware presents a deceptive ad falsely claiming “You have been personally selected for todays annual anonymous survey” (s.i.c.).

Blinkx adware presents a deceptive ad falsely claiming a user's browser needs updating. Blinkx adware presents a deceptive ad falsely claiming a user’s browser needs updating.

Once installed, Blinkx adware shows deceptive ads. For example, in testing on March 10, 2014, Desktop Weather Alerts used the Blinkx adware engine to present a Consumerslifestyledaily .com popup claiming “You have been personally selected for todays annual anonymous survey” (s.i.c.). See top screenshot at right. Because Blinkx told Consumerslifestyledaily .com the domain name of the site I had been viewing, the popup mentioned the name of that site — making the popup look more like a genuine part of the site, even though the site had nothing to do with the popup and indeed is a victim of the popup’s ability to divert and distract its users. Moreover, far from conducting a bona fide survey, the questions actually lead only to a page that attempts to sell the user skincare products and electronic cigarettes — claiming “Your price: $0.00” but adding significant shipping charges.

Similarly, in testing on March 9, Blinkx adware delivered a N9dj.info popup claiming “Outdated Browser Detected” (screenshots: 1, 2). The popup used the distinctive Internet Explorer logo and even delivered an installer called Internet_Explorer_Setup.exe. Despite the “Internet Explorer” label, the popup attempted to install an adware bundle, not Internet Explorer. Moreover, the popup falsely claimed “You are currently using Internet Explorer 7 which is now outdated,” when in fact I was browsing using Windows 8 which came with Internet Explorer 10.

In critiquing Fast Media Converter’s installation of Blinkx adware above, I noted its deceptive ads: claiming a “New Version Available” and using the Chrome name and logo, claiming “your Video Player has a faster version available” and using the Internet Explorer name and logo, and claiming “Outdated Browser Detected” and repeatedly using the Internet Explorer name and logo.

Only because of Blinkx are these advertisers able to interrupt users’ browsing to display their deceptive offers. Consider: I received these popups while browsing well-known trusted sites that would never accept such deceptive advertising. But Blinkx has no such standards.

Defrauding Affiliate Merchants (this section co-authored with Wesley Brandi)

Blinkx and a rogue affiliate charge Hotels.com for traffic it would otherwise receive for free. Blinkx and a rogue affiliate charge Hotels.com for traffic it would otherwise receive for free.

My January posting flagged Blinkx defrauding affiliate merchants by loading popups that promote the very merchants users are already visiting — thereby claiming commission on users that the merchants had already reached via other methods. I noted that these practices can be difficult for merchants to detect: Standard measurement systems report a high volume of sales, hence seemingly-effective ad campaigns, and the measurement systems fail to alert merchants that this is traffic they would otherwise receive without charge.

To demonstrate the scope of the problem, Wesley and I today post ten more examples showing widespread affiliate fraud.

These incidents weren’t hard to find: Wesley and I built automation that runs many adware programs (not just Blinkx) to protect our advertiser and ad network clients. Our automation found all these examples (and plenty more) in one 12-hour run. Indeed, in the course of a typical month, we regularly alert our clients to a dozen rogue affiliates using Blinkx adware, making Blinkx adware among the most frequent sources of prohibited affiliate traffic draining our clients’ budgets.

# Date Traffic origin Intermediary domains Network Victim merchant Notes Details
1 April 4, 2014 Blinkx adware Statsad, Bdpromocodes Tradedoubler Expedia UK Referer faking screenshot, packet log
2 April 4, 2014 Blinkx adware Trackmyads Zanox Hotels.com   screenshot, packet log
3 April 4, 2014 Blinkx adware Gottemborgcity.blogspot.no Tradedoubler Hotels.com   screenshot, packet log
4 April 4, 2014 Blinkx adware Dblol, Skyseek Zanox Ebookers.de   screenshot, packet log
5 April 4, 2014 Blinkx adware Theworldaventure.blogspot.no Commission Junction Avis   screenshot, packet log
6 April 4, 2014 Blinkx adware Trackmyads, Thequickcoupon Commission Junction Thewalkingcompany Referer faking screenshot, packet log
7 April 4, 2014 Blinkx adware Adssend, Eh86, Moreniche Commission Junction VItamin Shoppe   screenshot, packet log
8 April 4, 2014 Blinkx adware Bit.ly LinkConnector RingCentral   screenshot, packet log
9 April 4, 2014 Blinkx adware Fluxhub Digital River Nuance   screenshot, packet log
10 April 4, 2014 Blinkx adware Sale-reviews LinkShare BH Cosmetics Decoy popup and invisible (1×1) IFRAME screenshot, packet log

In response to my evidence of Blinkx and an affiliate improperly claiming commission on traffic Walmart would otherwise receive for free, Blinkx responded that it “specifically prohibits the kind of activity” I presented. But a contract provision is only the beginning. Whatever prohibition may be written in Blinkx’s contracts, we see no sign of Blinkx taking steps to enforce that rule. It would be easy for Blinkx to check whether a Blinkx advertiser is in fact an affiliate and, if so, what network the affiliate is using and what merchant the affiliate is promoting — it could simply load the advertiser’s ad and check for any affiliate link(s). If the affiliate is using a network that has banned adware popups, or promoting a network that has banned adware popups, Blinkx could immediately eject that advertiser. Blinkx could also ban any advertiser that is promoting the same merchant the user is already viewing. Blinkx says it is “always possib[le for an affiliate to] circumvent[] any technical measures that may be put in place” — but there’s no sign that Blinkx has actually established these or other suitable measures. My first article about Zango (then “180solutions”) in 2004 focused on exactly these affiliate frauds, and these practices have continued apace ever since.

Breaking Google’s Rules by Displaying Ads in Popups

Google rules specifically disallow placing Google ads into adware and pop-ups. For example, Google’s AdSense rules specifically disallow “[a]ds in a software application” and “[p]lacing ads in pop-up windows.” I understand that Google’s rules for other search syndicators are broadly similar, although those agreements are not ordinarily available to the public.

Contrary to Google’s rules, Blinkx and its advertisers often load Google advertisements in popup ads. These popups cover other companies’ sites and interrupt users’ browsing. The effects on advertisers are particularly negative: Advertisers pay full price for a Google click that is supposed to be top-quality, but they receive the inferior quality and brand tarnishment of placement in a pop-up ad.

Blinkx presents Google ads in an adware popup. Blinkx presents Google ads in an adware popup.

PPC advertisers (e.g. Snapsurveys.com)
money viewers
   Google   
money viewers
InfoSpace
money viewers
Eboom
money viewers
Blinkx

The money trail – how funds flow from advertisers to Google to Blinkx adware.

For example, in testing last month, other adware (installed in a bundle along with Blinkx) opened a popup that presented a supposed survey from Websurveypanel.org. (This page was deceptive for other reasons that I won’t explore here.) Blinkx noticed that traffic and opened a popup to Eboom.com with a supposed user search term (“q=”) parameter referencing “websurvey.” Eboom then presented a page of Google ads, with four oversized Google ads and no other content visible in the window. I clicked the first ad and was taken through a Google pay-per-click link to the advertiser, Snapsurveys.com. By all indications, Snapsurveys paid a pay-per-click advertising fee for my visit. Screen-capture video and packet log.

One might ask why Google would allow a partner like Eboom, which buys traffic from adware like Blinkx. But Google does not work with Eboom directly. Rather, the packet log reveals Eboom using Blucora/InfoSpace (an aggregator of subsyndicators) to access Google’s advertising network. I’ve repeatedly flagged tainted InfoSpace traffic, including deceptive toolbars and multiple adware applications. In 2010, I summarized and consolidated my prior findings about InfoSpace, concluding that “InfoSpace hardly appears a sensible partner for Google and the advertisers who entrust Google to manage their spending.” I stand by that conclusion. Indeed, I’ve recently collected ample additional evidence, including proof of InfoSpace sending Google various traffic from other adware beyond Blinkx and through numerous brokers beyond Eboom. (I’ll post other examples when time permits.)

The complexity of the relationship — traffic flowing from Blinkx to Eboom to InfoSpace to Google to advertisers — reveals why advertisers and even Google struggle to put an end to these practices. Yet the complexity is of Google’s own creation, resulting from Google’s decision to let InfoSpace subsyndicate Google’s ads to other partners Google fails to rigorously supervise. Importantly, Google engineers could detect such placements through suitable automation. By 2005, I had already built a crawler to inventory Zango (then 180solutions) advertisements and to determine the ad networks funding Zango. With a similar crawler today, Google could readily identify sites that impermissibly buy traffic from Blinkx — then eject all such sites from the Google syndication network.

Next Steps

I previously suggested that Blinkx disclose its revenue from adware, as distinguished from its other lines of business. My rationale: Of the adware vendors known (from their statements and investor statements) to have received venture capital funding, many or most have ceased operations, and in several instances publicly-available documents indicate that investors received little or no return of capital (not to mention profit). Meanwhile, industry experts widely report that Blinkx is importantly reliant on adware: For example, in a blog comment in March 2014, Zango ex-CTO Ken Smith remarked that “It was my understanding that for a while, the majority of their money was being made off the Zango technology and audience.” (Smith also noted that only “recently” did Blinkx disable the last of the Zango adware clients — entirely consistent with the test installations in my lab.)

In a particularly spirited section of its reply, Blinkx declined to provide the revenue apportionment I suggested. Rather, Blinkx said it “places equal importance on all of its product lines and acquisitions.” I credit Blinkx’s argument that it “is under no obligation to expend resources and energy to detail information beyond its regulatory requirements.” Yet my suggestion has an undeniable appeal. If adware is in fact small, then Blinkx could address investors’ concerns by showing the size of this business. Conversely, failure to provide such proof reinforces my suspicion — and Ken’s! — that adware is and has been a significant revenue source for Blinkx. Meanwhile, Blinkx’s approach also strengthens the inference that adware is significant: If adware were not important to Blinkx, shrewd managers would have elected to discard this controversial business years ago.

Meanwhile, I’ve gotten back in touch with other computer security researchers who have found other deceptive installations of Blinkx adware. We used to write articles about adware weekly, but we’ve subsequently largely moved on to other things, and it takes a while to resuscitate the prior spirit of testing and exposition. Nonetheless, I expect more reports from others in due course.

Looking at Blinkx’s practices as a while, it is striking to see Blinkx paying distributors to put its adware on users’ computers without the hard-fought protections the FTC previously demanded of Zango. Seven years ago, Zango promised to cease these practices, and it paid a multi-million dollar fine to disgorge a portion of its ill-gotten gains. Facing equally brazen conduct continuing after that consent order, the FTC should demand even more far-reaching remedies here.

My testing of Blinkx ex-Zango adware began in 2004 with unpaid writing on my web site, and has grown to include paid and unpaid work for advertisers, ad networks, publishers, investors, and regulators. However, none of these requested or funded this article or any portion of the research presented in this article.

The Darker Side of Blinkx

Video and advertising conglomerate Blinkx tells investors its “strong performance” results from “strategic initiatives” and “expanding demand, content, and audiences.” Indeed, Blinkx recently climbed past a $1.2 billion valuation. At first glance, it sounds like a great business. But looking more carefully, I see reason for grave doubts.

My concerns result in large part from the longstanding practices of two of Blinkx’s key acquisitions, Zango and AdOn. But concerns extend even to Blinkx’s namesake video site. In the following sections, I address each in turn. Specifically, I show ex-Zango adware still sneaking onto users’ computers and still defrauding advertisers. I show the ex-AdOn traffic broker still sending invisible, popup, and other tainted traffic. I show Blinkx’ namesake site, Blinkx.com, leading users through a maze of low-content pages, while charging advertisers for video ads systematically not visible to users.

The Legacy Zango (Adware) Business

In April 2009, Blinkx acquired a portion of Zango, a notorious adware vendor known for products that at various times included 180 Search Assistant, ePipo, Hotbar, Media Gateway, MossySky, n-Case, Pinball, Seekmo, SpamBlockerUtility, and more. Zango was best known for its deceptive and even nonconsensual installations — in write-ups from 2004 to 2008, I showed Zango installing through security exploits (even after design updates purportedly preventing such installations by supposed rogue partners), targeting kids and using misleading statements, euphemisms, and material omissions, installing via deceptive ActiveX popups, These and other practices attracted FTC attention, and in a November 2006 settlement, Zango promised to cease deceptive installations as well as provide corrective disclosures and pay a $3 million penalty.

Few users would affirmatively request adware that shows extra pop-ups, so Blinkx and its distributors use deceptive tactics to sneak adware onto users’ computers. In a representative example, I ran a Google search for “Chrome” (Google’s well-known web browser), clicked an ad, and ended up at Youdownloaders.com — a site that bundles Chrome with third-party advertising software. (The Youdownloaders footer states “The installers are compliant with the original software manufacturer’s policies and terms & conditions” though it seems this claim is untrue: Chrome Terms of Service section 5.3 disallows copying and redistributing Chrome; 8.6 disallows use of Google’s trademarks in a way that is likely to cause confusion; 9.3 disallows transfer of rights in Chrome.) In my testing, the Youdownloaders installer presented offers for five different adware programs and other third-party applications, among them Weather Alerts from desktopweatheralerts.com. Installation video.

I consider the Youdownloaders installation deceptive for at least four reasons: 1) A user’s request for free Chrome software is not a proper circumstance to tout adware. The user gets absolutely nothing in exchange for supposed “agreement” to receive the adware; Chrome is easily and widely available for free, without adware. It is particularly one-sided to install five separate adware apps — taking advantage of users who do not understand what they are asked to accept (including kids, non-native speakers, and those in a hurry). 2) On the Weather Alerts page of the installation, on-screen statements mention nothing of pop-up ads or, indeed, any advertising at all. In contrast, the FTC’s settlement with Zango requires that disclosure of advertising practices be “clear and prominent,” “unavoidable,” and separate from any license agreement — requirements not satisfied here. 3) The Youdownloaders user interface leads users to think that the bundled installations are compulsory. For example, the “decline” button (which lets a user reject each adware app) appears without the distinctive shape, outline, color, or font of an ordinary Windows button. 4) Users are asked to accept an objectively unreasonable volume of agreements and contracts, which in my testing include at least 14 different documents totaling 37,564 words (8.5 times the length of the US Constitution).

Tellingly, Blinkx takes considerable steps to distance itself from these deceptive practices. For example, nothing on Blinkx’s site indicates that Weather Alerts is a Blinkx app or shows Blinkx ads. The Desktopweatheralerts.com site offers no name or address, even on its Contact Us form. Weather Alerts comes from a company called Local Weather LLC, an alter ego of Weather Notifications LLC, both of Minneapolis MN, with no stated affiliation with Blinkx. Weather Notifications’ listed address is a one-bedroom one-bathroom apartment — hardly a standard corporate office. Nonetheless, multiple factors indicate to me that Desktop Weather Alerts is delivers a version of Zango adware. For one, Desktop Weather Alerts popups use the distinctive format long associated with Zango, including the distinctive browser buttons at top-left, as well as distinctive format of the advertisement label at bottom-left. Similarly, many sections of the license agreement and privacy policy are copied verbatim from longstanding Zango terms. Within the Weather Alerts EXE, strings reference 180search Assistant (a prior Zango product name) as well as 180client and various control systems long associated with Zango’s ad-targeting system. Similarly, when Weather Alerts delivers ads, its ad-delivery communications use a distinctive proprietary HTTP syntax both for request (to showme.aspx, with a HTTP POST parameter of epostdata= providing encoded ad context) and response (a series of HTML FORM elements, most importantly an INPUT NAME=ad_url to indicate the popup to open). I have seen this syntax (and its predecessors) in Zango apps for roughly a decade, but I have never seen this syntax used by any advertising delivered by other adware vendors or other companies. Moreover, when a Blinkx contractor previously contacted a security vendor to request whitelist treatment of its adware, the Blinkx representative said “The client is Blinkx … Your engine … was flagging their installer package SWA as SevereWeatherAlerts…” (emphasis added). Notice the Blinkx representative indicating that SWA (another Local Weather program, virtually identical save for domain name and product name) is “their” app, necessarily referring to Blinkx. Finally, in a February 2014 presentation, Blinkx CEO Brian Mukherjee included the distinctive Local Weather icon (present throughout the LW app and in LW’s installation solicitations) as part of the “Blinkx Ecosystem” — further confirming the link between LW and Blinkx. Taken together, these factors give good reason to conclude that Local Weather is applications are powered by Blinkx and part of the Blinkx network. Furthermore, in my testing Blinkx is the sole source of advertising for Weather Alerts — meaning that Blinkx’s payments are Weather Alerts’ primary source of revenue and primary reason for existence. (Additions made February 13, 2014, shown in grey highlighting.)

Blinkx/Zango software continues to defraud affiliate merchants. Blinkx/Zango software continues to defraud affiliate merchants.

Meanwhile, Zango-delivered advertising remains a major cause of concern. Zango’s core advertising product remains the browser popup — a disruptive form of advertising unpopular with most users and also unpopular with most mainstream advertisers. Notably, Zango’s popups perpetrate various advertising fraud, most notably ‘lead stealing” affiliate windows that cover merchant sites with their own affiliate links. If the user purchases through either window, the Zango advertiser gets paid a commission — despite doing nothing to genuinely cause or encourage the user’s purchase. (Indeed, the popup interrupts the user and thereby somewhat discourages a purchase.) At right, I show a current example: In testing of January 19, 2014, Blinkx/Zango sees a user browsing Walmart, then opens a popup to Blinkx/LeadImpact (server lipixeltrack) which redirects to LinkShare affiliate ORsWWZomRM8 and on to Walmart. Packet log proof. Thus, Walmart ends up having to pay an affiliate commission on traffic it already had — a breach of Walmart’s affiliate rules and broadly the same as the practice for which two eBay affiliates last year pled guilty. I’ve reported Zango software used for this same scheme since June 2004. As shown at right and in other recent examples, Zango remains distinctively useful to rogue affiliates perpetrating these schemes. These rogue affiliates pay Blinkx to show the popups that set the scheme in motion — and I see no sign that Blinkx has done anything to block this practice.

Rather than put a stop to these practices, Blinkx largely attempts to distance itself from Zango’s legacy business. For one, Blinkx is less than forthright as to what exactly it purchased. In Blinkx’s 2010 financial report, the first formal investor statement to discuss the acquisition, Blinkx never uses the word “Zango” or otherwise indicates the specific company or assets that Blinkx acquired. Rather, Blinkx describes the purchase as “certain net assets from a consortium of financial institutions to facilitate the growth of the video search and advertising businesses.” If a reader didn’t already know what Blinkx had bought, this vague statement would do nothing to assist.

Even when Blinkx discusses the Zango acquisition, it is less than forthcoming. UK news publication The Register quotes an unnamed Blinkx spokeswoman saying that Blinkx “purchased some technical assets from the bank [that foreclosed on Zango] including some IP and hardware, which constituted about 10 per cent of Zango’s total assets.” Here too, readers are left to wonder what assets are actually at issue. A natural interpretation of the quote is that Blinkx purchased trademarks, domain names, or patents plus general-purpose servers — all consistent with shutting the controversial Zango business. But in fact my testing reveals the opposite: Blinkx continues to run key aspects of Zango’s business: legacy Zango installations continue to function as usual and continue to show ads, and Blinkx continues to solicit new installations via the same methods, programs, and partners that Zango previously used. Furthermore, key Zango staff joined Blinkx, facilitating the continuation of the Zango business. Consider Val Sanford, previously a Vice President at Zango; her LinkedIn profile confirms that she stayed with Blinkx for three years after the acquisition. I struggle to reconcile these observations with the claim that Blinkx only purchased 10% of Zango or that the purchase was limited to “IP and hardware.” Furthermore, ex-Zango CTO Ken Smith contemporaneously disputed the 10% claim, insisting that “Blinkx acquired fully 100% of Zango’s assets.”

Blinkx has been equally circumspect as to the size of the ex-Zango business. In Blinkx’ 2010 financial report, Blinkx nowhere tells investors the revenue or profit resulting from Zango’s business. Rather, Blinkx insists “It is not practical to determine the financial effect of the purchased net assets…. The Group’s core products and those purchased have been integrated and the operations merged such that it is not practical to determine the portion of the result that specifically relates to these assets.” I find this statement puzzling. The ex-Zango business is logically freestanding — for example, separate relationships with the partners who install the adware on users’ computers. I see no proper reason why the results of the ex-Zango business could not be reported separately. Investors might reasonably want to know how much of Blinkx’s business comes from the controversial ex-Zango activities.

Indeed, Blinkx’s investor statements make no mention whatsoever of Zango, adware, pop-ups, or browser plug-ins of any kind in any annual reports, presentations, or other public disclosures. (I downloaded all such documents from Blinkx’ Financial Results page and ran full-text search, finding no matches.) As best I can tell, Blinkx also failed to mention these endeavors in conference calls or other official public communications. In a December 2013 conference call, Jefferies analyst David Reynolds asked Blinkx about its top sources of traffic/supply, and management refused to answer — in sharp contrast to other firms that disclose their largest and most significant relationships.

In March-April 2012, many ex-Zango staff left Blinkx en masse. Many ended up at Verti Technology Group, a company specializing in adware distribution. Myriad factors indicate that Blinkx controls Verti: 1) According to LinkedIn, Verti has eight current employees of which five are former employees of Zango, Pinball, and/or Blinkx. Other recent Verti employees include Val Sanford, who moved from Zango to Blinkx to Verti. 2) Blinkx’s Twitter account: Blinkx follows just nineteen users including Blinkx’s founder, various of its acquisitions (including Prime Visibility / AdOn and Rhythm New Media), and several of their staff. Blinkx follows Verti’s primary account as well as the personal account of a Verti manager. 3) Washington Secretaty of State filings indicate that Verti’s president is Colm Doyle (then Directory of Technology at Blinkx, though he subsequently returned to HP Autonomy) and secretary, treasurer, and chairman is Erin Laye (Director of Project Management at Blinkx). Doyle and Laye’s links to Blinkx were suppressed somewhat in that both, at formation, specified their home addresses instead of their Blinkx office. 4) Whois links several Verti domains to Blinkx nameservers. (Details on file.) Taken together, these facts suggest that Blinkx attempted to move a controversial business line to a subsidiary which the public is less likely to recognize as part of Blinkx.

The Legacy AdOn Business

In November 2011, Blinkx acquired Prime Visibility Media Group, best known for the business previously known as AdOn Network and MyGeek. I have critiqued AdOn’s traffic repeatedly: AdOn first caught my eye when it boasted of relationships with 180solutions/Zango and Direct Revenue. New York Attorney General litigation documents later revealed that AdOn distributed more than 130,000 copies of notorious Direct Revenue spyware. I later repeatedly reported AdOn facilitating affiliate fraud, inflating sites’ traffic stats, showing unrequested sexually-explicit images, and intermediating traffic that led to Google click fraud.

Similar problems continue. For example, in a February 2013 report for a client, I found a botnet sending click fraud traffic through AdOn’s ad-feeds.com server en route to advertisers. In an August 2013 report for a different client, I found invisible IFRAMEs sending traffic to AdOn’s bing-usa.com and xmladfeed.com servers, again en route to advertisers. Note also the deceptive use of Microsoft’s Bing trademark — falsely suggesting that this tainted traffic is in some way authorized by or affiliated with Bing, when in fact the traffic comes from AdOn’s partners. Moreover, the traffic was entirely random and untargeted — keywords suggested literally at random, entirely unrelated to any aspect of user interests. In other instances, I found AdOn receiving traffic directly from Zango adware. All told, I reported 20+ distinct sequences of tainted AdOn traffic to clients during 2013. AdOn’s low-quality traffic is ongoing: Advertisers buying from AdOn receive invisible traffic, adware/malware-originating traffic, and other tainted traffic that sophisticated advertisers do not want.

An AdOn staff member touts multiple incriminating characteristics of AdOn traffic. An AdOn staff member touts multiple incriminating characteristics of AdOn traffic.

Industry sources confirm my concern. For example, a June 2013 Ad Week article quotes one publisher calling AdOn “just about the worst” at providing low-quality traffic, while another flags “crazy traffic patterns.” In subsequent finger-pointing as to tainted traffic to OneScreen sites, OneScreen blamed a partner, Touchstorm, for working with AdOn — wasting no words to explain why buying from AdOn is undesirable. Even intentional AdOn customers report disappointing quality: In comments on a posting by Gauher Chaudhry, AdOn advertisers call AdOn “the reason I stopped doing any PPV [pay-per-view] … this is bot traffic”, “junk”, and “really smell[s] like fake traffic.” Of 31 comments in this thread, not one praised AdOn traffic quality.

Recent statements from AdOn employees confirm undesirable characteristics of AdOn traffic. Matthew Papke’s LinkedIn page lists him as Director of Contextual Ads at AdOn. But his page previously described AdOn’s offering as “pop traffic” — admitting undesirable non-user-requested pop-up inventory. His page called the traffic “install based” — indicating that the traffic comes not from genuine web pages, but from adware installed on users’ computers. See screenshot at right. All of these statements have been removed from the current version of Matthew’s page.

Problems at Blinkx.com: Low-Quality Traffic, Low-Quality Content, and Invisible Ads

Alexa reports a sharp jump in Blinkx traffic in late 2013. Alexa reports a sharp jump in Blinkx traffic in late 2013.

Alexa reports a sharp jump in Blinkx traffic in late 2013. Zango adware caused my computer to display this page from the Blinkx site, full-screen and without standard window controls.

Blinkx’s namesake service is the video site Blinkx.com. Historically, this site has been a bit of an also-ran — it’s certainly no YouTube! But Alexa reports a striking jump in Blinkx popularity as of late 2013: Blinkx’s traffic jumped from rank of roughly 15,000 worldwide to, at peak, rank of approximately 3,000. What could explain such a sudden jump?

In my automated and manual testing of Zango adware, I’ve recently begun to see Zango forcing users to visit the Blinkx site. The screenshot at right gives an example. My test computer displayed Blinkx full-screen, without title bar, address bar, or standard window buttons to close or minimize. See also a partial packet log, wherein the Blinkx site attributes this traffic to Mossysky (“domain=mossysky”), one of the Zango brand names. It’s a strikingly intrusive display — no wonder users are complaining, about their computers being unusable due to Blinkx’s unwanted intrusion. See e.g. a December 2013 Mozilla forum post reporting “my computer has been taken over by malware, half the links are inaccessible because of hovering links to Blinkx,” and a critique and screenshot showing an example of these hovering links. On a Microsoft support forum, one user reports Internet Explorer automatically “opening … numerous BLINKX websites” — as many as “20 websites open at one time, all Blinkx related.”

Moreover, Alexa’s analysis of Blinkx visitor origins confirms the anomalies in this traffic. Of the top ten sites sending traffic to Blinkx, according to Alexa, six are Blinkx servers, largely used to forward and redirect traffic (networksad.com, advertisermarkets.com, networksads.com, advertiserdigital.com, blinkxcore.com, and networksmarkets.com). See Alexa’s Site Info for Blinkx.com at heading “Where do Blinkx.com’s visitors come from?”

Strikingly, Zango began sending traffic to Blinkx during the winter 2013 holiday season — a time of year when ad prices are unusually high. Zango’s popups of Blinkx seem to have ended as suddenly as they began — consistent with Blinkx wanting extra traffic and ad revenue when ad prices are high, but concluding that continuing this practice at length risks excessive scrutiny from both consumers and advertisers.

Meanwhile, examining Blinkx.com, I’m struck by the lack of useful content. I used the Google search site:blinkx.com to find the parts of the Blinkx site that, according to Google, are most popular. I was directed to tv.blinkx.com, where the page title says users can “Watch full episodes of TV shows online.” I clicked “60 Minutes” and received a page correctly profiling the excellence of that show (“the granddaddy of news magazines”). But when I clicked to watch one of the listed episodes, I found nothing of the kind: Requesting “The Death and Life of Asheboro, Stealing History, The Face of the Franchise,” I was told to “click here to watch on cbs.com” — but the link actually took me to a 1:33 minute home video of a dog lying on the floor, “Husky Says No to Kennel”, syndicated from YouTube, entirely unrelated to the top-quality 60 Minutes content I had requested. (Screen-capture video.) It was a poor experience — not the kind of content likely to cause users to favor Blinkx’s service. I tried several other shows supposedly available — The Colbert Report, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, Family Guy, and more — and never received any of the listed content.

In parallel, the Blinkx site simultaneously perpetrated a remarkable scheme against advertisers: On the video index page for each TV show, video advertising was triggered to play as I exited each page by clicking to view the supposed video content. Because the supposed content opened in a new tab, the prior tab remained active and could still host a video player with advertising. Of course the prior tab was necessarily out of visibility: Blinkx’s code had just commanded the opening of a new tab showing the new destination. But the video still played, and video advertisers were still billed. Screen-capture video.

Industry sources confirm concerns about Blinkx ad visibility. For example, a December 15, 2013 Ad Week piece reported Vindico analysis finding just 23% of Blinkx videos viewable (defined as just 50% of pixels visible for just one second). By Vindico’s analysis, an advertiser buying video ads from Blinkx suffers three ads entirely invisible for every ad visible even by that low standard — a remarkably poor rate of visibility. In contrast, mainstream video sites like CBS and MSN enjoyed viewability rates two to four times higher.

Putting the Pieces Together

  Q3 ’13 Headcount ’13 Revenue ($mm) revenue / headcount ($k)
Tremor 287 $148 $517
YuMe 357* $157 $440
RocketFuel 552 $240 $434
Criteo 452 $240 $532
Blinkx 265** $246*** $927

* Q3 ’13 headcount not available. 357 is 2012 year-end. S&M spend up ~50% in 2013. Adjusted revenue/headcount is $293k
** Q3 ’13 headcount not available. 265 is 2012 year-end. S&M spend up ~15% in 2013. Adjusted revenue/headcount is $803k.
*** 2013 revenue estimate based on Bloomberg consensus estimates

Comparing Blinkx’s revenues to competitors, I am struck by Blinkx’s apparent outsized success. See the table at right, finding Blinkx producing roughly twice as much revenue per employee as online video/display ad networks and advertising technology companies which have recently made public offerings. Looking at Blinkx’s sites and services, one doesn’t get the sense that Blinkx’s service is twice as good, or its employees twice as productive, as the other companies listed. So why does Blinkx earn twice as much revenue per employee? One natural hypothesis is that Blinkx is in a significantly different business. While other services make significant payments to publishers for use of their video content, my browsing of Blinkx.com revealed no distinctive content obviously licensed from high-quality high-cost publishers. I would not be surprised to see outsized short-term profits in adware, forced-visit traffic, and other black-hat practices of the sort used by some of the companies Blinkx has acquired. But neither are these practices likely to be sustainable in the long run.

Reviewing Blinkx’s statements to investors, I was struck by the opacity. How exactly does Blinkx make money? How much comes from the legacy Zango and AdOn businesses that consumers and advertisers pointedly disfavor? Why are so many of Blinkx’s metrics out of line with competitors? The investor statements raise many questions but offer few answers. I submit that Blinkx is carefully withholding this information because the company has much to hide. If I traded in the companies I write about (I don’t!), I’d be short Blinkx.

This article draws in part on research I prepared for a client that sought to know more about Blinkx’s historic and current practices. At my request, the client agreed to let me include portions of that research in this publicly-available posting. My work for that client yielded a portion of the research presented in this article, though I also conducted significant additional research and drew on prior work dating back to 2004. My agreement with the client did not oblige me to circulate my findings as an article or in any other way; to my knowledge, the client’s primary interest was in learning more about Blinkx ‘s business, not in assuring that I tell others. By agreement with the client, I am not permitted to reveal its name, but I can indicate that the client is two US investment firms and that I performed the research during December 2013 to January 2014. The client tells me that it did not change its position on Blinkx after reading my article. (Disclosure updated and expanded on February 4-5, 2014.)

I thank Eric Howes, Principal Lab Researcher at ThreatTrack Security, and Matthew Mesa, Threat Researcher at ThreatTrack Security, for insight on current Blinkx installations.

IAC Toolbars and Traffic Arbitrage in 2013

Beginning in 2005, I flagged serious problems with IAC/Ask.com toolbars — including installations through security exploits and through bundles that nowhere sought user consent, installations targeting kids, rearranging users’ browsers to invite unintended searches, and showing a veritable onslaught of ads. IAC’s practices have changed in various respects, but the core remains as I previously described it: IAC’s search advertising business exists not to solve a genuine user need or provide users with genuine assistance, but to prey on users who — through inattention, inexperience, youth, or naivete — stumble into IAC’s properties.

Crucially, IAC remains substantially dependent on Google for monetization of IAC’s search services. A rigorous application of Google’s existing rules would put a stop to many of IAC’s practices, and sensible updated rules — following the stated objective of Google’s existing policies — would end much of the rest.

In this piece I examine current IAC toolbar installation practices (including targeting kids and soliciting installations when users are attempting to install security updates), the effects of IAC toolbars once installed (including excessive advertising and incomplete uninstall), and IAC’s search arbitrage business. I conclude by flagging advertisements with impermissibly large clickable areas (for both toolbars and search arbitrage), and I call on Google to put an end to Ask’s practices.

IAC Toolbar Installation

IAC’s search toolbar business is grounded in placing IAC toolbars on as many computers as possible. To that end, IAC offers 50+ different toolbars with a variety of branding — Webfetti (“free Facebook graphics”), Guffins (“virtual pet games”), religious toolbars of multiple forms (Know the Bible, Daily Bible Guide, Daily Jewish Guide), screensavers, games, and more. One might reasonably ask: Why would a user want such a toolbar?

IAC ad promises 'free online television' but actually merely links to material already on the web; promises an 'app' but actually provides a search toolbar. IAC ad promises “free online television” but actually merely links to material already on the web; promises an “app” but actually provides a search toolbar.

IAC ad solicits installations via 'virtual pet' ad distinctively catering to kids.IAC ad solicits installations via “virtual pet” ad distinctively catering to kids.

Other IAC Guffins ads specifically invite 'kids' to install. (Screenshot by iSpionage) Other IAC Guffins ads specifically invite “kids” to install. (Screenshot by iSpionage)

IAC Guffins offer features multiple animated cartoon images, distinctively catering to kids.

The Television Fanatic toolbar is instructive. IAC promotes this toolbar with search ads that promise “free online television” and “turn your computer into a TV watch full TV episode w free app.” It sounds like an attractive deal — many users would relish the ability to watch free live broadcast television on an ordinary computer, and it would not be surprising if such a service required downloading some sort of desktop application or browser plug-in. But in fact Television Fanatic offers nothing of the sort. To the extent that Television Fanatic offers the “free online television” promised in the ad, it only links to ordinary video content already provided by others. (For example, I clicked the toolbar’s “ABC” link and was taken to http://abc.go.com/watch/ — an ordinary ABC link equally available to users without Television Fanatic. That’s a far cry from IAC’s promise of special access to premium material.

Meanwhile, IAC’s Guffins toolbar distinctively targets kids. IAC promotes Guffins via search ads for terms like “virtual pet”, and the resulting ad says Guffins offers “puppy, cats, bunny, dragons & more” which a user can “feed, play, [and] care for.” The landing page features four animated animals with oversized faces and overstated features, distinctively attractive to children. Under COPPA factors or any intuitive analysis, IAC clearly targets kids. Indeed, ad tracking service iSpionage reports Guffins ads touting “Free Kids Games Download”, “Free Kids Computer Games”, “Play Kids Games Online”, and more — explicitly inviting children to install Guffins. Of course kids are ill-equipped to evaluate IAC’s offer — less likely to notice IAC’s disclosures of an included toolbar, less likely to understand what a search toolbar even is, and less able to evaluate the wisdom of installing such a toolbar in exchange for games.

While IAC’s ads often promise an “app” (including as shown in the ad screenshots at right), IAC actually offers just toolbars — add-ins appearing within web browsers, not the freestanding applications that the ads suggest. That’s all the more deceptive: IAC enticed users with the promise of genuine distinct programs offering exceptional video content and rich gaming. Instead IAC provided browser plug-ins that claim valuable screen space whenever users browse the web. And far from providing exclusive content, IAC toolbars send users to material already on the web and driving traffic to IAC’s advertising displays (as detailed in the next section). That’s strikingly inferior.

IAC’s toolbar installation practices stack up unfavorably vis-a-vis applicable Google policies, industry standards, and regulatory requirements. Google’s Software Principles call for “Upfront disclosure” with no suggestion that an app may promise one thing in an initial solicitation, then something else in a subsequent landing page. (IAC is obliged to comply with Google’s rules because IAC toolbars show ads from Google, as discussed in the next section.) Meanwhile, the Anti-Spyware Coalition specifically flags installations targeting children, allowing bundling by affiliates, and modifying browser settings as risk factors making software a greater concern. Even decades-old FTC rules are on point, disallowing “deceptive door openers” that promise one thing at the outset (like IAC’s initial promise of “free online television”) but later deliver something importantly different (a search toolbar).

Web searches reveal numerous user complaints about IAC toolbars. Consider search results for “televisionfanatic”. A first result links to product’s official site. Second is a Sitejabber forum with 20 harsh reviews. (17 reviewers gave Television Fanatic just one star out of five, with comments systematically reporting surprise and annoyance at the toolbar’s presence.) The third result advises “How to uninstall a Television fanatic toolbar”, and the fourth is multiple Yahoo Answers discussions including a user asking “Is television fanatic toolbar a virus?” and others repeatedly complaining about unintended installation. Clearly numerous users are dissatisfied with Television Fanatic.

So too for DailyBibleGuide. In a Q1 2011 earnings call, IAC CEO Greg Blatt touted the DailyBibleGuide toolbar as a new product IAC is particularly proud of. But a Google search results for “DailyBibleGuide” include a page advising “do not download Dailybiblestudy, Dailybibleguide, or Knowthebible extension.” There and elsewhere, users seem surprised to receive IAC’s toolbars. Reading users’ complaints, it seems their confusion ultimately results from IAC’s decision to deliver bible trivia via a toolbar. After all, such material would more naturally be delivered via a web page, email newsletter, or perhaps RSS feed. IAC chose the odd strategy of toolbar-based delivery not because it was genuinely what users wanted, but because this is the format IAC can best monetize. No wonder users systematically end up disappointed.

By all indications, a huge number of users are running IAC toolbars. The IAC toolbars discussed in this section all send users to mywebsearch.com, a site users are unlikely to visit except if sent there by an IAC toolbar. Alexa reports that mywebsearch.com is the #41 most popular site in the US and #71 worldwide — more popular than Instagram, Flickr, Pandora, and Hulu.

Some of IAC’s browser configuration changes remain in place even if a user removes an IAC toolbar. I installed then uninstalled an IAC Television Fanatic toolbar and received a prompt instructing “Click here for help on resetting your home page and default search settings.” The resulting page specified four different procedures totaling 16 steps — far more lengthy than the initial installation. I can see no proper reason why uninstall is so difficult. Indeed, IAC’s incomplete uninstall specifically violates Google’s October 2012 requirement that “During the uninstall process, users must be presented with a choice that gives them the option of returning their browser’s user settings to the previous settings.” Google’s Software Principles are also on point, instructing that uninstall must be “easy” and must disable “all functions of the application” — whereas IAC’s automated installer does not undo all of IAC’s changes, and IAC’s manual 16-step process is the opposite of “easy.”

The Special Problems of IAC Ask Toolbar Installed by Oracle’s Java Updates

Oracle Java security updates install Ask Toolbar by default, with just a single click in a multi-step installer. Java security update installs Ask Toolbar by default — a single click in a multi-step installer.

Ongoing Oracle Java updates also install the IAC Ask Toolbar. I discuss these installations in this separate section because they raise concerns somewhat different from the IAC toolbars discussed above. I see five key problems with Oracle Java updates that install IAC toolbars:

First, as Ed Bott noted last week, the “Install the Ask Toolbar” checkbox is prechecked, so users can install the Ask toolbar with a single click on the “Next” button. Accidental installations are particularly likely because the Ask installation prompt is step three of five-screen installation process. When installing myriad software updates, it’s easy to get into a routine of repeatedly clicking Next to finish the process as quickly as possible. But in this case, just clicking Next yields the installation of Ask’s toolbar.

Second, although the Ask installation prompt does not show a “focus” (a highlighted button designated as the default if a user presses enter), the Next button actually has focus. In testing, I found that pressing the enter or spacebar keys has the same effect as clicking “Next.” Thus, a single press of either of the two largest keys on the keyboard, with nothing more, is interpreted as consent to install Ask. That’s much too low a bar — far from the affirmative indication of consent that Google rules and FTC caselaw call for.

Third, in a piece posted today, Ed Bott finds Oracle and IAC intentionally delaying the installation of the Ask Toolbar by fully ten minutes. This delay undermines accountability, especially for sophisticated users. Consider a user who mistakenly clicks Next (or presses enter or spacebar) to install Ask Toolbar, but immediately realizes the mistake and seeks to clean his computer. The natural strategy is to visit Control Panel – Programs and Features to activate the Ask uninstaller. But a user who immediately checks that location will find no listing for the Ask Toolbar: The uninstaller does not appear until the Ask install finishes after the intentional ten minute delay. Of course even sophisticated users have no reason or ability to know about this delay. Instead, a sophisticated user would conclude that he somehow did not install Ask Toolbar after all — and only later will the user notice and, perhaps, proceed with uninstall. Half a decade ago I found WhenU adware engaged in similar intentional delay. Similarly, NYAG litigation documents revealed notorious spyware vendor Direct Revenue intentionally declining to show ads in the first day after its installation. (Direct Revenue staff said this delay would “reduce the correlation between the Morpheus download [which bundled Direct Revenue spyware] and why they are seeing [Direct Revenue’s popup] ads” — confusion that DR staff hoped would “creat[e] less of a path to what they [users] should uninstall.”) Against this backdrop, it’s particularly surprising to see IAC and Oracle adopt this tactic.

Fourth, IAC makes changes beyond the scope of user consent and fails to revert these changes during uninstall. The Oracle/IAC installation solicitation seeks permission to install an add-on for IE, Chrome, and Firefox, but nowhere mentions changing address bar search or the default Chrome search provider. Yet the installer in fact makes all these changes, without ever seeking or receiving user consent. Conversely, uninstall inexplicably fails to restore these settings. As noted above, these incomplete uninstalls violate Google’s Software Principles requirement that an “easy” uninstall must disable “all functions of the application.”

Finally, the Java update is only needed as a result of a serious security flaw in Java. It is troubling to see Oracle profit from this security flaw by using a security update as an opportunity to push users to install extra advertising software. Java’s many security problems make bundled installs all the worse: I’ve received a new Ask installation prompts with each of Java’s many security updates. (Ed Bott counts 11 over the last 18 months.) Even if the user had declined IAC’s offer on half a dozen prior requests, Oracle persists on asking — and a single slip-up, just one click or keystroke on the tenth request, will nonetheless deliver Ask’s toolbar.

A security update should never serve as an opportunity to push additional software. As Oracle knows all too well from its recent security problems, users urgently need software updates to fix serious vulnerabilities. By bundling advertising software with security updates, Oracle teaches users to distrust security updates, deterring users from installing updates from both Oracle and others. Meanwhile, by making the update process slower and more intrusive, Oracle reduces the likelihood that users will successfully patch their computers. Instead, Oracle should make the update process as quick and easy as possible — eliminating unnecessary steps and showing users that security updates are quick and trouble-free.

Toolbar Operations and Result Format

Once a user receives an IAC toolbar, a top-of-browser stripe appears in Internet Explorer and Firefox, and IAC also takes over default search, address bar search, and error handling. That’s an intrusive set of changes, and particularly undesirable in light of the poor quality of IAC’s search results.

If a user runs a search through an IAC toolbar or through a browser search function modified by IAC, the user receives Mywebsearch or Ask.com results page with advertisements and search results syndicated from Google. The volume of advertisements is remarkable: On a 800×600 monitor, the entire first two screens of Mywebsearch results presented advertisements (screen one, screen two) — four large ads with a total of seven additional miniature ads contained within. The first algorithmic search result appears on the third on-screen page, where users are far less likely to see it. At Ask.com, ads are even larger: fully seven advertisements appear above the first algorithmic result, and three more ads appear at page bottom — more than filling two 800×600 screens.

IAC obtains these advertisements and search results from Google, but IAC omits features Google proudly touts in other contexts. For example, Google claims that its maps, hotel reviews, and hotel price quotes benefit users and save users time — but inexplicably IAC Mywebsearch lacks these features, even though these features appear prominently and automatically for users who run the same search at Google. In short, a user viewing IAC results gets listings that are intentionally less useful — designed to serve IAC’s business interest in encouraging the user to click extra advertisements, with much less focus on providing the information that IAC and Google consider most useful.

The ad format at IAC Mywebsearch and Ask.com makes it particularly likely that users will mistake IAC ads for algorithmic results. For one, IAC omits any distinctive background color to help users distinguish ads from algorithmic results. Furthermore, IAC’s voluminous ads exceed beyond the first screen of results for many searches. A user familiar with Google would expect ads to have a distinctive background color and would know that ads typically rarely completely fill a screen — so seeing no such background color and similar-format results continuing for two full screens, the user might well conclude that these are algorithmic listings rather than paid advertisements.

Traffic Arbitrage

IAC buys traffic from Google and other search engines. The resulting sequence is needlessly convoluted: A user runs a search at Google, clicks an IAC ad purporting to offer what the user requested], then receives an IAC landing page with the very same ads just seen at Google. For example, I searched for [800 number look up] at Google and clicked an Ask ad. The resulting Ask page allocated most of its the above-the-fold space to three of the same ads I had just seen at Google! This process provides zero value to the user — indeed, negative value, in that the extra click adds time and confusion. But IAC monetizes its site unusually aggressively — for example, regularly putting four ads at the top of the page, where Google sometimes puts none and never presents more than three. Of course these extra ads serve IAC’s interest: By pushing a fraction of users to click multiple ads, IAC can more than cover its costs of buying the traffic from Google in the first place.

Longstanding Google rules exactly prohibit IAC’s search arbitrage. Google’s AdWords Policy Center instructs that “Google AdWords doesn’t allow the promotion of websites that are designed for the sole or primary purpose of showing ads.” Google continues: “One example of this kind of prohibited behavior is called arbitrage, where advertisers drive traffic to their websites at low cost and pay for that traffic by earning money from the ads placed on those websites”

Why isn’t Google enforcing its rules against arbitrage? An October 2012 Search Engine Land article quotes a reader who wrote to Google AdWords support, where a representative replied with unusual candor: “Since Ask.com is considered a Google product, they are able to serve ads at the top of the page when the search query is found to be relevant to their ads.” Of course Ask.com is not actually “a Google product” — it’s a Google syndicator, showing Google ads in exchange for a revenue share, just like thousands of other sites. But with IAC reportedly Google’s biggest advertising customer, special privileges would be less than surprising. Meanwhile, Google lets IAC do Google’s dirty work — showing extra ads to gullible users — which could let Google collect additional ad revenue from those users’ clicks. Still, that’s no help to users (who get pulled into extra page-views and less useful pages with more advertisements) or advertisers (whose costs increase as a result). And once the public recognizes Google’s role in authorizing this scheme, selling all advertising, and funding the entirety of IAC’s activity, Google ends up looking at least as culpable as IAC.

Ads with Oversized Clickable Areas

IAC ad promises 'free online television' but actually merely links to material already on the web; promises an 'app' but actually provides a search toolbar. Contrary to standard industry practice and Google rules, IAC makes the entire ad — including domain name, ad text, and large whitespace — into a clickable link. Notice the large clickable area flagged in the red box.

IAC ad promises 'free online television' but actually merely links to material already on the web; promises an 'app' but actually provides a search toolbar. At Google, only the ad itself is clickable. Not the much smaller red box.

IAC’s ads also flout industry practice and Google rules as to the size of an ad’s clickable area. Both in arbitrage landing pages and in toolbar results, IAC’s search result pages expand the clickable area of each advertisement to fill the entire page width, sharply increasing the fraction of the page where a click will be interpreted as a request to visit the advertiser’s page.

See the screenshot at right. (To create the red-outlined box showing the shape of the clickable area, I clicked an empty section of the ad and began a brief drag, causing my browser to highlight the ad’s clickable area in red as shown in the screenshot.)

Ask is an outlier in converting whitespace around an ad into a clickable area. Every other link on Ask.com landing pages — every link other than an advertisement — follows standard industry practice with only the words of the link being clickable, but not the surrounding whitespace. Indeed, at Google, Bing, and Yahoo, white space is never clickable. At Google and Bing, only ad titles are clickable, not ad domain names, or ad text. (See Google screenshot at right, showing the limited clickable area of a Google ad.) At Yahoo, only ad titles and domain names are clickable, not ad text or white space.

IAC has taken intentional action to expand its ads’ clickable area to cover all available width. As W3schools explains, “A block element is an element that takes up the full width available.” To expand ad hyperlinks to fill the entire width, Ask tags each ad hyperlink with the CSS STYLE of display:block.

<a id=”lindp” class=”ptbs pl20 pr30 ptsp pxl” style=”display:block;padding-bottom: 0px;” …

Google’s rules prohibit IAC’s expanded clickable areas. Google requires that “clicking on space surrounding an ad should not click the ad.” Yet IAC nonetheless makes a clickable area out of the area surrounding each ad, extending all the way to the right column.

IAC’s expanded ads invite accidental clicks. Accidental clicks are particularly likely from the inexperienced users IAC systematically targets for toolbar installations, and also from users searching on tablets, phones, and other touch devices. These extra clicks waste users’ time and drive up advertisers’ costs — but every such click yields extra revenue for IAC and Google.

What Comes Next

Google should enforce its rules strictly. No doubt IAC can offer Google some short-term revenue via extra ad-clicks from unsophisticated or confused users. But this isn’t the kind of business Google aspires to, and Google’s public statements indicate no interest in such bottom-feeding. Indeed, a fair application of Google’s existing AdWords rules would disallow both IAC’s toolbar ads (using AdWords to solicit installations) and IAC’s search arbitrage ads (using AdWords to send users to IAC pages presenting syndicated AdWords ads). Meanwhile, numerous Google AdSense rules are also on point, including prohibiting encouraging accidental clicks, prohibiting site layout that pushes content below the fold, and limiting the number of ads per page. So too for Software Principles requiring up-front disclosure as well as “easy” and complete uninstall.

As a publicly-traded company, IAC should benefit from the oversight and guidance of its outside directors. But the New York Times commented in 2011 that “IAC’s board is filled with high-powered friends of Mr. Diller,” calling into question the independence and effectiveness of IAC’s outside directors. Of particular note is Chelsea Clinton, who joined IAC’s board in September 2011. Ms. Clinton’s prior experience includes little obvious connection to Internet advertising or online business, suggesting that she might need to invest extra time to learn the details of IAC’s business. Yet she also has weighty commitments including ongoing doctoral studies, serving as an Assistant Vice Provost at NYU, and reporting as a special correspondent for the NBC Nightly News — calling into question the time she can devote to IAC matters. The Times questioned why IAC had brought in Ms. Clinton, concluding that “This is clearly an appointment made because of who she is, not what she has done.” Indeed, Ms. Clinton’s background means she will be held to a particularly high standard: if she fails to stop IAC’s bad practices, the public may reasonably ask whether she has done her duty as an outside director.

Recent research from Goldman analyst Heath Terry flags investor concerns at IAC’s tactics. In a December 4, 2012 report, Terry downgraded IAC to sell due to vulnerability from Google policy changes. A January 9, 2013 follow-up noted IAC changing its uninstall practices to comply with Google policy as well as slowdown in arbitrage. Terry flags some important factors, and I share his bottom line that IAC’s search practices are unsustainable. But the real shoe has yet to drop. If Google is embarrassed at IAC’s actions — and it should be — Google is easily able to put an end to this mess.

I prepared a portion of this article at the request of a client that prefers not to be listed by name. The client kindly agreed to let me include that research in this publicly-available posting.

Debunking Zango’s "Content Economy" updated May 29, 2008

Zango often touts its so-called “content economy” — purportedly providing users access to media in exchange for accepting Zango’s popup ads. After four years of debunking Zango’s claims, I’ve come to suspect the worst — and my investigations of Zango’s media offerings confirm that Zango’s media library is nothing to celebrate. This article reports the results of my recent examinations. I show:

  • Widespread copyrighted video content presented without any indication of license from the corresponding rights-holders. Details.
  • Widespread sexually-explicit material, including prominent explicit material nowhere labeled as such. Details.
  • An audio library consisting solely of prank phone calls to celebrities (without the “music” Zango promises). Details.
  • Widespread material users can get elsewhere for free, without any popups or other detriments. Details.
  • Widespread material that content creators never asked to have included in any Zango library. Details.

Widespread copyrighted video content presented without any indication of license from the corresponding rights-holders

Many of the videos in of Zango’s video library are the work of major movie studios, TV networks, and other third parties that own and assert copyright in their respective works. These videos consistently appear without any statement of authorization (e.g. “used with permission”) or even the ordinary copyright notice. I therefore conclude that Zango’s site features these videos without authorization from the corresponding rights-holders.

Zango Offers Daily Show with Guest Chris Rock Zango Offers Daily Show w/ Chris Rock

Zango Offers 'Borat' Zango Offers Borat

For many videos in Zango’s library, it is trivially easy to determine the video’s source. For example, text in the corner of Zango’s “Ashley Judd Nude Photoshoot” indicates the video comes from “Norma Jean & Marilyn” (1996, released on DVD by HBO Home Video). The title of Zango’s “Wild Things” suggests the video comes from the 2004 Sony Pictures movie by the same name; watching the video confirms the match. Zango’s “Girls Next Door Nude Compilation” begins with the distinctive Playboy logo. Zango’s “Chris Rock on the Daily Show” reproduces a video clip from Comedy Central’s Daily Show. It’s easy to find scores of other examples plainly labeled as well-known copyrighted works.

Other videos in Zango’s library are harder to identify — at least those without extensive entertainment industry experience. For example, I cannot easily determine the specific movie that included the scenes shown in Zango’s “Paris Hilton Striptease” or “Rachel Hunter in the Bathtub.” But the clips leave little doubt that they were filmed professionally and that the respective studios hold copyright in the resulting works. Similarly, I cannot easily determine the specific source of Zango’s “Branding Beat Down.” However, every frame of the video bears the distinctive Fox logo — indicating that the video originated with the Fox Broadcasting Company.

As to at least eight of the files in Zango’s library, I have specifically confirmed that Zango’s reproduction occurs without authorization from the underlying rights-holders. (Details below.) As to selected other files, I have sent inquiries to the corresponding rights-holders. I will update this page if I confirm whether Zango has properly licensed the content at issue.

Infringing videos are remarkably prominent in Zango’s video library. For example, as of May 27, Zango’s home page linked to “Borats First Trip To An American Gym” (s.i.c.). This clip was listed as the second most popular video in Zango’s entire content library, and it was placed in the top-center of Zango’s main www.zango.com web page, “above the fold” (within the portion of the page visible without using scroll bars). Yet the title of the video plainly indicates that the video contains the copyrighted work of others. Moreover, the video features the “DIVX Video” logo, indicating that DivX software was used to extract (“rip”) the video from a DVD. No authorized reproduction would be provided with a DivX overlay, so the presence of the DivX marker confirms that this video was reproduced without permission from the creators of Borat.

Other online video sites have been the target of major copyright litigation. For example, Viacom last year sued Google, alleging that “YouTube appropriates the value of creative content on a massive scale for YouTube’s benefit without payment or license.” In defense, Google points out that YouTube receives videos from independent — potentially granting Google immunity for these infringements due to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act‘s safe harbor for infringements occurring at the direction of users (17 USC 512(c)(1)).

Unlike YouTube, Zango’s video library offers no prominent “upload” function. Some of Zango’s videos arrive through the Revver video-sharing service (discussed below), probably originating with a variety of independent users. But many of the copyrighted videos Zango offers reside on Zango’s servers, not on Revver servers. (For example, all eight of the sexually-explicit videos linked in the first paragraph of the next section are hosted on Zango servers.) Because Zango offers no “upload” function by which ordinary users could have put videos onto Zango’s site, it therefore appears that these videos were provided by Zango or its agents, not by independent users. If so, Zango will not find protection in the DMCA’s safe harbor for infringements caused by users.

Moreover, even if Zango’s videos were provided by independent users, the circumstances of the reproduction seem to render Zango ineligible for the DMCA safe harbor. For one, the safe harbor requires that Zango lack actual knowledge of the infringements. But the infringing videos were obvious and self-evident, not just from their titles and contents, but also from their prevalence in featured results Zango chose to highlight. In addition, the safe harbor requires that Zango not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringements. But Zango used these videos to induce users to download its popup-generating software, a financial benefit that is directly attributable to the infringing videos. (Consider the case of a user who installs Zango in response to solicitation offering a specific copyrighted video clip. Example.) Furthermore, Zango has the right and ability to control the infringement (e.g. by removing the infringing videos). Because Zango’s financial benefit can be directly tracked to a specific infringement, and because Zango has the right and ability to prevent such infringement, Zango seems to fail the test in 17 USC 512(c)(1)(B).

Zango may claim that its videos are fair use. The Copyright Act sets out a four-factor test for determining whether reproduction of a copyrighted work is permissible, despite lack of authorization from the rights-holder. The fair use test calls for considering 1) the purpose and character of the use (e.g. whether commercial or nonprofit), 2) the nature of the copyrighted work, 3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for the work. Factor one is easy: Zango’s use is clearly commercial, which tends to cut against a finding of fair use. Zango might claim that its presentation of excerpts (rather than entire movies) supports a finding of fair use under the third test — but Zango exactly chooses what it views as highlights (e.g. the explicit portions of full-length movies), yielding clips with a greater than usual effect on the potential market for the underlying works. In short, a fair use defense is at best uncertain.

Wide-scale copyright infringement could expose Zango to substantial liability. The Copyright Act provides for statutory damages of “not less than $750” per violation. My examination indicates Zango is reproducing (at least) hundreds of copyrighted videos without any statement of authorization. Furthermore, such videos have surely been downloaded repeatedly — giving rise to potential statutory damages that could easily reach seven digits or more.

Widespread sexually-explicit material, including prominent explicit material nowhere labeled as such

Celebrity Videos Featured by Zango Celebrity Videos Featured by Zango

Prominent Video - Explicit but Unlabeled
Prominent Video – Explicit but Unlabeled

Browse Zango’s video library, and it’s easy to find sexually-explicit video. As shown in the first inset image at right, the bottom-right corner of each Zango “Browse” page gives a list of celebrities — each of them female, each featured in various states of undress. Among other explicit videos of these celebrities, Zango offers “Britney Spears See Thru“, “Britney Spears Black Dress Upskirt“, “Paris Hilton Striptease“, “Rachel Hunter in the Bathtub“, “Jessica Alba’s Chest and You“, “Jessica Simpson Nipple Slip“, “Anna Kournikova Panties Oops“, and “Angelina Jolie Sex Scene.”

The titles and descriptions of many of Zango’s videos suggest that their subjects were unwilling participants. See e.g. “nipple slip” and “upskirt” above, as well as additional videos like Zango’s “Arab wife’s sexy dance secretly taped” and Zango’s “Girlfriend Finds Hidden Camera.”

Through its placement and labeling of sexually-explicit videos, Zango creates a substantial risk that users will receive explicit materials they did not seek. For example, on May 24, I clicked “Browse” to flip through Zango’s content library. Using Zango’s default sort, the third video was entitled “the pool” with comment “havin fun in the pool” (s.i.c.). (Screenshot of the link from within Zango’s video library.) This title and comment give no indication that the resulting material is explicit. But clicking the “Watch” button immediately yields a large video showing two male adults swimming nude, then exiting the pool (entirely disrobed). As best I can tell, Zango did nothing to alert users to this explicit material, nor does Zango prevent (or even discourage) children from viewing such material.

Zango’s May 24 “the pool” video was not a mere anomaly. The same video remained linked in the same way in my tests on May 25 and 26, and on portions of May 27.

In litigation documents, Zango last week claimed that it never distributes explicit material to those do not want it. In particular, Zango argues: “Zango never sends unwanted links to pornography web sites” and “Zango only directs adult-oriented advertisements to a user after that user, by his own behavior, has demonstrated interest in such content.” I disagree. The preceding paragraphs offer a counterexample — Zango prominently providing a link to sexually-explicit materials, and provideing that links to users who never demonstrated interest in any such content. Zango may claim that these links tout videos — not a “web site” as in the first quoted sentence. Alternatively, Zango may claim that the links are not “advertisements” — hence beyond a strict reading of the second quoted sentence. But the underlying contradiction remains: Zango says it doesn’t provide pornography except when users seek it; yet in fact Zango does sometimes deliver explicit materials unrequested.

That Zango funds and distributes sexually-explicit materials is well-known. See e.g. the Sunbelt Blog’s February 2008 conclusion that “80% of [Zango’s] business comes from Seekmo, the porn side of its business.” See also Sunbelt’s off-hand November 2006 remark that “hardcore porno videos [are] funded through Zango Seekmo installs.”

But the scope of explicit materials within Zango’s video library is quite striking. Consider the first page of Zango’s library listings for Angeline Jolie. Beyond the “sex scene” video linked above, the listings also include “Angelina Jolie Taking a Bath”, “Angelina Jolie Under the Sheets”, “Angelina Jolie in Bra & Panties”, “A fairly long nude scene staring Angelina Jolie” (s.i.c.), “Angeline Jolie Getting It On”, “Angelina Jolie Nip Slip”, “Angelina Jolie Hardcore”, and “Angelina Jolie Dominatrix”, and “Angelina Jolie Hot On The Runway.” That’s ten explicit results out of twenty links — suggesting that explicit materials are remarkably widespread on Zango’s site.

The initial version of this article also flagged Zango’s “Nice But” (s.i.c.), a video that on May 27 occupied the fourth-most prominent position in Zango’s “Browse” listings. The thumbnail image of this video appeared to feature a full-screen display of a man’s naked buttocks, filling the entire screen. In a follow-up, Zango points out that in fact, the video shows an extreme close-up zoom of of two hands. So this image and video are not actually explicit. Yet a viewer merely flipping through Zango’s listings would nonetheless see an image that is, by all indications, explicit. The title “but” (s.i.c.) and the keyword “naked,” both adjacent to the thumbnail, reinforce the user’s perception of having seen an unrequested explicit image. Although the image is not actually explicit, the image’s content, placement, and labeling make it likely to leave users with the same feeling as an unrequested image that is actually sexually explicit: In both instances, a viewer who merely sees the image and does not watch the video will think he has seen an unwanted explicit image. In my view, Zango errs in mocking this harm. To the users who Zango tricks, the harm is perfectly real.

Zango’s audio library consists solely of prank phone calls to celebrities

Zango Offers Prank Phone Call Recordings Zango Offers Prank Phone Call Recordings

Zango’s content library offers three types of media: Videos, screensavers, and audio. Despite Zango’s much-touted “content economy,” Zango offers just eight audio clips. And although Zango’s “About Zango” description promises to provide free access to “music,” in fact all eight of these audio files are recordings from talk radio — just voices, with no music at all.

All eight of Zango’s audio recordings share a common theme: Prank phone calls to celebrities. In each, a caller pretends to be someone famous (e.g. the Prime Minister of Canada), and calls a celebrity (e.g. Bill Gates) under the guise of a bona fide discussion. The caller proceeds to berate the celebrity (e.g. by criticizing the features and reliability of Windows).

A comment in several of the videos reveals the source of the recordings: The Masked Avengers, which Wikipedia describes as “a Canadian radio duo … of disk jockeys and comedians Sebastien Trudel and Marc-Antoine Audette, known for making prank calls to famous persons by pretending to be government officials or officers in charitable organizations.” I wrote to Mr. Trudel, who confirmed to me that he has not granted Zango any license to use or reproduce these clips.

After placing these recordings in its content library, Zango further syndicates the materials onto Zango’s partner sites. For example, celebsprankd.com (screenshot) features all eight recordings, but requires users to install Zango before listening. Whois reports that Celebsprankd comes from the Vancouver, B.C. advertising firm Neverblue Media — a conclusion confirmed by the presence of the Neverblue.com web server at the same IP address. Neverblue describes itself as a “leading … online marketing company” offering “premier” advertising and “solid business leads” — claims arguably inconsistent with distributing and profiting from prank phone calls, not to mention distributing Zango. (But these recordings aren’t Neverblue’s only tie to Zango. This month alone, my Automatic Spyware Tester found eleven incidents of Neverblue affiliates buying popup traffic from Zango. I’ve also found dozens more incidents as to Neverblue affiliates buying traffic from other spyware.)

What of Zango’s distribution of these prank call recordings? With so few clips yet such prominent placement (including five of these eight audio recordings featured on Zango’s home page), senior Zango staff surely know what the files contain. Does Zango support prank phone calls? Wasting celebrities’ time under false pretenses? Recording phone calls without permission, even in states that specifically require such permission? It’s hard to reconcile these practices with Zango’s supposed reforms.

Widespread material users can get elsewhere for free, without any popups or other detriments

Much of Zango’s content is available elsewhere without charge and without installing any software that tracks online behavior or shows popup ads. For example, clicking Zango’s “Browse” tab and retaining defaults, every single video on the first page of results is syndicated from Revver. Users could just as easily get these videos directly from Revver, as receive them from Zango. But if users watched these videos at Revver, Zango’s software would not track their web browsing and searching, and users would not receive Zango’s popup ads.

Zango Falsely Claims that Uninstallation Eliminates Content Access Zango Falsely Tells Its Users:
“Uninstallation … eliminates content access”

Furthermore, Zango makes untrue claims about the necessity of its software. For example, Zango claims that “uninstallation … eliminates content access.” It does not. For files hosted at Revver, installation of Zango is not necessary to watch the videos in the first place, and uninstallation does not interfere with watching the videos later. Moreover, even many Zango-hosted files can be accessed without installing Zango, or after uninstalling Zango. For example, Zango’s “Chris Rock on the Daily Show” is actually just a standard Windows Media Video (WMV) distributed from the following URL: preview.licenseacquisition.org/123/1054944882.36393/yikers_chris_rock_on_the_daily_show.wmv . Zango’s “Borats First Trip To An American Gym” (s.i.c.) is preview.licenseacquisition.org/123/1054944854.02531/yikers_borats_first_trip_to_an_american_gym.wmv . Similarly, Zango’s “Bill Gates Gets Pranked” is a WMA hosted at preview.licenseacquisition.org/13/12295/12295.wma . Any user who knows these URLs can easily receive the corresponding files — without ever installing Zango, or after uninstalling Zango. Zango ought not claim otherwise.

Presenting material that content creators never asked to have included in any Zango library

By syndicating videos from Revver, Zango causes its video library to feature materials that content creators never asked to have associated with Zango in any way.

Zango’s syndication of Revver videos has prompted numerous complaints content creators who post videos to Revver. For example, Chris Pirillo asked why his videos are appearing on Zango. (“I don’t remember giving Zango permission to push crapware on my behalf.”) Revver forum user JPPI pointed out the irony of Zango claiming his videos were “FREE, thanks to Zango” when in fact the videos were free all along (even before Zango syndicated them). Revver forum user David complained that it is “kinda deceptive” (s.i.c.) “to make it sound like Zango was the one who made the video free.”

In response, Revver Vice President Asi Behar agreed to ask Zango to remove any Revver videos that Revver authors specifically so designate. But such removals do nothing to cure the deception of Zango requiring that users install its software before watching materials widely available elsewhere for free. Furthermore, such removals do nothing to protect Revver content creators who are unaware of Revver’s relationship with Zango. The word “Zango” appears nowhere on Revver’s official web site (as distinguished from Revver’s forums and some Revver-hosted videos). Thus, a Revver content creator has no easy way to learn about Revver’s relationship with Zango — not to mention learn of the option to request exclusion from Zango.

Zango’s syndication of Revver videos risks tainting the good name of Revver content creators. Consider a user who searches for a Revver video and finds that video hosted at Zango (just as Chris Pirillo did last year). The user may mistakenly conclude that installing Zango is in fact necessary to watch the video. If so, the user is likely to end up with a negative view of the underlying content creator — mistakenly concluding that, e.g., Chris Pirillo has partnered with Zango or endorses Zango’s activities. Revver forum complaints indicate that numerous Revver users share this concern. Yet Revver continues to syndicate videos to Zango without first checking with content creators.

Zango’s problems in context

Last week, Zango was one of four finalists for the Software & Information Industry Association’s CODiE Best Video Content Aggregation Service. In my view, that award is misguided: Far from deserving praise, Zango should be criticized and shunned for reproducing others’ copyrighted work without any apparent license to do so, showing sexually-explicit material unrequested, and offering users a lousy value by bundling extra ads with content users could get elsewhere for free.

Meanwhile, Zango continues litigation with Kaspersky. Recall: Kaspersky blocked Zango’s software from installing; Zango sued; Kaspersky successfully defended on the grounds that the Communications Decency Act, 47 USC 230, immunizes Kaspersky’s behavior because Kaspersky is an “interactive computer service provider” blocking material that, in its subjective opinion, is “objectionable.” In Zango’s appeal, Zango claims its software is not “otherwise objectionable” (brief pages 12-15; PDF pages 17-20). If it’s not objectionable to show explicit material unrequested — not to mention to infringe copyrights on a massive scale, and to insert extra ads around material available elsewhere without such ads – then I don’t know what is.

Finally, I’m often asked whether Zango continues the behaviors I previously reported. Installing through sneaky fake-user-interface pop-up ads that mimic the appearance of official Windows dialog boxes (as I reported last summer)? Yes. I made a fresh video showing such installations just last week.Defrauding advertisers through popups that cover merchants’ sites with their own affiliate offers(as I reported last spring, in September 2005, in summer 2004, and otherwise)? Definitely. This month alone, I reported six Zango incidents to just one of my advertiser clients — not to mention scores of other incidents targeting other web sites and advertisers. Zango repeatedly claims its problems are all in the past, but my hands-on testing continues to indicate otherwise.

The Sears "Community" Installation of ComScore

Late last month, Benjamin Googins (a senior researcher in the Anti-Spyware unit at Computer Associates) critiqued a ComScore installation performed by Sears’ “Sears Holdings Community” (“My SHC Community” or “SHC”). After reviewing the installation sequence, Ben concluded that the installation offered “very little mention of software or tracking” and otherwise fell short of CA and industry standards. I agree.

I write today to add my own critique. I begin by presenting the entire installation sequence in screenshots and video. I then explain why the limited notice provided falls far short of the standards the FTC has established. Finally, I show that Sears’ claims of adequate notice are demonstrably false.

The SHC Installation Sequence

The SHC installation proceeds in four steps:

1) An email from Sears after a user provides an address at Sears.com. In seven paragraphs plus a set of bullet points, 582 words in total, the email describes the SHC service in general terms. But the paragraphs’ topic sentences make no mention of any downloadable software, nor do the bullet points offer even a general description of what the software does. The only disclosure of the software’s effects comes midway through the fourth paragraph, where the program is described as “research software [that] will confidentially track your online browsing.” Sophisticated users who notice this text will probably abandon installation and proceed no further. But novices may mistakenly think the tracking is specific to Sears sites: SHC is a research program offered by Sears, so it is difficult to understand why tracking would occur elsewhere. Furthermore, the quoted text appears midway through a paragraph — in no way brought to users’ attention via topic sentences, headings, section formatting, or other labels. So it’s strikingly easy to miss.

2) If a user presses the “Join” button in the email, the user is taken to a SHC web-based installation sequence that further details SHC’s offerings. The first page describes some aspects of SHC in reasonable detail — with six prominent and clear bullet points. Yet nowhere does this text make any mention whatsoever of downloadable software, market research, or other tracking.

3) Pressing “Join” in the SHC screen takes a user to a “Welcome to My SHC Community” page which requests the user’s name, address, and household size. The page then presents a document labeled “Privacy Statement and User License Agreement” — 2,971 words of text, shown in a small scroll box with just ten lines visible, requiring fully 54 on-screen pages to view in full. The initial screen of text is consistent with the “privacy statement” heading: The visible text indicates that the document describes “what information [SHC] gather[s and] how [SHC] use[s] it” — typical subjects for a privacy policy. But despite the title and the first screen of text, the document actually proceeds to an entirely different subject, namely downloadable software and its far-reaching effects: The tenth page admits that the application “monitors all of the Internet behavior that occurs on the computer on which you install the application, including … filling a shopping basket, completing an application form, or checking your … personal financial or health information.” That’s remarkably comprehensive tracking — but mentioned in a disclosure few users are likely to find, since few users will read through to page 10 of the license.

    Within the Privacy Statement section, a link labeled “Printable version” offers users a full-screen version of the document, requiring “only” ten on-screen pages on my test PC. But nothing in the Privacy Statement caption or visible text suggests that the document merits such thorough review. Due to the labeling and the first screen of text, few users will see any need to click through to the full-screen version.

4) A user next arrives at a screen labeled “You’re almost finished!” Clicking “Next” triggers an ActiveX screen offering an unnamed program, signed by a company called TMRG, Inc. (nowhere previously mentioned in the installation sequence), authenticated by Thawte (part of VeriSign). Pressing Yes in the ActiveX yields an installation program with no further opportunity to cancel installation. Packet sniffer analysis confirms that ComScore software is installed.

See also a video of the installation sequence.

Relevant FTC Rules

The FTC’s recent settlements with Direct Revenue and Zango explain the disclosure and consent required before installing tracking software on users’ computers. To install such software on users’ PCs, vendors must obtain “express consent” — defined to require “clear[] and prominent[] disclos[ure of] the material terms of such software … including the nature and purpose of the program and the effects it will have … prior to the display of, and separate from, any final End User License Agreement.” “Clear[] and prominent[]” installations are defined to be those that are “unavoidable”, among other requirements.

The Sears SHC installation of ComScore falls far short of these rules. The limited SHC disclosure provided by email lacks the required specificity as to the nature, purpose, and effects of the ComScore software. Nor is that disclosure “unavoidable,” in that the key text appears midway through a paragraph, without a heading or even a topic sentence to alert users to the important (albeit vague) information that follows.

The disclosure provided within the Privacy Statement and User License Agreement also cannot satisfy the FTC’s requirements. The FTC demands a disclosure prior to … and separate from” any license agreement, whereas the only disclosure on this page occurs within the license agreement — exactly contrary to FTC instructions. Furthermore, users can easiliy overlook text on page ten of a lengthy license agreement. Such text is the opposite of “unavoidable.”

The SHC/ComScore violation could hardly be simpler. The FTC requires that software makers and distributors provide clear, prominent, unavoidable notice of the key terms. SHC’s installation of ComScore did nothing of the kind.

Other Installation Deficiencies

Beyond the problems set out above, the SHC installation also falls short in other important respects.

Failure to provide the promised additional information. Sears’ initial email promises that “during the registration process, you’ll learn more about this application software.” In fact, no such information is provided in the visible, on-screen installation sequence. Based on this false promise and users’ general experience, users may reasonably expect that the download link in step 4 will offer additional information about the software at issue, along with an opportunity to cancel installation if desired. In fact no such information is ever provided, nor do users have any such opportunity to cancel.

Choosing little-known product names that prevent users from learning more. The initial SHC email refers to the ComScore software as “VoiceFive.” The license agreement refers to the ComScore software as “our application” and “this application” without ever providing the application’s name. The ActiveX prompt gives no product name, and it reports company name “TMRG, Inc.” These conflicting names prevent users from figuring out what software they are asked to accept. Furthermore, none of these names gives users any easy way to determine what the software is or what it does. In contrast, if SHC used the company name “ComScore” or the product name “RelevantKnowledge,” users could run a search at any search engine. These confusing name-changes fit the trend among spyware vendors: Consider Direct Revenue’s dozens of names (AmazingMerchants, BestDeals, Coolshopping, IPInsight, Blackone Data, Tps108, VX2, etc.).

Critiquing Sears SHC’s Response

To my surprise, Sears defends the practices described above. In a reply to CA’s Ben Googins, Sears SHC VP Rob Harles claims that SHC “goes to great lengths to describe the tracking aspect.” In particular, Harles says “[c]lear notice appears in the invitation”, “on the first signup page”, and “in the privacy policy and user licensing agreement.”

I emphatically disagree. The email invitation provides vague notice midway through a lengthy paragraph that, according to its topic sentence, is otherwise about another topic. The first signup page makes no mention at all of any downloadable software. The privacy policy and license agreement describe the software only in the tenth page of text (where few users are likely to find the disclosures), and even then it fails to reference the program by name.

Harles further claims that the installer provides “a progress bar that they [users] can abort.” Again, I disagree. The video and screenshots are unambiguous: The SHC installer shows no progress bar and offers no abort button.

The Installation in Context

In June 2007, I showed other examples of ComScore software installing without consent — including multiple installations through security exploits. TRUSTe responded by removing ComScore’s RelevantKnowledge from TRUSTe’s Trusted Download Program for three months. Now that more than five months have elapsed, I expect that ComScore is seeking readmission. But the installation shown above stands in stark contrast to TRUSTe Trusted Download rules. See especially the requirement that primary notice be “clear, prominent and unavoidable” (Schedule A, sections 3.(a).(iii) and 1.(hh)).

Why so many problems for ComScore? The basic challenge is that users don’t want ComScore software. ComScore offers users nothing sufficiently valuable to compensate them for the serious privacy invasion ComScore’s software entails. There’s no good reason why users should share such detailed information about their browsing, purchasing, and other online activities. So time and time again, ComScore and its partners resort to trickery (or worse) to get their software onto users’ PCs.

Zango’s Compliance Problems

Last November, Zango and the FTC announced a settlement of the FTC’s investigation of Zango’s practices. Among the key requirements: Zango agreed to install only after “clearly and prominently disclos[ing] the material terms [of its software] prior to the display of, and separate from, any [EULA].” Zango further agreed to label each of its ads with a “clear[] and prominent[]” marking as to the source of the ad, as well as a hyperlink to removal and complaint procedures.

Some of Zango’s installations do some of what the settlement requires. But others don’t. Today I’m posting a critique. In a series of screenshots, I show widespread Zango installations with no disclosure outside of a EULA. I also present numerous Zango ads appearing with no labeling at all. Details:

Zango Practices Violating Zango’s Recent Settlement with the FTC

ComScore Doesn’t Always Get Consent updated July 26, 2007

This past Wednesday, ComScore raised $82 million in an IPO that jumped 42% in its first day of trading. Some investors clearly like ComScore’s business, but I wonder whether they fully understand ComScore’s business model, privacy implications, and poor track record of nonconsensual installations.

ComScore’s tracking software is remarkably invasive. The privacy policy for ComScore’s RelevantKnowledge tracking program purports to grant ComScore the right to track users’ name and address, browsing, shopping, and even “online accounts … includ[ing] personal financial [and] health information.” Based on these privacy concerns, well-respected security researchers have long warned about ComScore’s software. For example, in 2004 Cornell University began blocking all communications with ComScore’s MarketScore tracking servers. Multiple other universities (including Columbia University and Indiana University) followed up with special warnings to their users.

At least as serious are ComScore’s installation practices. ComScore pays independent distributors to install ComScore software onto users’ computers. Predictably, some of these distributors install ComScore software without getting user consent. Some specific examples:

  • On Wednesday (June 27, 2007), I browsed ExitExchange, a well-known banner farm widely loaded in popups and popunders by various sites (as well as some spyware programs). ExitExchange showed several ads, one of which performed a security exploit that installed ComScore’s RelevantKnowledge. See video proof. Notice the exploit beginning at 0:12. When I ran a HijackThis scan to check for infections (0:29), I found RelevantKnowledge’s “rk.exe” already running (1:10), even though I had not granted permission for it to install. Packet log analysis indicates that the installation was performed by Topinstalls and by Searchclickads. The installation was predicated on two simultaneous attempted exploits — one using a Java vulnerability, another using a Microsoft MSXML vulnerability. Also installed (all without my consent): Deskwizz/Searchingbooth, Look2me, and WebBuying, among others not yet identified.
  • I previously observed and recorded a substantially similar nonconsensual installation of RelevantKnowledge (by these same distributors) on April 26, 2007.
  • Spyware researchers at Sunbelt Software observed a nonconsensual installation of RelevantKnowledge, seemingly by these same distributors, earlier in June 2007. Sunbelt staff browsed FirstStolz and received an exploit that installed TopInstalls and Searchclickads, which in turn installed RelevantKnowledge.
  • In August-September 2006, I repeatedly observed RelevantKnowledge installed by DollarRevenue, a notorious spyware bundler (subsequently shut down by Dutch law enforcement). In my testing, DollarRevenue installed RelevantKnowledge software without users’ consent. ComScore staff later admitted they had “engaged in partnership negotiations with DollarRevenue.” ComScore claims it never paid DollarRevenue — but I personally observed and recorded DollarRevenue installing ComScore software onto my testing systems.
  • In November 2005, I observed ComScore’s MarketScore software installed by PacerD, a notorious spyware bundler that installed through widespread exploits syndicated through ad networks. PacerD installed RelevantKnowledge without user consent.
  • In April 2007, I observed ComScore’s MarketScore software installed when users request and install a media converter program. The inclusion of MarketScore was disclosed only if users scrolled to page four of a box simply labeled “License Agreement.” No on-screen label indicated that multiple documents were concatenated into that single scroll box, nor did any short notice or other prominent text make any mention of RelevantKnowledge’s presence or effects. These omissions stand in stark contrast to recent FTC precedent requiring “clear and prominent disclosure of material terms prior to and separate from any end user license agreement.”

ComScore’s nonconsensual installations are particularly notable because TRUSTe’s Trusted Download program recently granted a certification (albeit “provisional”) to ComScore’s RelevantKnowledge software. I’ve previously criticized other TRUSTe certifications — concerned that TRUSTe-certified sites may be no safer than other sites, and arguably less safe. That said, to TRUSTe’s credit, Integrated Search Technologies’ Vomba is no longer on TRUSTe’s Trusted Download list — albeit a result that TRUSTe attributes to Vomba’s financial concerns rather than to security researcherscritique of Vomba’s practices and lineage. Whatever the reasons for IST’s removal, perhaps ComScore’s MarketScorecould stand for an equally thorough review.

ComScore also boasts a “WebTrust” seal from Ernst & Young. See the associated Audit Report. Ernst & Young indicates that it “test[ed] and evaluat[ed] the operating effectiveness” of ComSCore’s internal controls but concedes that “error or fraud may occur and not be detected.”

Update – TRUSTe’s Response (July 26, 2007)

On Friday July 20 — well after the close of the East Coast business day, and fully three weeks after I first reported the nonconsensual installs described above — TRUSTe announced that ComScore’s RelevantKnowledge has been removed from the Trusted Download whitelist for three months.

I have mixed views about this outcome. On one hand, it’s certainly an improvement from prior TRUSTe practice, during which companies as notorious as Direct Revenue were allowed to continue to hold TRUSTe privacy seals despite widespread nonconsensual installations. But a comment from Sunbelt Software’s Eric Howes offers compelling concerns. Eric explains:

[TRUSTe has] essentially decided to continue working with ComScore, provided ComScore spends a token amount of time in the “naughty corner.” … Who loses as a result? Consumers and web surfers ultimately, as ComScore will be allowed to continue plying its trade of surreptitious, underhanded installs of its RelevantKnowledge software to support some very aggressive and intrusive data collection on unsuspecting users’ machines, all with PR cover from TRUSTe.

Eric also cites a June 27 exchange between Sunbelt CEO Alex Eckleberry and TRUSTe’s Colin O’Malley. Transcribing from the audio recording of the Anti-Spyware Coalition‘s public workshop :

Alex Eckelberry: “So what if you have an application that is installing through an exploit? Do those guys go through a probationary process, or do they just get cut off? Are they just gone?”

Colin O’Malley: “If they’re installing through an exploit, that’s covered in what’s described in what we describe as our prohibited activities. That’s not an activity that is acceptable by any level of notice, and so they’re terminated immediately.”

Alex Eckelberry: “Good. OK.”

Remarkably, TRUSTe’s spokesperson now claims Colin promised termination only when a vendor itself uses exploits, but not when its distributors do so. Reports Vnunet: “‘Colin [O’Malley]’s remarks were specifically about a company that is directly responsible,’ the spokesperson explained. ‘In this case, it was the affiliate that was exploiting the flaw.'”

I’ve read and reread the exchange, and listened repeatedly for good measure. On my interpretation, Colin plainly promised to terminate any vendor whose software is becoming installed through exploits — no matter whether the vendor itself performs the exploit, or whether the exploit is performed by one of the vendor’s distributors. I reach this conclusion for two separate reasons:

1) The plain language of Alex’s question is intentionally inclusive as to who is doing the installation. Notice the broad “that is installing” — vague as to how exactly the installation is occurring.

2) Distributor-perpetrated exploit installs have been standard practice in the “adware” industrry. That’s what I widely observed as to 180solutions, Direct Revenue, eXact Advertising, and so many others. Meanwhile, vendor-perpetrated exploit installs are few and far between — common only among little-known companies, and even then usually comingled with installing third parties’ software. So if Colin had wanted to remark only on the (unusual or unprecedented) vendor-perpetrated exploits, he would have needed to say that specifically.

Perhaps TRUSTe regrets the breadth of Colin’s promise. But Colin made a tough commitment for good reason: As Colin spoke to dozens of anti-spyware researchers already suspicious of Trusted Download, his big promises helped bolster TRUSTe’s credibility. Had Colin told the ASC what now seems to be TRUSTe’s policy — that some exploit-based installs yield only a temporary suspension — I gather Alex would have questioned Colin further to emphasize the need for a tougher response. Other meeting attendees would probably have done the same.

In any event, if Colin’s goal was to build support among anti-spyware researchers, his efforts don’t seem to be succeeding. Eric continues:

Th[is] case was significant in that it was the first big public test of how well TRUSTe would perform when called to defend the standards that allegedly undergird the Trusted Download program. When push came to shove, though, TRUSTe demonstrated itself to be lacking the backbone to deliver on its word. [This is] another illustration of why we at Sunbelt place no value whatsoever in TRUSTe’s whitelisting and certifications.

Added FaceTime’s Chris Boyd:

For Gods sake, when are we going to stop gimping around and actually break out some actual punishments for people? Either kick someone from your program and be done with it, or … just give up already.

TRUSTe’s extreme delay further compromises the standing of Trusted Download: Three weeks elapsed before TRUSTe responded to my documentation and proof of nonconsensual ComScore RelevantKnowledge installations. Throughout that period, the Trusted Download whitelist continued to list RelevantKnowledge — falsely suggesting that RelevantKnowledge was in good standing. Internet users deserve better: When TRUSTe learns of an infraction of such seriousness, all applicable web pages ought to be updated promptly, lest the Internet community mistakenly proceed in reliance on TRUSTe’s supposed diligence.

Bad Practices Continue at Zango, Notwithstanding Proposed FTC Settlement and Zango’s Claims with Eric Howes; updated December 8, 2006

Earlier this month, the FTC announced the proposed settlement of its investigation into Zango, makers of advertising software widely installed onto users’ computers without their consent or without their informed consent (among other bad practices).

We commend the proposed settlement’s core terms. But despite these strong provisions, bad practices continue at Zango — practices that, in our judgment, put Zango in violation of the key terms and requirements of the FTC settlement. We begin by explaining the proposed settlement’s requirements. We then present eight types of violations of the proposed settlement, with specific examples of each. We conclude with recommendations and additional analysis.

Except where otherwise indicated, this document describes only downloads we tested during November 2006 — current, recent installations and behaviors.

Zango’s Burdens Under the Proposed FTC Settlement

The FTC’s proposed settlement with Zango imposes a number of important requirements and burdens on Zango, including Zango’s installation and advertising practices. Specifically, the settlement:

  • Prohibits Zango from using “any legacy program to display any advertisement to, or otherwise communicate with, a consumer’s computer.” (settlement I)
  • Prohibits Zango from (directly or via third parties) “exploit[ing] a security vulnerability … to download or install onto any computer any software code, program, or content.” (II)
  • Prohibits from Zango installing software onto users’ computers without “express consent.” Obtaining “express consent” requires “clearly and prominently disclos[ing] the material terms of such software program or application prior to the display of, and separate from, any final End User License Agreement.” (III) Defines “prominent” disclosure to be, among other requirements, “unavoidable.” (definition 5)
  • Requires Zango to “provide a reasonable and effective means for consumers to uninstall the software or application,” e.g. through a computers’ Add/Remove utility. (VII)
  • Requires Zango to “clearly and prominently” label each advertisement it displays. (VI)

These are serious burdens and requirements that, were they zealously satisfied by Zango, would do much to protect consumers from the numerous nonconsensual and misleading Zango installations we have observed.

Zango Is Not In Compliance with the Proposed Settlement

Zango has claimed that it “has met or exceeded the key notice and consent standards detailed in the FTC consent order since at least January 1, 2006.”

Despite Zango’s claim, we continue to find ongoing installations of Zango’s software that fall far short of the proposed settlement’s burdens, requirements, and standards. The example installations that we present below establish that Zango’s current installation and advertising practices remain in violation of the terms and requirements of the proposed settlement.

  • “Material Terms” Disclosed Only in EULA
    Zango often announces “material terms” only in its End User License Agreement, not in the more prominent locations required by the proposed settlement. (Examples A, B)
  • “Material Terms” Omitted from Disclosure
    Zango often omits “material terms” from its prominent installation disclosures — failing to prominently disclose facts likely to affect consumers’ decisions to install Zango’s software. (Examples A, B, C)
  • Disclosures Not Clear & Prominent 
    Zango presents disclosures in a manner and format such that these disclosures fail to gain the required “express consent” of users because the disclosures are not “clearly and prominently” displayed. (Examples B, E, F)
  • Disclosures Presented Only After Software Download & Execution
    Zango presents disclosures only after the installation and execution of Zango’s software on the users’ computers has already occurred, contrary to the terms of the proposed settlement. (Examples C, F)
  • No Disclosure Provided Whatsoever
    Some Zango software continues to become installed with no disclosure whatsoever. (Example D)
  • Installation & Servicing of Legacy Programs
    Older versions of Zango’s software — versions with installation, uninstallation, and/or disclosure inconsistent with the proposed settlement — continue to become installed and to communicate with Zango servers. (Examples C, D, E, F)
  • Installations Promoted & Performed through Miscellaneous Other Deceptive Means & Circumstances
    Zango installs are still known to be promoted and performed in or through a variety of miscellaneous practices that can only be characterized as deceptive. (Multiple examples in section G)
  • Unlabeled Advertising
    Some Zango advertisements lack the labeling required by the proposed settlement. (Multiple examples in section H)

These improper practices remain remarkably easy to find, and we have numerous additional recent examples on file. Moreover, these problems are sufficiently serious that they cast doubt on the efficacy and viability of the FTC’s proposed settlement as well as Zango’s ability to meet the requirements of the settlement.

Example A: Zango’s Ongoing Misleading Installations On and From Its Own Servers

The proposed settlement requires “express consent” before software may be “install[ed] or “download[ed]” onto users’ PCs (III). The term “prominent” is defined to mean “clear[] and prominent[]” disclosure of “the material terms” of the program to be installed, and most of Zango’s recent installation disclosures seem to meet this standard. But we are concerned by what those disclosures say. In our view, the disclosures omit the material facts Zango is obliged to disclose.

Although the proposed settlement does not explain what constitute “material” terms, other FTC authority provides a definition. The FTC’s Policy Statement on Deception, holds that a material fact is one “likely to affect the consumer’s conduct or decision with regard to a product or service.”

From our analysis of Zango’s software, we think Zango has two material features — two features particularly likely to affect a reasonable user’s decision to install (or not install) Zango software. First, users must know that Zango will give them extra pop-up ads — not just “advertisements,” but pop-ups that appear in separate, freestanding windows. Second, users must know that Zango will transmit detailed information to its servers, including information about what web pages they view, and what they search for.

A Misleading Zango Installer Appearing Within Windows Media Player A Misleading Zango Installer Appearing Within Windows Media Player

Unfortunately, many of Zango’s installations fail to include these disclosures with the required prominence. Consider the screen shown at right. Here, Zango admits that it shows “advertisements,” but Zango fails to disclose that its ads appear in pop-ups. Zango’s use of the word “advertisements,” with nothing more, suggests that Zango’s ads appear in standard advertising formats — formats users are more inclined to tolerate, like ordinary banner ads within web pages (e.g. the ads at nytimes.com) or within other software programs (e.g. the ads in MSN Messenger). In fact Zango’s pop-up ads are quite different, in that they appear in pop-ups known to be particularly annoying and intrusive. But the word “advertisements” does nothing to alert users to this crucial fact.

Zango also fails to disclose that its servers receive detailed information about users’ online behavior. Zango tell users that ads are “based on” users’ browsing. But this disclosure is not enough, because it omits a material fact. In particular, the disclosure fails to explain that users’ behavior will be transmitted to Zango, a fact that would influence reasonable users’ decision to install Zango.

In addition, Zango’s description of its toolbar omits important, material effects of the toolbar — namely, that the toolbar will show distracting animated ads. Zango says only that the toolbar “lets [users] search the Internet from any webpage” — entirely failing to mention the toolbar’s advertising,

We’re also concerned about the format and circumstances of these installation screens. Zango’s installation request appears in a Windows Media “license acquisition” screen — a system Microsoft provides for bona fide license acquisition, not for the installation of spyware or adware. Zango’s installer appears within Windows Media Player — a context where few users will expect to be on the lookout for unwanted advertising software, particularly when users had merely sought to watch a video, not to install any software whatsoever. Furthermore, the button to proceed with installation is misleadingly labeled “Play Now” — not “I Accept,” Install,” or any other caption that might alert users to the consequences of pressing the button. The screen’s small size further adds to user confusion: At just 485 by 295 pixels, the window doesn’t have room to explain the material effects of Zango’s software, even with Zango’s extra-small font. (In Zango’s main disclosure, capital letters are just seven pixels tall.) Furthermore, a user seeking to read Zango’s EULA (as embedded in these installation screens) faces a remarkable challenge: The 3,033 word document is shown in a box just five lines tall, therefore requiring fully 53 on-screen pages to view in full. Finally, if a user ultimately presses the “Play Now ” button, then the “Open” button on the standard Open/Save box that follows, Zango installs immediately, without any further opportunity for users to learn more or to change their mind. Such a rapid installation is contrary to standard Windows convention of further disclosures within an EXE installer, providing further opportunities for users to learn more and to change their minds. Video capture of this installation sequence.

All in all, we think typical users would be confused by this screen — unable to figure out who it comes from, what it seeks to do, or what exactly will occur if they press the Play Now button. A more appropriate installation sequence would use a standard format users better understand (e.g. a web page requesting permission to install), would tell users far more about the software they’re receiving, and would label its buttons far more clearly.

These installations are under Zango’s direct control: They are loaded directly from Zango’s servers. Were Zango so inclined, it could immediately terminate this installation sequence, or it could rework these installations, without any cooperation with (or even requests to) its distributors.

Example B: Zango’s Ongoing Misleading Hotbar Installations On and From Its Own Servers

Hotbar's Initial Installation Solicitation - Silent as to Hotbar's Effects Hotbar’s Initial Installation Solicitation – Silent as to Hotbar’s Effects

Hotbar's ActiveX Installer - Without Disclosure of Material Effects Hotbar’s ActiveX Installer – Without Disclosure of Material Effects

Final Step in Hotbar Installation - No Cancel Button, No Disclosure of Material Effects Final Step in Hotbar Installation – No Cancel Button, No Disclosure of Material Effects

The “express consent” required under the proposed settlement applies not just to software branded as “Zango,” but also to all other software installed or downloaded by Zango. (See “any software” in section III.) The “express consent” requirement therefore applies to Hotbar-branded software owned by Zango as a result of Zango’s recent merger with Hotbar. But Hotbar installations fail to include unavoidable disclosures of material effects, despite the requirements in the proposed settlement.

Consider the Hotbar installation shown in this video and in the screenshots at right. The installation sequence begins with an ad offering “free new emotion icons” (first screenshot at right) — certainly no disclosure of the resulting advertising software, the kinds of ads to be shown, or the significant privacy effects. If a user clicks that ad, the user receives the second screenshot at right — a bare ActiveX screen, again lacking a substantive statement of material effects of installing. If the user presses Yes in the ActiveX screen, the user receives the third screen at right — disclosing some features of Hotbar (e.g. weather, wallpapers, screensavers), and vaguely admitting that Hotbar is “ad supported,” but saying nothing whatsoever about the specific types of ads (e.g. intrusive in-browser toolbar animations) nor the privacy consequences. Furthermore, this third screen lacks any button by which users can decline or cancel installation. (Note the absence of any “cancel” button, or even an “x” in the upper-right corner.)

This installation sequence is substantially unchanged from what Edelman reported in May 2005.

This installation lacks the unavoidable material disclosures required under the proposed settlement. We see no way to reconcile this installation sequence with the requirements of the proposed settlement.

Example C: Incomplete, Nonsensical, and Inconsistent Disclosures Shown by Aaascreensavers Installing Zango Software

Aaascreensavers' Initial Zango Prompt - Omitting Key Material Information Aaascreensavers’ Initial Zango Prompt – Omitting Key Material Information

Zango's Subsequent Screen -- with deficiencies set out in the text at left Zango’s Subsequent Screen — with deficiencies set out in the text at left

We also remain concerned about third parties installing Zango’s software without the required user consent. Zango’s past features a remarkable serious of bad-actor distributors, from exploit-based installers to botnets to faked consent. Even today, some distributors continue to install Zango without providing the required “clear and prominent” notice of “material” effects.

Consider an installation of Zango from Aaascreensavers.com. Aaascreensavers provides a generic “n-Case” installation disclosure that says nothing about the specifics of Zango’s practices — omitting even the word “advertisements,” not to mention “pop-ups” or privacy consequences. (See first screenshot at right.) Furthermore, Aaascreensavers fails to show or even reference a EULA for Zango’s software. Nonetheless, Aaascreensavers continues to place Zango software onto users’ PCs through these installers.

Particularly striking is the nonsensical screen that appears shortly after Aaascreensavers installs Zango. (See second screenshot at right.) Beneath a caption labeled “Setup,” the screen states “the content on this site is free, thanks to 180search Assistant” — although the user has just installed a program (and is not browsing a site), and the program the user (arguably) just agreed to install was called “n-Case” not “180search Assistant.” At least as paradoxically, the “Setup” screen asks users to choose between “Uninstall[ing] 180search Assistant” and “Keep[ing]” the software. Since “180search Assistant” is software reasonable users will not even know they have, this choice is particularly likely to puzzle typical users. After all, it is nonsense to speak of a user making an informed decision to “keep” software he didn’t know he had.

Crucially, both installation prompts omit the material information Zango must disclose under its settlement obligations: Neither prompt mentions that ads will be shown in pop-ups, nor do they mention the important privacy effects of installing Zango software.

Video capture of this installation sequence.

Example D: Msnemotions Installing Zango with No Disclosure At All

Msnemotions continues to install Zango software with no disclosure whatsoever. In particular, Msnemotions never shows any license agreement, nor does it mention or reference Zango in any other on-screen text, even if users fully scroll through all listings presented to them. Video proof.

This installation is a clear violation of section III of the proposed FTC settlement. That section prohibits Zango “directly, or through any person [from] install[ing] or download[ing] … any software program or application without express consent.” Here, no such consent was obtained, yet Zango software downloaded and installed anyway.

In our tests, this Zango installation did not show any ads (although it did contact a Zango server and download a 20MB file). Nonetheless, the violation of section III occurs as soon as the Zango software is downloaded onto the user’s computer, for lack of the requisite disclosure and consent.

Example E: Emomagic Installing Zango with an Off-Screen Disclosure

Emomagic First Mentions Zango Five Pages Down In Its EULA
Emomagic First Mentions Zango 5 Pages Down In Its EULA

Emomagic continues to install Zango software with a disclosure buried five pages within its lengthy (23 on-screen-page) license agreement. That is, unless a user happened to scroll to at least the fifth page of the Emomagic license, the user would not learn that installing Emomagic installs Zango too. Video proof.

This installation is a clear violation of the proposed FTC settlement, because the hidden disclosure of Zango software is not “unavoidable.” In contrast, the proposed Settlement’s provision III and definition 5 define “prominent” disclosures to be those that are unavoidable, among other requirements.

We have additional examples on file where the first mention of Zango comes as far as 64 pages into a EULA presented in a scroll box. See also example F, below, where Zango appears 44 pages into a EULA, after the GPL.

Example F: Warez P2P Speedup Pro Installing Zango with an Off-Screen Disclosure

Warez P2P First Mentions Zango at Page 44 of its EULA, Below the GPL Warez P2P First Mentions Zango at Page 44 of its EULA, Below the GPL

Warez P2P Speedup Pro continues to install Zango software with a disclosure buried 44 pages within its lengthy license agreement. Video proof. Users are unlikely to see mention of Zango in part because Zango’s first mention comes so far down within the EULA.

Users are particularly unlikely to find Zango’s EULA because the first 43 pages of the EULA scroll box show the General Public License (GPL). (Screenshot of the first page, giving no suggestion that anything but the GPL appears within the scroll box.) Sophisticated users may already be familiar with this license, which is known for the many rights it grants to users and independent developers. Recognizing this pro-consumer license, even sophisticated users are discouraged from reviewing the scroll box’s contents in full — making it all the less likely that they will find the Zango license further down.

After installation, Warez P2P Speedup Pro proceeds to the second screen shown in Example C, above. The video confirms the special deceptiveness of this screen: If a user chooses the “uninstall” button — exercising his option (however deceptively mislabeled) to refuse Zango’s software — the user then receives a further screen attempting to get the user to change his mind and accept installation after all. The substance of this screen is especially deceptive — asking the user whether he wants to “cancel,” when in fact he had never elected even to start the Zango installation sequence in the first place. Finally, if the user presses the “Exit Setup” button on that final screen, the user is told he must restart his computer — a particularly galling and unnecessary interruption.

Section G: Zango Installations Predicated on Consumer Deception or on Use of Other Vendors’ Spyware

A Zango Ad Injected into Google by FullContext A Zango Ad Injected into Google by FullContext

We have also observed Zango installs occurring subsequent to consumer deception or other vendors sending spyware-delivered traffic to Zango.

Fullcontext spyware promoting Zango. We have observed Fullcontext spyware (itself widely installed without consent) injecting Zango ads into third parties’ web sites. Through this process, Zango ads appear without the permission of the sites in which they are shown, and without payment to those sites. These ads even appear in places in which no banner ads are not available for purchase at any price. See e.g. the screenshot at right, showing a Zango banner ad injected to appear above Google’s search results.

Typosquatters promoting Zango. Separately, Websense and Chris Boyd recently documented Zango installs commencing at “Yootube”. “Yootube” is a clear typosquat on the well-known “Youtube” site — hoping to reach users who mistype the address of the more popular site. If users reach the misspelled site, they will be encouraged to install Zango. Such Zango installations are predicated on a typosquat, e.g. on users reaching a site other than what they intended — a particularly clear example of deception serving a key role in the Zango installation process.

Spyware bundlers promoting Zango. In our testing of summer and fall 2006, we repeatedly observed Zango “S3” installer programs downloaded onto users’ computers by spyware-bundlers themselves operating without user consent (e.g. DollarRevenue and TopInstalls). Users received these Zango installation prompts among an assault of literally dozens of other programs. Any consent obtained through this method is predicated on an improper, nonconsensual arrival onto users’ PCs — a circumstance in which we think users cannot grant informed consent. Furthermore. the proposed settlement requires “express consent” before “installing or downloading” (emphasis added) “any software” onto users’ PCs (section III). Zango’s S3 installer is a “software program” within the meaning of the proposed settlement, yet DollarRevenue and TopInstalls downloaded this program onto users’ computers without consent. So these downloads violate the plain language of the proposed settlement, even where users ultimately refuse to install Zango software.

Update (December 8): We have uncovered still other Zango installations predicated on deception, including on phishing at MySpace. We discuss these improper practices in our follow-up comment to the FTC. Our bottom line: These Zango installs are disturbing not because they put zango in violation of hte terms of hte proposed settlement, but precisely because they do not — because tehse isntallations, disturbing though they may be, do not clearly violate any of the settlement’s requirements. These installations raise the alarming prospect that this settlement could allow Zango to continue to pay distributors to create malicious and/or deceptive software and web pages.

Section H: Unlabeled Ads

Today CDT filed a further comment about the FTC’s proposed settlement, focusing in part on Zango’s recent display of unlabeled ads, again specifically contrary to Zango’s obligations under the proposed settlement (section VI). CDT has proof of 39 unlabeled ads — 10% of their recent partially-automated tests — in which Zango’s pop-up ads lacked the labeling required under the proposed settlement. CDT explains that the ads “provide[d] absolutely no information that would allow consumers to correlate the advertisements’ origins to Zango’s software.”

We share CDT’s concern, because we too have repeatedly seen these problems. For example, this video shows a Zango ad served on November 19, 2006 — with labeling that disappears after less than four seconds on screen (from 0:02 to 0:06 in the video). Furthermore, Edelman first reported this same problem in July 2004: That when ads include redirects (as many do), Zango’s labeling often disappears. Compliance with the proposed settlement requires that Zango’s labeling appear on each and every ad, not just on some of the ads or even on most of the ads. So, here too, Zango is in breach of the proposed settlement.

Furthermore, the proposed settlement’s labeling requirement applies to “any advertisement” Zango serves — not just to Zango’s pop-ups, but to other ads too. Zango’s toolbars show many ads, as depicted in the screenshots below. Yet these toolbars lack the labeling and hyperlinks required by the proposed settlement. These unlabeled toolbars therefore constitute an additional violation of Zango’s duties under the proposed settlement.


Zango and Zango/Hotbar Toolbars Without the Labeling Required under the Proposed Settlement

The Size of Zango’s Payment to the FTC

We are puzzled by the size of the cash payment to be made by Zango. We understand that the FTC’s authority is limited to reclaiming ill-gotten profits, not to extracting penalties. But we think Zango’s profits to date far exceed the $3 million payment specified in the proposed settlement.

Available evidence suggests Zango’s company-to-date profits are substantial, probably beyond $3 million. As a threshold matter, Zango’s business is large: Zango claims to have 20 million active users at present (albeit with some “churn” as users manage to uninstall Zango’s software). Furthermore, Zango’s revenues are large: Zango recently told a reporter of daily revenues of $100,000 (i.e. $36 million per year), a slight increase from a 2003 report of $75,000 per day. With annual revenues on the order of $20 to $40 million, and with three years of operation to date, we find it inconceivable that Zango has made only $3 million of profit.

Zango’s prior statements and other companies’ records also both indicate that Zango’s profits exceed $3 million. A 2005 Forbes article confirms high profits at Zango, reporting “double-digit percentage growth in profits” — though without stating the baseline level of profits. But financial records from competing “adware” vendor Direct Revenue indicate a remarkable 75%+ profit margin: In 2004, DR earned $30 million of pre-tax profit on $38 million of revenue. Because Zango’s business is in many respects similar to DR, Zango’s profit margin is also likely to be substantial, albeit reduced from the 2004-era “adware” peak. Even if Zango’s profit margin were an order of magnitude lower, i.e. 7%, Zango would still have earned far more than $3 million profits over the past several years.

If Zango’s profits substantially exceed $3 million, as we think they do, the settlement’s payment is only a slap on the wrist. A tougher fine — such as full disgorgement of all company-to-date profits worldwide — would better send the message that Zango’s practices are and have been unacceptable.

Zango’s Statements and the Need for Enforcement

In its November 3 press release, Zango claims its reforms are already in place. “Every consumer downloading Zango’s desktop advertising software sees a fully and conspicuously disclosed, plain-language notice and consent process,” Zango’s press release proclaims. This claim is exactly contrary to the numerous examples we present above. Zango further claims that it “has met or exceeded the key notice and consent standards detailed in the FTC consent order since at least January 1, 2006” — again contrary to our findings that nonconsensual and deceptive installations remain ongoing.

From the FTC’s press release and from recent statements of FTC commissioners and staff, it appears the FTC intends to send a tough message to makers of advertising software. We commend the FTC’s goal. The proposed settlement, if appropriately enforced, might send such a message. But we worry the FTC will send exactly the opposite message if it allows Zango to claim compliance without actually doing what the proposed settlement requires.

As a first step, we endorse CDT’s suggestion that the FTC require Zango to retract its claim of compliance with the proposed settlement. Zango’s statement is false, and the FTC should not stand by while Zango mischaracterizes its behavior vis-a-vis the proposed settlement.

More broadly, we believe intensive ongoing monitoring will be required to assure that Zango actually complies with the settlement. We have spent 3+ years following Zango’s repeated promises of “reform,” and we have first-hand experience with the wide variety of techniques Zango and its partners have used to place software onto users’ PCs. Testing these methods requires more than black-letter contracts and agreements; it requires hands-on testing of actual infected PCs and the scores of diverse infection mechanisms Zango’s partners devise. To assure that Zango actually complies with the agreement, we think the FTC will need to allocate its investigatory resources accordingly. We’ve spent approximately 10 hours on the investigations leading to the results above, and we’ve uncovered these examples as well as various others. With dozens or hundreds of hours, we think we could find many more surviving Zango installations in violation of the proposed settlement’s requirements. We think the FTC ought to find these installations, or require that Zango do so, and then ought to see that the associated files are entirely removed from the web.

Update (December 8): Our follow-up comment to the FTC discusses additional concerns, further ongoing bad practices at Zango, and the special difficulty of enforcement in light of practices seemingly not prohibited by the proposed settlement.

Intermix Revisited

I recently had the honor of serving as an expert witness in The People of the State of California ex. rel. Rockard J. Delgadillo, Los Angeles City Attorney v. Intermix Media, Inc., Case No. BC343196 (L.A. Superior Court), litigation brought by the City Attorney of Los Angeles (on behalf of the people of California)against Intermix. Though Intermix is better known for creating MySpace, Intermix also made spyware that, among other effects, can become installed on users’ computers without their consent.

On Monday the parties announced a settlement under which Intermix will pay total monetary relief of $300,000 (including $125,000 of penalties, $50,000 in costs of investigation, and $125,000 in a contribution of computers to local non-profits). Intermix will also assure that third parties cease continued distribution of its software, among other injunctive relief. These penalties are in addition to Intermix’s 2005 $7.5 million settlement with the New York Attorney General.

In the course of this matter, I had occasion to examine my records of past Intermix installations. For example, within my records of installations I personally observed nearly two years ago, I found video evidence of Intermix becoming installed by SecondThought. By all indications, SecondThought’s exploit-based installers placed Intermix onto users’ computers without notice or consent.

Using web pages and installer files found on Archive.org, I also demonstrated that installations on Intermix’s own web sites were remarkably deficient. For example, some Intermix installations disclosed only a portion of the Intermix programs that would become installed, systematically failing to tell users about other programs they would receive if they went forward with installation. Most Intermix installations failed to affirmatively show users their license agreements, instead requiring users to affirmatively click to access the licenses; and in some instances, even when a user did click, the license was presented without scroll bars, such that even a determined user couldn’t read the full license. Furthermore, some Intermix installations claimed a home page change would occur only if a user chose that option (“you can choose to have your default start page reset”), when in fact that change occurred no matter what, without giving users any choice.

Remarkably, I also found evidence of ongoing Intermix installations, despite Intermix’s 2005 promise to “permanently discontinue distribution of its adware, redirect and toolbar programs.” For example, in my testing of October 2006 and again just yesterday, the Battling Bones screensaver (among various others) was still available on Screensavershot.com (a third-party site). Installing Battling Bones gives users Intermix’s Incredifind too. Even worse, this installation proceeds without any disclosure to the user of the Intermix software that would be installed. (Video proof. The installer’s EULA mentions various other programs to be installed, but it never mentions Intermix or the specific Intermix programs that in fact were installed.) Furthermore, I found dozens of “.CAB” installation files still on Intermix’s own web servers — particularly hard to reconcile with Intermix’s claim of having abandoned this business nearly two years months ago. Truly shutting down the business would have entailed deleting all such files from all servers controlled by Intermix.

I continue to think there’s substantial room for litigation against US-based spyware vendors. I continue to see nonconsensual and materially deceptive installations by numerous identifiable US spyware vendors. (For example, I posted a fresh Ask.com nonconsensual toolbar installation just last month. And I see more nonconsensual installations of other US-based vendors’ programs, day in and day out.) These vendors continue to cause substantial harm to the users who receive their unwanted software.


Technology news sites and forums have been abuzz over the FTC’s proposed settlement with Zango, whose advertising software has widely been installed without consent or without informed consent. I commend the FTC’s investigation, and the injunctive terms of the settlement (i.e. what Zango has to do) are appropriately tough. Oddly, Zango claims to have “met or exceeded the key notice and consent standards … since at least January 1, 2006.” I disagree. From what I’ve seen, Zango remains out of compliance to this day. I’m putting together appropriate screenshot and video proof.