This page shows specific network transmissions that implement 180's double-popup
cookie-stuffing, targeting a request for apple.com made at approximately 9pm
(Eastern) on July 22, 2004. See also a video (WMV
format, view in full-screen mode) confirming what took place, including
showing my Cookies folder before and after receiving the 180solutions popup.
The thumbnail at right shows the final on-screen display -- the store.apple.com
site, largely covered by the double popup that reached store.apple.com through
an affiliate link.
Other Targeted
Merchants: Double and Silent
Popups
In my testing, 180's targeting of apple.com proceeds in the following way:
First, when users visit store.apple.com on a computer with Zango installed,
Zango sends the request shown in HTTP Transaction 1 (sending
the apple.com keyword trigger as shown in yellow highlighting), and Zango receives
in response an instruction to show a web page at dealsavings.com (purple highlighting).
Next, Zango loads that dealsavings.com URL in a new window, causing the HTTP
communications shown in Transaction 2. The HTML response from
Transaction 2 is a lengthy file, primarily consisting of blank lines and spaces,
though ultimately including 30 identical links to LinkShare; however, users
never see this page, because the page's META tags include a redirect to LinkShare
(orange highlighting). As a result, in Transaction 3, the
user's PC ultimately loads the LinkShare tracking link (red highlighting), subsequently
setting cookies per its instructions.
Consistent with the rest of my site, the network logs below omit my DUID (my
unique 180solutions user ID number), and the logs also omit 180solutions' affiliate
ID number.
In my recent testing of July 21-23, 2004, store.apple.com is but one of many
merchants that remain targeted by 180solutions double popups. Some targeted
merchants (like apple.com) use LinkShare; others use Commission Junction; others
use other networks, or run in-house affiliate programs. Some double popups (including
this one) reach affiliate links through redirect servers, while others entail
180solutions sending users directly to an affiliate link via no other intermediaries.
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<meta name="vs_targetSchema" content="http://schemas.microsoft.com/intellisense/ie5">
</HEAD>
<body>
<SPAN class="957085619-06032003"><FONT face="Arial"
color="#ff0000" size="5">Thank you
for your patience. You will be redirected to your destination site
in a
few seconds.</FONT></SPAN>
</body>
</HTML>
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 2004 01:19:47 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.29 (Unix) mod_perl/1.29
Set-Cookie: lsn_session=ziPPOtWG3QQ; domain=.linksynergy.com; path=/; expires=Fri,
23-Jul-2004 01:21:47 GMT
Expires: Thu, 22 Jul 2004 01:19:47 GMT
P3p: CP="ALL DSP COR NID DEV ADM CUR OUR BUS LEG NAV"
Location: http://click.linksynergy.com/fs-bin/swat?lsnsig=ziPPOtWG3QQ&id=...&offerid=13301.10000510&type=4&subid=78
Connection: close
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
18e
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML 2.0//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<TITLE>302 Found</TITLE>
</HEAD><BODY>
<H1>Found</H1>
The document has moved <A HREF="http://click.linksynergy.com/fs-bin/swat?lsnsig=ziPPOtWG3QQ&id=...&offerid=13301.10000510&type=4&subid=78">here</A>.<P>
<HR>
<ADDRESS>Apache/1.3.29 Server at gcws0061.private.linksynergy.com Port
80</ADDRESS>
</BODY></HTML>
As
discussed in Affiliate Code Replacement via Popup "Double"
Windows within The Effect of 180solutions on Affiliate Commissions
and Merchants, 180 has implemented a system that can set affiliate tracking
codes by showing a user a duplicate copy of a merchant's site. These popups
set affiliate codes that, in the ordinary course of events, cause 180 to be
paid commissions otherwise payable to other affiliates, and cause 180 to be
paid commissions even if no commissions would otherwise be paid. For a listing
of affected merchants (as of tests of June 2004), see merchants
targeted with double windows. See also merchants
I previously found to be targeted with silent cookie-stuffing.