Assessing Uber: Competition and Regulation in Transportation Networks

For consumers, it’s easy to applaud Uber, Lyft, and kin (transportation network companies or TNCs). Faster service, usually more reliable, often in nicer vehicles—all at lower prices. What’s to dislike?

Look behind the curtain and things are not so clear. TNCs cut corners on issues from insurance to inspections to background checks, thereby pushing costs from their customers to the general public—while also delivering a service that plausibly falls short of generally-applicable requirements duly established by law and, sometimes, their own marketing promises.

In a forthcoming article in Competition Policy International, Whither Uber?: Competitive Dynamics in Transportation Networks, I look at a range of concerns in this area, focusing on market dynamics and enforcement practices that have invited TNC to play fast-and-loose. This page offers excerpts and some further thoughts.

Corners cut

My article enumerates a variety of concerns resulting from prevailing TNC practices:

In most jurisdictions, a “for hire” livery driver needs a commercial driver’s license, a background check and criminal records check, and a vehicle with commercial plates, which often means a more detailed and/or more frequent inspection. Using ordinary drivers in noncommercial vehicles, TNCs skip most of these requirements, and where they take such steps (such as some efforts towards a background check), they do importantly less than what is required for other commercial drivers (as discussed further below). One might reasonably ask whether the standard commercial requirements in fact increase safety or advance other important policy objectives. On one hand, detailed and frequent vehicle inspections seem bound to help, and seem reasonable for vehicles in more frequent use. TNCs typically counter that such requirements are unduly burdensome, especially for casual drivers who may provide just a few hours of commercial activity per month. Nonetheless, applicable legal rules offer no “de minimis” exception and little support for TNCs’ position.

Differing standards for background checks raise similar questions. TNCs typically use standard commercial background check services which suffer from predictable weaknesses. For one, TNC verifications are predicated on a prospective driver submitting his correct name and verification details, but drivers with poor records have every incentive to use a friend’s information. (Online instructions tell drivers how to do it.) In contrast, other commercial drivers are typically subject to fingerprint verification. Furthermore, TNC verifications typically only check for recent violations—a technique far less comprehensive than the law allows. (For example, Uber admits checking only convictions within the last seven years, which the company claims is the maximum duration permitted by law. But federal law has no such limitation, and California law allows reporting of any crime for which release or parole was at most seven years earlier.) In People of the State of California v. Uber, these concerns were revealed to be more than speculative, including 25 different Uber drivers who passed Uber’s verifications but would have failed the more comprehensive checks permitted by law.

Relatedly, TNC representations to consumers at best gloss over potential risks, but in some areas appear to misstate what the company does and what assurances it can provide. For example, Uber claimed its service offered “best in class safety and accountability” and “the safest rides on the road” which “far exceed… what’s expected of taxis”—but taxis, with fingerprint verification of driver identity, offer improved assurances that the person being verified is the same person whose information is checked. Moreover, Uber has claimed to be “working diligently to ensure we’re doing everything we can to make Uber the safest experience on the road” at the same time that the company lobbies against legislation requiring greater verifications and higher safety standards.

Passengers with disabilities offer additional complaints about TNCs. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and many state laws, passengers with disabilities are broadly entitled to use transportation services, and passengers cannot be denied transport on the basis of disability. Yet myriad disabled passengers report being denied transport by TNCs. Blind passengers traveling with guide dogs repeatedly report that TNC drivers sometimes reject them. In litigation Uber argued that its service falls beyond the scope of the ADA and thus need not serve passengers with disabilities, an argument that a federal court promptly rejected. Nonetheless, as of November 2015, Uber’s “Drivers” page continues to tell drivers they can “choose who you pick up,” with no mention of ADA obligations, nor of prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or other prohibited factors.

I offer my sharpest criticism for certain TNC practices as to insurance:

TNCs encourage drivers to carry personal insurance rather than commercial insurance —anticipating, no doubt correctly, that drivers might be put off by the higher cost of commercial coverage. But TNC drivers are likely to have more frequent and more costly accidents than ordinary drivers: they drive more often, longer distances, with passengers, in unfamiliar locations, primarily in congested areas, and while using mobile apps. To the extent that drivers make claims on their personal insurance, they distort the market in two different ways: First, they push up premiums for other drivers. Second, the cost of their TNC accidents are not borne by TNC customers; by pushing the cost to drivers in general, TNCs appear to be cheaper than they really are.

In a notable twist, certain TNC policies not only encourage drivers to make claims on their personal policies, but further encourage drivers to commit insurance fraud. Consider a driver who has an accident during the so-called “period 1” in which the driver is running a TNC app, but no passenger has yet requested a ride from the driver. If the driver gets into an accident in this period, TNCs historically would deny both liability and collision coverage, claiming the driver was not yet providing service through the TNC. An affected driver might instead claim from his personal insurance, but if the driver admits that he was acting as a TNC driver—he had left home only to provide TNC services; he had transported several passengers already; he was planning more—the insurer will deny his claim. In fact, in all likelihood, an insurer in that situation would drop the driver’s coverage, and the driver would also be unable to get replacement coverage since any new insurer would learn the reason for the drop. As a practical matter, the driver’s only choices are to forego insurance coverage (a possibility in case of a collision claim, though more difficult after injuring others or damaging others’ property) or, more likely, lie to his insurance issuer. California law AB 2293, effective July 1, 2015, ended this problem as to collision claims in that state, requiring TNCs to provide liability coverage during period 1, but offering nothing elsewhere, nor any assistance on collision claims.

Where TNC practices merely shortchange a company’s own customers, such as providing a level of safety less than customers were led to believe, we might hope that market forces would eventually fix the problem—informing consumers of the benefits they are actually receiving, or compelling TNCs to live up to their promises. But where TNC practices push costs onto third parties, such as raising insurance rates for all drivers, there is no reason to expect market forces to suffice. Regulatory enforcement, discussed below, is the only apparent way forward on such issues.

Competitive dynamics when enforcement is lax

A striking development is the incompleteness of regulation of TNC or, more precisely, the incompleteness of enforcement of existing and plainly-applicable regulation. I explain:

In this environment, competition reflects unusual incentives: Rather than competing on lawful activities permitted under the applicable regulatory environment, TNC operators compete in part to defy the law—to provide a service that, to be sure, passengers want to receive and buyers want to provide, notwithstanding the legal requirements to the contrary.

The brief history of TNCs is instructive. Though Uber today leads the casual driving platforms, it was competing transportation platform Lyft that first invited drivers to provide transportation through their personal vehicles. Initially, Uber only provided service via black cars that were properly licensed, insured, and permitted for that purpose. In an April 2013 posting by CEO Travis Kalanick, Uber summarized the situation, effectively recognizing that competitors’ casual drivers are largely unlawful, calling competitors’ approach “quite aggressive” and “non-licensed.” (Note: After I posted this article, Uber removed that document from its site. But Archive.org kept a copy. I also preserved a screenshot of the first screen of the document, a PDF of the full document, and a print-friendly PDF of the full document.)

Uber’s ultimate decision, to recognize Lyft’s approach as unlawful but nonetheless to follow that same approach, is hard to praise on either substantive or procedural grounds. On substance, it ignores the important externalities discussed above—including safety concerns that sometimes culminate in grave physical injury and, indeed, death. On procedure, it defies the democratic process, ignoring the authority of democratic institutions to impose the will of the majority. Uber has all but styled itself as a modern Rosa Parks defying unjust laws for everyone’s benefit. But Uber challenges purely commercial regulation of business activity, a context where civil disobedience is less likely to resonate. And in a world where anyone dissatisfied with a law can simply ignore it, who’s to say that Uber is on the side of the angels? One might equally remember former Arkansas governor Orville Faubus’ 1957 refusal to desegregate public schools despite a court order.

Notice the impact on competition: Competitors effectively must match Uber’s approach, including ignoring applicable laws and regulation, or suffer a perpetual cost disadvantage.

Consider Hailo’s 2013-2014 attempt to provide taxi-dispatch service in New York City. On paper, Hailo had every advantage: $100 million of funding from A-list investors, a strong track record in the UK, licensed and insured vehicles, and full compliance with every applicable law and regulation. But Uber’s “casual driver” model offered a perpetual cost advantage, and in October 2014 Hailo abandoned the U.S. market. Uber’s lesson to Hailo: Complying with the law is bad business if your competitor doesn’t have to. Facing Uber’s assault in numerous markets in Southeast Asia, transportation app GrabTaxi abandoned its roots providing only lawful commercial vehicles, and began “GrabCar” with casual drivers whose legality is disputed. One can hardly blame them—the alternative is Hailo-style irrelevance. When Uber ignores applicable laws and regulators stand by the wayside, competitors are effectively compelled to follow.

Moreover, the firm that prevails in this type of competition may build a corporate character that creates other problems for consumers and further burdens on the legal system. My assessment:

Notice Uber’s recent scandals: Threatening to hire researchers to “dig up dirt” on reporters who were critical of the company. A “God view” that let Uber staff see any rider’s activity at any time without a bona fide purpose. Analyzing passengers’ rides to and from unfamiliar overnight locations to chronicle and tabulate one-night-stands. Charging passengers a “Logan Massport Surcharge & Toll” for a journey where no such fee was paid, or was even required. A promotion promising service by scantily-clad female drivers. The CEO bragging about his business success yielding frequent sexual exploits. “Knowing and intentional” “obstructive” “recalcitrance” in its “blatant,” “egregious,” “defiant refusal” to produce documents and records when so ordered by administrative law judges.

On one view, these are the unfortunate mishaps of a fast-growing company. But arguably it’s actually something more than that. Rare is the company that can pull off Uber’s strategy—fighting regulators and regulation in scores of markets in parallel, flouting decades of regulation and managing to push past so many legal impediments. Any company attempting this strategy necessarily establishes a corporate culture grounded in a certain disdain for the law. Perhaps some laws are ill-advised and should be revisited. But it may be unrealistic to expect a company to train employees to recognize which laws should be ignored versus which must be followed. Once a company establishes a corporate culture premised on ignoring the law, its employees may feel empowered to ignore many or most laws, not just the (perhaps) outdated laws genuinely impeding its launch. That is the beast we create when we admit a corporate culture grounded in, to put it generously, regulatory arbitrage.

An alternative model

Uber offers one approach to regulation: Ignore any laws the company considers outdated or ill-advised. But in other sectors, firms have chosen a different model to demonstrate their benefits and push for regulatory change. I offer one example as to the launch of Southwest Airilnes:

Planning early low-fare operations in 1967, Southwest leaders realized that the comprehensive regulatory scheme, imposed by the federal Civil Aeronautics Board, required unduly high prices, while simultaneously limiting routes and service in ways that, in Southwest’s view, harmed consumers. Envisioning a world of low-fare transport, Southwest sought to serve routes and schedules CAB would never approve, at prices well below what regulation required.

Had Southwest simply begun its desired service at its desired price, it would have faced immediate company-ending sanctions; though CAB’s rules were increasingly seen as overbearing and ill-advised, CAB would not have allowed an airline to brazenly defy the law. Instead, Southwest managers had to find a way to square its approach with CAB rules. To the company’s credit, they were able to do so. In particular, by providing solely intra-state transport within Texas, Southwest was not subject to CAB rules, letting the company serve whatever routes it chose, at the prices it thought best. Moreover, these advantages predictably lasted beyond the impending end of regulation: After honing its operations in the intra-state Texas market, Southwest was well positioned for future expansion.

In fact Southwest is far from unique in its attention to regulatory matters. Consider the recent experience of AT&T. In October 2015, AT&T sought to offer wifi calling for certain smartphones, but the company noticed that FCC rules required a teletypewriter (TTY) service for deaf users, whereas AT&T envisioned a replacement called real-time text (RTT). Competitors Sprint and T-Mobile pushed ahead without TTY, not bothering to address the unambiguous regulatory shortfall. To AT&T’s credit, it urged the FCC to promptly approve its alternative approach, noting the “asymmetry in the application of federal regulation to AT&T on the one hand and its marketplace competitors on the other hand.” With the issue framed so clearly, FCC leaders saw the need for action, and they did so just days after AT&T’s urgent request.

Knowing that its casual-driver service was unlawful, as effectively admitted in CEO Travis Kalanick’s April 2013 posting Uber could have sought a different approach. (Note: After I posted this article, Uber removed that document from its site. But Archive.org kept a copy. I also preserved a screenshot of the first screen of the document, a PDF of the full document, and a print-friendly PDF of the full document.) I argue that this approach might have worked:

Assuming strict compliance with the law, how might Uber have tried to get its service off the ground? One possibility: Uber could have sought some jurisdiction willing to let the company demonstrate its approach. Consider a municipality with little taxi service or deeply unsatisfactory service, where regulators and legislators would be so desperate for the improvements Uber promised that they would be willing to amend laws to match Uber’s request. Uber need not have sought permanent permission; with great confidence in its offering, even a temporary waiver might have sufficed, as Uber would have anticipated the change becoming permanent once its model took off. Perhaps Uber’s service would have been a huge hit—inspiring other cities to copy the regulatory changes to attract Uber. Indeed, Uber could have flipped the story to make municipalities want its offering, just as cities today vie for Google Fiber and, indeed, make far-reaching commitments to attract that service.

Where’s the enforcement?

Park in front of a fire hydrant, and you can be pretty sure that you’ll get a ticket—even if there’s no fire and even if no one is harmed. TNCs violate laws that are often equally unambiguous, yet often avoid sanction. I discuss Uber’s standard approach to unfavorable regulation:

[Regulators’ findings of unlawfulness] are not self-effectuating, even when backed up with cease and desist letters, notices of violation, or the like. In fact, Uber’s standard response to such notices is to continue operation. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission prosecutor Michael Swindler summarized his surprise at Uber’s approach: “In my two-plus decades in practice, I have never seen this level of blatant defiance,” noting that Uber continued to operate in despite an unambiguous cease-and-desist order. Pennsylvania Administrative Law Judges were convinced, in November 2015 imposing $49 million of civil penalties, electing to impose “the maximum penalty” because Uber flouted the cease-and-desist order in a “deliberate and calculated” “business decision.”

Nor was this defiance limited to Pennsylvania. Uber similarly continued to provide service at San Francisco International Airport, and affirmatively told passengers “you can request” an Uber at SFO, even after signing a 2013 agreement with the California Public Utilities Commission disallowing transport onto airport property unless the airport granted permission and even after San Francisco International Airport served Uber with a cease-and-desist letter noting the lack of such permission. In some instances, cities ultimately force Uber to cease or suspend operations. But experience in Paris is instructive. There, Uber continued operation despite a series of judicial and police interventions. Only the arrest of two Uber executives compelled the company to suspend its casual driving service in Paris.

While TNCs continue operation in most jurisdictions where they have begun, they nonetheless face a growing onslaught of litigation. PlainSite indexes 77 different dockets involving Uber, including complaints from competitors, regulators, drivers and passengers. (Notably, this is only a small portion of the disputes, omitting all international matters, most state proceedings, and most or all local and regulatory proceedings.) But no decision has gone as far as the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission docket culminating in the remarkable 57-page November 2015 decision by two administrative law judges. In a July 1, 2014 order, the judges had ordered Uber to cease and desist its UberX service throughout the state for lack of required permits. Uber refused. The judges eviscerate Uber’s response, noting that their prior order “clearly directed Uber to cease its ridesharing service until it received authority from the ion,” and “Uber was acting in defiance … as a calculated business decision” because “Uber simply did not want to comply … so it continued to operate.” Uber then argued that it was justified in continuing to operate because the July 1, 2014 order was subject to further review and appeal. The PUC judges call this argument “incredibl[e],” noting the lack of any legal basis for Uber to refuse to comply with a duly issued order. It’s hard to imagine a decision more thoroughly rejecting Uber’s conduct in this period.

Notably, the Pennsylvania PUC fully engages with Uber’s defenses. In this proceeding and elsewhere, Uber argued that it is “just a software company” and hence not subject to longstanding laws that regulate transportation providers. The PUC picks apart this argument with care, noting Uber’s extensive control over the system. The PUC notes relevant facts demonstrating Uber’s “active role”: Uber screened drivers and ejected some. Uber initially required drivers to use company-owned smartphones. Uber offered and touted an insurance policy which it claimed would cover possible accidents. Uber held the service out to the public as “Uber,” including emails subject lines like “Your first Uber ride” and “Your ride with Uber” as well as message text like “Uber invite code” and “thanks for choosing Uber,” all of which indicate a service that is Uber, with the company providing a full service, not just software. Uber further charges customer credit cards, using a charge descriptor solely referencing Uber. Not mentioned by PUC but equally relevant, Uber attracted both drivers and passengers with subsidies and price adjustments, set compulsory prices that neither side could vary, published drivers whose conduct fell short of Uber’s requirements, and mediated disputes between passengers and drivers. The PUC notes the breadth of conduct requiring license authority: “offering, or undertaking, directly or indirectly, service for compensation to the public for the transportation of passengers” (emphasis added). If the word “indirect” is to have any meaning in this statute, how could it not include Uber?

The PUC imposed a $49 million civil penalty against Uber for its intentional operation in violation of a PUC order. The PUC discussed the purpose of this penalty: “not just to deter Uber, but also [to deter] other entities who may wish to launch … without Commission approval.” Their rationale is compelling: If the legal system requires a permit for Uber’s activity, and if we are to retain that requirement, sizable penalties are required to reestablish the expectation that following the law is indeed compulsory.

Meanwhile, the PUC sets a benchmark for others. Uber flouted a PUC order in Pennsylvania from July 1, 2014 through August 21, 2014. In how many other cities, states, and countries do Uber and Lyft equally violate the law? If each such jurisdiction imposed a similar fine, the total could well reach the billions of dollars—enough to put a dent in even Uber’s sizable balance sheet, and enough to compel future firms to rethink the way they approach law and regulation.

Looking back and looking ahead

Tempting as it may be to think Uber is first of its kind, others have tried this strategy before. I explain:

Take a walk down memory lane for a game of “name that company.” At an entrepreneurial California startup, modern electronic communication systems brought speed and cost savings to a sector that had been slow to adopt new technology. Consumers quickly embraced the company’s new approach, particularly thanks to a major price advantage compared to incumbents’ offerings, as well as higher quality service, faster service, and the avoidance of unwanted impediments and frictions. Incumbents complained that the entrant cut corners and didn’t comply with applicable legal requirements. The entrant knew about the problems but wanted to proceed at full speed in order to serve as many customers as possible, as quickly as possible, both to expand the market and to defend against potential competition. When challenged, the entrant styled its behavior as “sharing” and said this was the new world order.

You might think I’m talking about Uber, and indeed these statements all apply squarely to Uber. But the statements fit just as well with Napster, the “music sharing” service that, during brief operation from 1999 to 2001, transformed the music business like nothing before or since. And we must not understate the benefits Napster brought: It offered convenient music with no need to drive to the record store, a celestial jukebox unconstrained by retail inventory, track-by-track choice unencumbered by any requirement to buy the rest of the album, and mobile-friendly MP3’s without slow “ripping” from a CD.

In fact, copyright litigation soon brought an end to Napster, including Chapter 7 bankruptcy, liquidation of the company’s assets, and zero return to investors. Where does that leave us?

One might worry that Napster’s demise could set society back a decade in technological progress. But subsequent offerings quickly found legal ways to implement Napster’s advances. Consider iTunes, Amazon Music, and Spotify, among so many others.

In fact, the main impact of Napster’s cessation was to clear the way for legal competitors—to increase the likelihood that consumers might pay a negotiated price for music rather than take it for free. When Napster offered easy free music with a major price advantage from foregoing payments to rights-holders, no competitor had a chance. Only the end of Napster let legitimate services take hold.

And what of Napster’s investors? We all now benefit from the company’s innovations, yet investors got nothing for the risk they took. But perhaps that’s the right result: Napster’s major innovations were arguably insufficient to outweigh the obvious and intentional illegalities.

I conclude the comparison:

Uber CEO Travis Kalanick knows the Napster story all too well. Beginning in 1998, he ran a file-sharing service soon sued by the MPAA and RIAA on claims of copyright infringement. Scour entered bankruptcy in response, giving Travis a first-hand view of the impact of flouting the law. Uber today has its share of fans, including many who would never have dared to run Napster. Yet the parallels are deep.

Despite the many concerns raised by TNC practices, I am fundamentally optimistic about the TNC approach:

It is inconceivable that the taxis of 2025 will look like taxis of 2005. Uber has capably demonstrated the benefits of electronic dispatch and electronic record-keeping, and society would be crazy to reject these valuable innovations. But Uber’s efforts don’t guarantee the $50+ billion valuation the company now anticipates—and indeed, the company’s aggressive methods seem to create massive liability for intentional violations in most jurisdictions where Uber operates. If applicable regulators, competitors, and consumers succeed in litigation efforts, they could well bankrupt Uber, arguably rightly so. But as with Napster’s indisputable effect on the music industry, Uber’s core contributions are unstoppable and irreversible. Consumers in the coming decades will no more telephone a taxi dispatcher than buy a $16.99 compact disc at Tower Records. And that much is surely for the best.

Will it be Uber (and perhaps Lyft) that bring us there? Or will their legal violations force a shut down, like Napster before them, to make way for lawful competitors? That, to my eye, is the multi-billion-dollar question.

Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling?

Edelman, Benjamin. “Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling?” Journal of Competition Law & Economics 11, no. 2 (June 2015): 365-400.

I examine Google’s pattern and practice of tying to leverage its dominance into new sectors. In particular, I show how Google used these tactics to enter numerous markets, to compel usage of its services, and often to dominate competing offerings. I explore the technical and commercial implementations of these practices, then identify their effects on competition. I conclude that Google’s tying tactics are suspect under antitrust law.

Whither Uber? Competitive Dynamics in Transportation Networks

Edelman, Benjamin. “Whither Uber? Competitive Dynamics in Transportation Networks.” Competition Policy International 11, no. 1 (Spring-Fall 2015).

Transportation Network Companies offer notable service advances–but do they comply with the law? I offer evidence of some important shortfalls, then consider how the legal system might appropriately respond. Though it is tempting to forgive many violations in light of the companies’ benefits, I offer a cautionary assessment. For one, I note the incentives that might result, including a race-to-the-bottom as a series of companies forego all manner of requirements. Furthermore, the firms that best compete in such an environment are likely to be those that build a corporate culture of ignoring laws, a diagnosis that finds support in numerous controversial Uber practices. On the whole, I suggest evenhanded enforcement of applicable laws, with thoughtful changes implemented with appropriate formality, but no automatic free pass for the platforms that have recently framed laws and regulations as suggestions rather than requirements.

Digital Business Models Should Have to Follow the Law, Too

Digital Business Models Should Have to Follow the Law, Too. HBR Online. January 2, 2015.

A timeless maxim suggests that it’s better to ask forgiveness than permission. Nowhere is that more prominent than in the current crop of digital businesses, which tend to skirt laws they find inconvenient. Though these services and their innovative business models win acclaim from consumers and investors, their approach to the law is troubling — both for its implications for civil society and in its contagious influence on other firms in turn pressured to skirt legal requirements.

Google Inc. in 2014 (teaching materials) with Thomas Eisenmann

Edelman, Benjamin, and Thomas R. Eisenmann. “Google Inc. in 2014.” Harvard Business School Case 915-004, September 2014. (Revised June 2017.).(educator access at HBP.)

Describes Google’s history, business model, governance structure, corporate culture, and processes for managing innovation. Reviews Google’s recent strategic initiatives and the threats they pose to selected competitors. Asks what Google should do next.

Supplements:

Google Inc. in 2014 (Abridged) – Case (HBP 915005)

Google Inc. in 2014 — Role Supplement – Supplement (HBP 915017)

Teaching Materials:

Google Inc. in 2014 and Google Inc. in 2014 (Abridged) – Teaching Note (HBP 915011)

Google’s Tying and Bundling

Disclosure: I serve as a consultant to various companies that compete with Google. That work is ongoing and covers varied subjects, most commonly advertising fraud. I write on my own—not at the suggestion or request of any client, without approval or payment from any client.

Google often argues that “competition is one click away” — as if Google’s many successes result solely from competition on the merits. Let me offer a different perspective: After early success in search and search advertising, Google used its strength in those sectors to increase its likelihood of success elsewhere — even where competitors’ offerings were objectively preferable and even where consumers would have preferred alternatives had that choice been genuinely available.

For example, in September 2013 web sites buzzed with the news that users would be required to create Google+ social networking accounts to comment on YouTube videos. There was no obvious reason why a user should need to join Google’s social network in order to post a brief comment on a video. Indeed, for years users had routinely posted via separate YouTube accounts. Google claimed that improvements would increase the quality of YouTube comment discussions and to prevent spam, but there was no obvious reason why those benefits required using Google+. That said, critics quickly saw the strategic implication: Google+ was years late to the market; other social networking services were far better established and already enjoyed much more success. But Google could use its other powerful properties, YouTube among others, to increase the pressure for users to join Google+.

Nor was Google+ unusual in benefiting from Google’s other products. In the context of mobile phones and tablets, Google had established a series of restrictions requiring that if a manufacturer sought to install any Google service–such as Maps, YouTube, or the Google Play store for installing other apps from Google and others–the manufacturer must accept a variety of obligations. For example, the manufacturer must install all the Google apps that Google specified–even if the manufacturer preferred another app. Furthermore, Google required that apps icons be placed in the locations that Google specified, including multiple entries on the device’s prominent “home” screen. The device must use Google Location Services, not competitors’ offerings, even if competitors’ offerings were faster, more accurate, or more protective of privacy. And manufacturers must take all these actions for Google’s benefit without any payment from Google. As a result, competing apps had to struggle to reach users–resorting to soliciting user installations one-by-one, rather than faster and more predictable bulk installations by device manufacturers.

Most obviously, Google’s core search service systematically favors Google results. Search for a stock ticker symbol, and you’re encouraged to go to Google Finance. If a video is deemed relevant, it will almost always be from YouTube. And so on. Sometimes these services are just as good for consumers; sometimes, not. But for any user unwilling to spend extra time requesting other services–day in and day out, ad infinitum–Google’s offerings become the easy and obvious defaults in every affected sector. Yelp may be a little better or even a lot better. But when Google puts Google Local front and center, many users will go there instead.

Today I’m posting an article exploring a series of incidents where Google used similar methods–broadly, tying and bundling–to expand its dominance into additional markets. In each market, I present the details of Google’s approach, then assess concerns under antitrust law. Selected examples:

If a ___ wants ___ Then it must accept ___
If a consumer wants to use Google Search Google Finance, Images, Maps, News, Products, Shopping, YouTube, and more
If a mobile carrier wants to preinstall YouTube for Android Google Search, Google Maps (even if a competitor is willing to pay to be default)
If an advertiser wants to advertise on any AdWords Search Network Partner All AdWords Search Network sites (in whatever proportion Google specifies)
If an advertiser wants to advertise on Google Search as viewed on computers   Tablet placements and, with limited restrictions, smartphone placements
If an advertiser wants image ads Google Affiliate Network (historic)
If an advertiser wants a logo in search ads Google Checkout (historic)
If a video producer wants preferred video indexing YouTube hosting
If a web site publisher wants preferred search indexing Google Plus participation

My bottom line: Google’s use of tying portends a future of reduced choice, slower innovation, lower quality, and higher prices. To date, Google has focused its harshest terms on advertisers, but after paying Google some $60+ billion each year, advertisers recoup these expenses through higher prices to consumers. Meanwhile, if a broad class of opportunities are effectively off-limits to competitors because Google either has claimed those sectors or is positioned to be able to claim them whenever it chooses, the incentive to invest is sharply attenuated. These are exactly the practices that competition law seeks to prevent.

My full article:

Leveraging Market Power through Tying and Bundling: Does Google Behave Anti-Competitively?

(update: published as “Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling?” Journal of Competition Law & Economics 11, no. 2 (June 2015): 365-400.)

Leveraging Market Power through Tying: Does Google Behave Anti-Competitively?

Edelman, Benjamin. “Leveraging Market Power through Tying: Does Google Behave Anti-Competitively?” Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 14-112, May 2014.

I examine Google’s pattern and practice of tying to leverage its dominance into new sectors. In particular, I show how Google used these tactics to enter numerous markets, to compel usage of its services, and often to dominate competing offerings. I explore the technical and commercial implementations of these practices, then identify their effects on competition. I conclude that Google’s tying tactics are suspect under antitrust law.

Secret Ties in Google’s "Open" Android

Disclosure: I serve as a consultant to various companies that compete with Google. That work is ongoing and covers varied subjects, most commonly advertising fraud. I write on my own—not at the suggestion or request of any client, without approval or payment from any client.

Google claims that its Android mobile operating system is “open” and “open source”—hence a benefit to competition. Little-known contract restrictions reveal otherwise: In order to obtain key mobile apps, including Google’s own Search, Maps, and YouTube, manufacturers must agree to install all the apps Google specifies, with the prominence Google requires, including setting these apps as default where Google instructs. It’s a classic tie and an instance of full line forcing: If a phone manufacturer wants any of the apps Google offers, it must take the others also.

In this piece, I present relevant provisions from key documents not previously available for public examination. I then consider the effects on consumers, competitors, and competition, and I compare these revelations to what was previously known about Google’s mobile rules. I conclude by connecting Google’s mobile practices to Google’s use of tying more broadly

The Mobile Application Distribution Agreement

To distribute Google’s mobile applications—Google Search, Maps, YouTube, Calendar, Gmail, Talk, the Play app store, and more—a phone manufacturer needs a license from Google, called a Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (MADA). Key provisions of the MADA:

“Devices may only be distributed if all Google Applications [listed elsewhere in the agreement] … are pre-installed on the Device.” See MADA section 2.1.

The phone manufacturer must “preload all Google Applications approved in the applicable Territory … on each device.” See MADA section 3.4(1).

The phone manufacturer must place “Google’s Search and the Android Market Client icon [Google Play] … at least on the panel immediately adjacent to the Default Home Screen,” with “all other Google Applications … no more than one level below the Phone Top.” See MADA Section 3.4(2)-(3).

The phone manufacturer must set “Google Search … as the default search provider for all Web search access points.” See MADA Section 3.4(4).

Google’s Network Location Provider service must be preloaded and the default. See MADA Section 3.8(c).

These provisions are confidential and are not ordinarily available to the public. MADA provision 6.1 prohibits a phone manufacturer from sharing any Confidential Information (as defined), and Google labels the MADA documents as “Confidential” which makes the MADA subject to this restriction.

I know, cite, and quote these provisions—and I am able to share them with the public—because two MADA documents became available during recent litigation: In Oracle America v. Google, the HTC MADA and Samsung MADA were admitted as Trial Exhibit 286 and 2775, respectively. Though both documents indicate in their footers that they are “highly confidential – attorney’s eyes only,” both documents were admitted in open court (the clerk’s minutes indicate no admission under seal), and court staff confirm that both documents are available in the case records in the court clerk’s office. (However, the documents are not available for direct download in PACER. Instead, PACER docket number 1205 references “five boxes of trial exhibits placed on overflow shelf.”)

Effects on Consumers, Competitors, and Competition

These MADA provisions serve both to help Google expand into areas where competition could otherwise occur, and to prevent competitors from gaining traction.

Consider the impact on a phone manufacturer that seeks to substitute an offering that competes with a Google app. For example, a phone manufacturer might conclude that some non-Google service is preferable to one of the listed Google Applications—perhaps faster, easier to use, or more protective of user privacy. Alternatively, a phone manufacturer might conclude that its users care more about a lower price than about preinstalled Google apps. Such a manufacturer might be willing to install an app from some other search engine, location provider, or other developer in exchange for a payment, which would be partially shared with consumers via a lower selling price for the phone. Google’s MADA restrictions disallow any such configuration if the phone is to include any of the listed Google apps.

Tying its apps together helps Google whenever a phone manufacturer sees no substitute to even one of Google’s apps. Manufacturers may perceive that Bing Search, Duckduckgo, Yahoo Search, and others are reasonable substitutes to Google Search. Manufacturers may perceive that Bing Maps, Mapquest, Yahoo Maps, and others are reasonable substitutes to Google Maps. But it is not clear what other app store a manufacturer could preinstall onto a smartphone in order to offer a comprehensive set of apps. Furthermore, a manufacturer would struggle to offer a phone without a preinstalled YouTube app: Without the short-format entertainment videos that are YouTube’s specialty, a phone would be unattractive to many consumers—undermining carriers’ efforts to sell data plans, and putting the phone at heightened risk of commercial failure. Needing Google Play and YouTube, a manufacturer must then accept Google Search, Maps, Network Location Provider, and more—even if the manufacturer prefers a competitor’s offering or prefers a payment for installing some alternative.

In principle, the MADA allows a phone manufacturer to install certain third-party applications in addition to the listed Google Applications. For example, the phone manufacturer could install other search, maps, or email apps in addition to those offered by Google. But multiple apps are duplicative, confusing to users, and a drain on limited device resources. Moreover, in the key categories of search and location, Google requires that its apps be the default, and Google demands prominent placements for its search app and app store. These factors sharply limit users’ attention to other preloaded apps, reducing competitors’ willingness to pay for preinstallation. Thus, even if phone manufacturers or carriers preload multiple applications in a given category, the multiple apps are unlikely to significantly weaken the effects of the tie.

These MADA restrictions suppress competition. Thanks to the MADA, alternative vendors of search, maps, location, email, and other apps cannot outcompete Google on the merits; even if a competitor offers an app that’s better than Google’s offering, the carrier is obliged to install Google’s app also, and Google can readily amend the MADA to require making its app the default in the corresponding category (for those apps that don’t already have this additional protection). Furthermore, competitors are impeded in using the obvious strategy of paying manufacturers for distribution; to the extent that manufacturers can install competitors’ apps, they can offer only inferior placement adjacent to Google, with Google left as the default in key sectors—preventing competitors from achieving scale or outbidding Google for prominent or default placement on a given device.

These MADA restrictions harm consumers. One direct harm is that competing app vendors face greatly reduced ability to subsidize phones through payments to manufacturers for preinstallation or default placement; Google’s rules leave manufacturers with much less to sell. Furthermore, these restrictions insulate Google from competition. If competing vendors were nipping at Google’s heels, Google would be forced to offer greater benefits to consumers—perhaps fewer ads or greater protections against deceptive offers. Instead, the MADA restrictions increase Google’s confidence of outmaneuvering competitors—insulating Google from the usual competitive pressures.

One might reasonably compare these MADA restrictions to other recent Google rules — also secret — apparently requiring phone manufacturers to install only a recent version of Android if they want to install Google apps (even if the apps run on earlier versions, which in general they do). But there are plausible pro-consumer benefits for Google to require that manufacturers move to the latest version of Android, including facilitating upgrades and coordinating platform usage on the latest version of Android. In contrast, there are no plausible pro-consumer benefits to the Google MADA restrictions I analyze above. For example, consumers do not benefit when Google prevents phone manufacturers from installing apps in whatever combination consumers prefer.

Little Prior Public Understanding of Google’s Restrictions on Phone Manufacturers

To date, these MADA restrictions have been unknown to the public. Meanwhile, Google’s public statements indicate few to no significant restrictions on use of the Android operating system or Google’s apps for Android—leading reasonable observers and even industry experts to conclude, mistakenly, that Google allows its apps to be installed in any combination that manufacturers prefer.

For example, on the “Welcome to the Android Open Source Project!” page, the first sentence touts that “Android is an open source software stack.” Nothing on that page indicates that the Android platform, or Google’s apps for Android, suffer any restriction or limitation on the flexibility standard for open source software.

Moreover, senior Google executives have emphasized the importance of Google’s openness in mobile. Google SVP Jonathan Rosenberg offered a 4300-word analysis of the benefits of openness for Google generally and in mobile in particular. For example, Rosenberg argued: “In an open system, a competitive advantage doesn’t derive from locking in customers, but rather from understanding the fast-moving system better than anyone else and using that knowledge to generate better, more innovative products.” Rosenberg also argued that openness “allow[s] innovation at all levels—from the operating system to the application layer—not just at the top”—a design which he said helps facilitate “freedom of choice for consumers” as well as “competitive ecosystem” for providers. Rosenberg says nothing about MADA provisions or restrictions on what apps manufacturers can install. I see no way to reconcile the MADA restrictions with Rosenberg’s claim of “allow[ing] innovation at all levels” and claimed “freedom of choice for consumers.”

Andy Rubin, then Senior Vice President of Mobile at Google, in 2011 claimed that “[D]evice makers are free to modify Android to customize any range of features for Android devices.” He continued: “If someone wishes to market a device as Android-compatible or include Google applications on the device, we do require the device to conform with some basic compatibility requirements [hyperlink in the original]. (After all, it would not be realistic to expect Google applications—or any applications for that matter—to operate flawlessly across incompatible devices).” Rubin’s post does not explicitly indicate that the referenced “basic compatibility requirements” are the only requirements Google imposes, but that’s the natural interpretation. Reading Rubin’s remarks, particularly in light of his introduction that Android is “an open platform,” most readers would conclude that there are no significant restrictions on app installation or search defaults.

Google Chairman Eric Schmidt offered particularly far-reaching remarks on Google’s rules about mobile apps and search defaults. After a 2011 Senate hearing about competition in online search, Senator Kohl asked Schmidt (question 8.a):

Has Google demanded that smartphone manufacturers make Google the default search engine as a condition of using the Android operating system?

Schmidt responded:

Google does not demand that smartphone manufacturers make Google the default search engine as a condition of using the Android operating system. …

One of the greatest benefits of Android is that it fosters competition at every level of the mobile market—including among application developers. Google respects the freedom of manufacturers to choose which applications should be pre-loaded on Android devices. Google does not condition access to or use of Android on pre-installation of any Google applications or on making Google the default search engine. …

Manufacturers can choose to pre-install Google applications on Android devices, but they can also choose to pre-install competing search applications like Yahoo! and Microsoft’s Bing. Many Android devices have pre-installed the Microsoft Bing and Yahoo! search applications. No matter which applications come pre-installed, the user can easily download Yahoo!, Microsoft’s Bing, and Google applications for free from the Android Market.

Schmidt’s response to Lee (question 15.b), to Franken (question 7), and to Blumenthal (question 7) were similar and, in sections, verbatim identical.

Taken on its own, Schmidt’s statement seems to offer a categorical denial that Google in any way restricts what apps manufacturers and carriers install. But in fact Schmidt’s statement is much narrower. For example, reread Schmidt’s assertion that “Google does not condition access to or use of Android on pre-installation of any Google applications or on making Google the default search engine.” The natural interpretation is that no Google rule requires manufacturers to preinstall any Google app or make Google the default search. But Schmidt actually leaves open the possibility that some other Google-granted benefit, other than permission to use Android, imposes exactly these requirements. Indeed, the above-referenced documents reveal that Google imposes these requirements if a manufacturer seeks any of the listed Google apps. But Schmidt’s statement indicates nothing of the sort.

Similarly, notice the ambiguity in Schmidt’s statement that “Manufacturers can choose to pre-install Google applications on Android devices, but they can also choose to pre-install competing search applications like Yahoo! and Microsoft’s Bing.” The clear implication is that manufacturers can pre-install Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, and other applications in any combination they choose. But her too, Schmidt’s carefully-worded response is narrower. Specifically, Schmidt indicates that manufacturers can install Google apps or they can install competitors’ apps. With the benefit of the above-referenced MADA, we see the gaps in Schmidt’s representation—leaving open the possibility that, as the MADA reveals, the choice is all-or-nothing. Yet ordinary readers have no reason to suspect the possibility of an all-or-nothing choice, and Schmidt’s response does nothing to suggest any such requirement. Schmidt’s statements—at best incomplete, and I believe affirmatively misleading—gave the senators and the general public a mistaken sense that Google apps and competing apps could be installed in any combination.

Even when industry experts have inquired, they have struggled to uncover Google’s true rules for mobile app preinstallations. Consider the September 2012 post entitled Google Doesn’t Require Google Search On Android by Danny Sullivan, arguably the web’s leading search engine expert. In that analysis, Sullivan consults publicly available sources to attempt to determine whether Google allows Android manufacturers to change Android default search while installing other Google apps. Finding no prohibition in any available document, Sullivan tentatively concludes that such changes are permitted. Sullivan clearly recognizes the difficulty of the question—he resorts to four separate postscripts as he consults additional sources. But with no document indicating that Google imposes any such restriction, Sullivan has no grounds to conclude that such a restriction exists. As it turns out, Sullivan’s conclusion is manifestly contrary to the plain language of the MADA: Sullivan concludes, for example, that a carrier could configure phones to “use the Android app store if [the carrier] made Bing [Search] the default.” In fact, a manufacturer must accept a MADA in order to obtain App Store access, and MADA Section 3.4(4) then imposes the requirement that Google Search be the default search at all web access points. But Sullivan had no access to a MADA, and MADA provision 6.1 prohibited manufacturers from telling Sullivan about MADA terms. No wonder Sullivan concluded there was no such restriction.

Similarly, when tech journalist Charles Arthur examined “why Google Android software is not as free or open-source as you may think,” he had to resort to unnamed sources and inferences from publicly-available materials. Arthur’s hypothesis was correct. But by keeping MADA’s secret, Google prevented Arthur from substantiating his allegations.

In principle, the public could have learned about MADA provisions through periodic company disclosures of key supplier contracts. Indeed, in 2011 Motorola circulated a redacted MADA as an exhibit to an SEC filing. But Motorola removed crucial provisions from the public version of this document. For example, the redacted Motorola MADA removes the most important sentence of MADA section 2.1—leaving only a placeholder where the original document stated “Devices may only be distributed if all Google Applications … are pre-installed.” Thus, even if a reader is savvy enough to find this SEC filing, the MADA’s key provisions remain unavailable.

MADA secrecy advances Google’s strategic objectives. By keeping MADA restrictions confidential and little-known, Google can suppress the competitive response. If users, app developers, and the concerned public knew about MADA restrictions, they would criticize the tension between the restrictions and Google’s promise that Android is “open” and “open source.” Moreover, if MADA restrictions were widely known, regulators would be more likely to reject Google’s arguments that Android’s “openness” should reduce or eliminate regulatory scrutiny of Google’s mobile practices. In contrast, by keeping the restrictions secret, Google avoids such scrutiny and is better able to continue to advance its strategic interests through tying, compulsory installation, and defaults.

Relatedly, MADA secrecy helps prevent standard market forces from disciplining Google’s restriction. Suppose consumers understood that Google uses tying and full-line-forcing to prevent manufacturers from offering phones with alternative apps, which could drive down phone prices. Then consumers would be angry and would likely make their complaints known both to regulators and to phone manufacturers. Instead, Google makes the ubiquitous presence of Google apps and the virtual absence of competitors look like a market outcome, falsely suggesting that no one actually wants to have or distribute competing apps.

Tying to Benefit Google’s Other Services

If a phone manufacturer wants to offer desired Google functions without close substitutes, the MADA provides that the manufacturer must install all other Google apps that Google specifies, including the defaults and placements that Google specifies. These requirements are properly understood as a tie: A manufacturer may want YouTube only, but Google makes the manufacturer accept Google Search, Google Maps, Google Network Location Provider, and more. Then a vendor with offerings only in some sectors—perhaps only a maps tool, but no video service—cannot replace Google’s full suite of services.

I have repeatedly flagged Google using its various popular and dominant services to compel use of other services. For example, in 2009-2010, to obtain image advertisements in AdWords campaigns, an advertiser had to join Google Affiliate Network. Since the rollout of Google+, a publisher seeking top algorithmic search traffic de facto must participate in Google’s social network. In this light, numerous Google practices entail important elements of tying:

If a ___ wants ___ Then it must accept ___
If a consumer wants to use Google Search Google Finance, Images, Maps, News, Products, Shopping, YouTube, and more
If a mobile carrier wants to preinstall YouTube for Android Google Search, Google Maps (even if a competitor is willing to pay to be default)
If an advertiser wants to advertise on any AdWords Search Network Partner All AdWords Search Network sites (in whatever proportion Google specifies)
If an advertiser wants to advertise on Google Search as viewed on computers   Tablet placements and, with limited restrictions, smartphone placements
If an advertiser wants image ads Google Affiliate Network (historic)
If an advertiser wants a logo in search ads Google Checkout (historic)
If a video producer wants preferred video indexing YouTube hosting
If a web site publisher wants preferred search indexing Google Plus participation

Looking at Google’s dominance, many critics focus on Google’s power in search and search advertising. But this table shows the breadth of Google’s dominant services and the many ways in which Google uses its dominant services to cause usage of its less popular offerings.

I do not claim that tying always makes Google’s products succeed. Weak offerings, strong competition, and competitors’ network effects can all still stand in the way. But by tying its offerings in these ways detailed above, Google increases the likelihood that its offerings will succeed. One might reasonably ask, for example, what chance Google Checkout should have had: Reaching users a decade after Paypal and competing with Paypal’s huge user base, by ordinary measures Checkout should have been entirely stillborn. Indeed Checkout’s growth has been slow. But what would have happened if, rather than featuring a special logo only for AdWords advertisers who joined Checkout, Google had shown such logos for all popular payment intermediaries? Surely equal treatment of Checkout versus competitors would have reduced Checkout’s adoption and harmed Checkout’s relative prospects. Yet equal treatment would have provided consumers with timely and actionable information, and would have facilitated genuine competition on the merits.

Google used a similar technique in its 2003 launch of AdSense. At the time, advertisers largely sought Google’s AdWords placements within Google’s search engine. Upon launching AdSense, Google required advertisers to accept placements through Google’s new contextual network. These placements offered additional exposure which some advertisers surely valued. But publishers have an obvious incentive to commit click fraud—increasing the amount that Google pays to advertisers, but at the same time inflating advertisers’ costs. Furthermore, some publishers present material that advertisers would not want to be associated with (such as adult material and copyright infringement). Many advertisers would have declined to participate in the contextual network had they been asked to make a decision one way or the other. By insisting that advertisers accept such placements, Google gave itself instant scale—hence ample resources to pay publishers and outbid other networks seeking space on publishers’ sites. In contrast, competing ad platforms had to recruit skeptical advertisers through long sales pitches, performance guarantees, and lower prices—yielding fewer advertisers, lower payments to publishers, and a weaker competitive position. No wonder AdSense achieved scale while competitors struggled—but Google’s success should be attributed as much to the tie as to the genuine merits of Google’s offering.

In a forthcoming article, I’ll explore these and other contexts in which Google ties its services together. Applicable antitrust law can be complicated: Some ties yield useful efficiencies, and not all ties reduce welfare. But Google’s use of tying gives it a leg up in numerous markets that would otherwise enjoy vibrant competition. Given Google’s dominance in so many sectors, this practice deserves a closer look.

Discrimination at Airbnb with Michael Luca

Online marketplaces often contain information not only about products, but also about the people selling the products. In an effort to facilitate trust, many platforms encourage sellers to provide personal profiles and even to post pictures of themselves. However, these features may also facilitate discrimination based on sellers’ race, gender, age, or other characteristics.

Last week Michael Luca and I posted Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com, in which we test for racial discrimination against landlords in the online rental marketplace Airbnb.com. We collected information about all Airbnb hosts in New York City, including their rental prices and the quality of their properties. We find that non-black hosts charge approximately 12% more than black hosts for the equivalent rental. These effects are robust when controlling for all information visible in the Airbnb marketplace, including even property photos.

Our findings highlight the risk of discrimination in online marketplaces, suggesting an important unintended consequence of a seemingly-routine mechanism for building trust. There is no fundamental reason why a guest needs see a host’s picture in advance of making a booking — nor does a guest necessarily even need to know a host’s name (from which race may sometimes be inferred). In other respects, Airbnb has been quite sophisticated in limiting the information available to hosts and guests on its platform — for example, AIrbnb prohibits (and runs software to prevent) hosts and guests from sharing email addresses or phone numbers before a booking is made, lest this information exchange let parties contract directly and avoid Airbnb fees. Given Airbnb’s careful consideration of what information is available to guests and hosts, Airbnb might consider eliminating or reducing the prominence of host photos: It is not immediately obvious what beneficial information these photos provide, while they risk facilitating discrimination by guests.